Patrick Hurley

The applicant sought to enforce a Letter of Request issued by a United States District Court for documentary discovery and depositions of the respondent, a non-party in the U.S. litigation.

The respondent objected to the scope of documentary discovery and the length of the depositions.

The court granted the application, finding the applicant met the requirements for enforcing the Letter of Request, and ordered the respondent to produce the requested documents and attend two days of depositions.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $3,500 in costs.

The appellant, Joshua Bennett, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, and his sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical assumptions about female behavior, failed to apply the Kienapple principle to the assault conviction, and misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual assault sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against the sexual assault conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or sentencing.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the assault conviction, staying it under the Kienapple principle as it was part of the same transaction as the sexual assault.

The defendants brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction and declaratory relief to prevent the plaintiff from interfering with land development projects governed by Joint Venture Agreements.

The plaintiff, whose principal had been terminated as project manager, had been contacting third parties and refusing to execute necessary documents, jeopardizing the final plan approval of the Johnson Point project.

The court found that the defendants had final decision-making authority under the agreements and met the test for a prohibitory interlocutory injunction.

The court granted the requested relief, limiting it to the Johnson Point project, and ordered the plaintiff not to cancel a related environmental permit.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order to transfer ownership of an Endangered Species Act benefit permit to the defendants.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff failed to comply with a prior security for costs order and failed to serve the Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion despite a minor delay in paying costs, but dismissed the motion on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the permit without notice to the Ministry.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs, primarily based on two unpaid costs awards totaling $125,000.

The court applied Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the holistic "justness" principle from Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation.

The court found the defendants satisfied the initial onus due to the unpaid costs.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that an order for security would be unjust, particularly regarding impecuniosity, the merits of its claim, and its dilatory conduct in litigation.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $150,000 security for costs, with a provision to reduce the amount to $20,000 if the outstanding costs awards plus accrued interest were paid within 60 days of the motion hearing.

The defendants brought a motion to consolidate several debt enforcement actions with a related action they commenced against the plaintiff and others, arising from a failed joint venture.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the debt enforcement actions were capable of summary determination and that the balance of convenience did not favour consolidation, as it would unnecessarily delay the adjudication of the debt claims.

The plaintiff, a land developer, sued the City of Belleville for breach of a 1999 Development Agreement and unjust enrichment.

The agreement stipulated that owners of "benefiting properties" would share the cost of sewer and water infrastructure constructed by the plaintiff.

The dispute arose when the City installed its own sewer and water lines on Cloverleaf Drive, connecting to the plaintiff's infrastructure, but did not require homeowners connecting to these services to enter into cost-sharing agreements with the plaintiff.

The court interpreted clause 22 of the Development Agreement, considering the factual matrix and the Public Utilities Act, concluding that the clause applied only to land developers of undeveloped adjoining properties, not individual homeowners.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the plaintiff's controlling mind, Mr. Beach, for allegedly violating previous court orders, and an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from interfering in the management of joint venture development projects.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding it unnecessary as the parties had reached an understanding regarding the interpretation of the joint venture agreements.

The court also declined to make a finding of contempt, noting that while Mr. Beach's conduct was not condoned, it did not rise to the level requiring a contempt order and would be better addressed through costs.

This endorsement addresses three issues arising from a prior trial judgment: the statutory deductible for non-pecuniary damages, the prejudgment interest rate, and the costs of the action.

The court determined that the 2019 statutory deductible applied, reducing the net non-pecuniary damages.

The prejudgment interest rate was fixed at 1%, rejecting the plaintiff's request for a higher rate due to the defendant's conduct.

On costs, the court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the Rule 49 offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, criticizing the defendant's inflexible settlement approach.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's requested hourly rates and disbursements, ultimately fixing fees at $300,000 plus HST and disbursements at $39,864.56 plus HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction and damages of $50,000, alleging an actionable nuisance caused by the defendants' commercial equipment (a compressor and coffee roaster flue) emitting noise, smell, smoke, and heat.

The defendants asserted that summary judgment should be granted in their favour, dismissing the action.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding both the existence of an actionable nuisance and the appropriate remedy, given conflicting evidence from witnesses and experts.

