James R. D. Clark

The accused, Stephen Jones, was charged with sexual assault (s. 271 Criminal Code) and sexual touching of a young person in a position of trust (s. 153(1)(a) Criminal Code).

The complainant, A.D., aged 17, alleged non-consensual sexual contact by Mr. Jones, her 60-year-old softball coach and father figure.

The court found A.D. to be a credible and reliable witness, whose testimony was corroborated by text messages and a letter from Mr. Jones expressing regret and acknowledging a breach of trust.

The court found that Mr. Jones intentionally touched A.D. for a sexual purpose without her consent, and that a relationship of trust existed, given the age gap, his role as coach and father figure, and the control he exercised.

Mr. Jones was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant, Carmen DaSilva, appealed a lower court judgment that declared a transfer of her husband's one-half interest in a property to her as a transfer for undervalue, void against the trustee in bankruptcy, and set it aside.

The appeal raised three grounds: error in declaring the transfer at undervalue, error in finding the husband insolvent at the time of transfer, and error in finding an intention to defraud creditors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's findings regarding undervalue and insolvency, and noting that comments on intent were obiter.

The appellant grandmother appealed a trial judgment ordering the partition and sale of a property she co-owned with the respondent grandson.

The trial judge found the respondent held a 10.17% interest based on his contributions to the purchase and carrying costs, rejecting the appellant's claim of a resulting or constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or his decision to order a sale under the Partition Act.

The moving parties, Amarjot Lamba and Chand Lamba, sought an order from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to extend the time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had upheld a motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment, forfeiting the moving parties' $20,000 deposit in a failed real estate transaction due to their breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The original dispute involved claims of misrepresentation regarding property square footage and building permit compliance.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension, finding no arguable question of law or public importance, and noting the moving parties' failure to form an intention to appeal within the relevant period and their non-compliance with prior cost orders.

The plaintiffs, a pharmacist and his holding company, brought a motion for leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of a pharmacy corporation against the defendants, another pharmacist and his wife's holding company.

The plaintiffs also sought a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against two commercial condominium units, a restraining order, and leave to amend their Statement of Claim.

The court dismissed the motion for a derivative action, finding it was essentially a shareholder dispute and not in the best interests of the corporation.

The requests for a CPL and a restraining order were also dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue regarding an interest in the land or a strong prima facie case.

Leave to amend the Statement of Claim was partially granted.

The appellant, a paralegal, acted as an agent for an accused in a Provincial Offences Act trial.

After the trial, the justice of the peace initiated proceedings under s. 50(3) of the Act and barred the appellant from appearing before him as an agent.

The appellant's application for certiorari was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction to make the order after the trial concluded and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had jurisdiction under the second branch of s. 50(3), which relates to an agent's general conduct and understanding of their duties, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition to the United States.

He raised constitutional issues previously decided against him by the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the alleged conduct constituted a breach of probation under Canadian law, satisfying the double criminality principle.