The court emphasized that summary judgment is a blunt tool for balancing interests, especially when permanent injunctive relief is claimed, and that a full appreciation of evidence from a trial is necessary for a fair and just adjudication.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendants' request for "boomerang summary judgment" was also declined due to procedural unfairness.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle owner, Ms. Barrett, had given consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, making her liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Ms. Barrett contended she did not give consent to drive, only to retrieve items from the car.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether giving keys to retrieve items constitutes "possession with consent" under the Highway Traffic Act, considering the driver's state and the owner's knowledge.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Ms. Barrett's request for summary judgment was also denied.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's professional negligence claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants, its accountants, should have detected an employee fraud earlier.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, considering the professional relationship and the defendants' ameliorative efforts.

It found the limitation period did not begin until the plaintiff received independent accounting advice in January 2016, making the July 2017 action timely.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Peter St. Marthe, sued the defendant for injuries sustained in a bicycle-car collision.

The defendant admitted liability, leaving the court to determine damages, contributory negligence, whether the plaintiff met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and if the action was statute-barred.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was not statute-barred, he met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and was not contributorily negligent.

Damages were awarded for non-pecuniary loss, past and future income loss, and future housekeeping and home maintenance expenses.

The applicants, participants in a syndicated mortgage, sought payment out of court of surplus funds from a municipal tax sale after the mortgage went into default.

They had previously settled litigation against their investment advisor for a substantial sum.

The respondents, also mortgage participants, contended that the applicants must account for these settlement funds, which would alter the distribution of the surplus.

The court found no obligation for the applicants to account for the settlement funds, as these were damages from third-party litigation, not proceeds from the mortgage or land.

The court granted the applications for payment out of court based on the First Priority lenders' interests, dismissing the respondents' accounting claim.

The defendants, CP REIT Ontario Properties Limited and Arcturus Realty Corporation, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The plaintiff was struck by a car in a shopping plaza managed by the defendants.

The court considered conflicting expert opinions regarding site safety and pedestrian "desire lines," and the impact of a jury notice on summary judgment motions.

The court found that a genuine issue for trial existed, as a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find the defendants liable for breaching the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

The defendant insurer, Trisura, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend the plaintiff, John Van Huizen, a real estate appraiser, in three underlying lawsuits.

These lawsuits arose from a negligent appraisal prepared by David Barkley, an alleged employee or agent of Van Huizen's business, Hastings Appraisal Services.

Van Huizen, also an insured under the same professional liability policy, sought a declaration that Trisura did have a duty to defend him.

The court found that the insurance policy provided coverage for Van Huizen's vicarious liability as an employer, interpreting the "Wrongful Act" definition consistently with the "Claim" and "Insured" definitions.

The court dismissed Trisura's motion and granted partial summary judgment to Van Huizen, affirming Trisura's duty to defend.

The moving party (former husband) brought a motion to change seeking to terminate child support and gain sole custody.

The responding party (former wife) sought increased child and spousal support, and an extension of spousal support beyond the previously ordered termination date.

The court dismissed the request to extend spousal support, finding no material change in circumstances and that the responding party was capable of working.

However, the court found the moving party's claimed business expenses were unreasonable and imputed his income at 50% of his gross professional income, ordering retroactive and ongoing increases to child and spousal support.

The plaintiffs, a mayor and a town councillor, sued the defendant for defamation over several Facebook posts criticizing their conduct in municipal governance.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant's expressions related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant had no valid defence of fair comment for most of the posts, and the court concluded that the public interest in protecting the defendant's political expression outweighed any harm to the plaintiffs' reputations.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

Following the settlement of a family law application regarding custody and mobility, the respondent sought costs on the basis that he was the successful party and had made an informal offer to settle.

The applicant opposed the costs claim, arguing she had proposed a private assessment early on and voluntarily agreed to pay child support.

The court found that neither party could be declared a clear winner and that the respondent's informal offer did not meet the strict requirements of Rule 18.

To encourage the judicious settlement of family disputes, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.