Patrick Hurley

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the motion was unreasonable under Rule 20.06.

The defendant argued for partial indemnity costs.

The court found that while the motion was misguided and caused delay, the defendant did not engage in improper conduct, noting that a case conference judge had permitted the motion to proceed without objection from the plaintiffs regarding its suitability.

The court awarded the plaintiffs costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $12,500.

The defendant landlord brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiff suffered a serious brain injury after allegedly falling from the roof of the commercial plaza due to an electrical shock while inspecting ventilation equipment.

The landlord argued there was no genuine issue for trial based on causation, lease exclusion clauses, and the plaintiff being the author of his own misfortune.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the interpretation of the lease, the cause of the fall, and the potential apportionment of liability among multiple defendants, noting that partial summary judgment in a jury case risks inconsistent findings.

The objectors, the widower and daughter of the deceased, brought a motion for directions under Rule 75.06 challenging the validity of the deceased's 2018 wills on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the applicant son.

The court found the objectors met the minimal evidentiary threshold to call the wills into question.

The court ordered broad documentary discovery and the examination of the drafting lawyer, and appointed an independent estate trustee during litigation on an interim basis to ensure fairness and preserve estate assets.

The defendant school board brought a motion to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action for negligent administration of long-term disability benefits, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was subject to grievance and arbitration under a collective agreement.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute involved the duties regarding enrolment in the benefits plan, which the collective agreement was silent on.

The court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the defendant's motion.

The applicant property owner sought a declaration that the respondents breached an agreement of purchase and sale, an eviction order, and damages.

The respondent brought a motion to stay the application, arguing the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court found that a landlord and tenant relationship existed and the parties could not contract out of the Act, meaning the applicant must comply with the Act for eviction.

However, the court declined to stay the entire application, as the claims for breach of contract and damages fell outside the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.

The applicant sought to enforce a Letter of Request issued by a United States District Court for documentary discovery and depositions of the respondent, a non-party in the U.S. litigation.

The respondent objected to the scope of documentary discovery and the length of the depositions.

The court granted the application, finding the applicant met the requirements for enforcing the Letter of Request, and ordered the respondent to produce the requested documents and attend two days of depositions.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $3,500 in costs.

The appellant, Joshua Bennett, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, and his sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical assumptions about female behavior, failed to apply the Kienapple principle to the assault conviction, and misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual assault sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against the sexual assault conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or sentencing.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the assault conviction, staying it under the Kienapple principle as it was part of the same transaction as the sexual assault.

The defendants brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction and declaratory relief to prevent the plaintiff from interfering with land development projects governed by Joint Venture Agreements.

The plaintiff, whose principal had been terminated as project manager, had been contacting third parties and refusing to execute necessary documents, jeopardizing the final plan approval of the Johnson Point project.

The court found that the defendants had final decision-making authority under the agreements and met the test for a prohibitory interlocutory injunction.

The court granted the requested relief, limiting it to the Johnson Point project, and ordered the plaintiff not to cancel a related environmental permit.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order to transfer ownership of an Endangered Species Act benefit permit to the defendants.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff failed to comply with a prior security for costs order and failed to serve the Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion despite a minor delay in paying costs, but dismissed the motion on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the permit without notice to the Ministry.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs, primarily based on two unpaid costs awards totaling $125,000.

The court applied Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the holistic "justness" principle from Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation.

The court found the defendants satisfied the initial onus due to the unpaid costs.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that an order for security would be unjust, particularly regarding impecuniosity, the merits of its claim, and its dilatory conduct in litigation.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $150,000 security for costs, with a provision to reduce the amount to $20,000 if the outstanding costs awards plus accrued interest were paid within 60 days of the motion hearing.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment on multiple defaulted mortgages granted to the defendants to fund a joint venture land development project.

The defendants argued the mortgages were unenforceable due to an oral agreement that the loans would only be repaid from future lot sales, and disputed the amounts owing.

The court granted summary judgment, holding that the alleged oral agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds and the doctrine of part performance did not apply.

The court also declined to stay the enforcement of the judgments under Rule 20.08, finding the defendants' counterclaims lacked merit and the prejudice to the plaintiffs in delaying recovery was significant.

The defendants brought a motion to consolidate several debt enforcement actions with a related action they commenced against the plaintiff and others, arising from a failed joint venture.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the debt enforcement actions were capable of summary determination and that the balance of convenience did not favour consolidation, as it would unnecessarily delay the adjudication of the debt claims.

The plaintiff, a land developer, sued the City of Belleville for breach of a 1999 Development Agreement and unjust enrichment.

The agreement stipulated that owners of "benefiting properties" would share the cost of sewer and water infrastructure constructed by the plaintiff.

The dispute arose when the City installed its own sewer and water lines on Cloverleaf Drive, connecting to the plaintiff's infrastructure, but did not require homeowners connecting to these services to enter into cost-sharing agreements with the plaintiff.

The court interpreted clause 22 of the Development Agreement, considering the factual matrix and the Public Utilities Act, concluding that the clause applied only to land developers of undeveloped adjoining properties, not individual homeowners.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the plaintiff's controlling mind, Mr. Beach, for allegedly violating previous court orders, and an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from interfering in the management of joint venture development projects.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding it unnecessary as the parties had reached an understanding regarding the interpretation of the joint venture agreements.

The court also declined to make a finding of contempt, noting that while Mr. Beach's conduct was not condoned, it did not rise to the level requiring a contempt order and would be better addressed through costs.

The applicants, who lease advertising signs, challenged a municipal by-law amendment that eliminated off-premise portable signs.

They argued the amendment infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, was ultra vires, and was tainted by bias.

The court found that while the by-law infringed s. 2(b), it was a reasonable limit saved by s. 1, as it addressed pressing aesthetic and traffic safety concerns.

The court also dismissed the ultra vires and bias claims, finding the municipality acted in good faith and within its statutory authority.

The application was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses three issues arising from a prior trial judgment: the statutory deductible for non-pecuniary damages, the prejudgment interest rate, and the costs of the action.

The court determined that the 2019 statutory deductible applied, reducing the net non-pecuniary damages.

The prejudgment interest rate was fixed at 1%, rejecting the plaintiff's request for a higher rate due to the defendant's conduct.

On costs, the court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the Rule 49 offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, criticizing the defendant's inflexible settlement approach.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's requested hourly rates and disbursements, ultimately fixing fees at $300,000 plus HST and disbursements at $39,864.56 plus HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction and damages of $50,000, alleging an actionable nuisance caused by the defendants' commercial equipment (a compressor and coffee roaster flue) emitting noise, smell, smoke, and heat.

The defendants asserted that summary judgment should be granted in their favour, dismissing the action.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding both the existence of an actionable nuisance and the appropriate remedy, given conflicting evidence from witnesses and experts.

The court emphasized that summary judgment is a blunt tool for balancing interests, especially when permanent injunctive relief is claimed, and that a full appreciation of evidence from a trial is necessary for a fair and just adjudication.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendants' request for "boomerang summary judgment" was also declined due to procedural unfairness.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle owner, Ms. Barrett, had given consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, making her liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Ms. Barrett contended she did not give consent to drive, only to retrieve items from the car.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether giving keys to retrieve items constitutes "possession with consent" under the Highway Traffic Act, considering the driver's state and the owner's knowledge.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Ms. Barrett's request for summary judgment was also denied.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a receiver and an interlocutory injunction, the parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $290,313.82, alleging improper conduct by the plaintiff.

The court found no reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the overriding principle of reasonableness and the defendants' divided success on their own motion, the court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants at $120,000.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's professional negligence claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants, its accountants, should have detected an employee fraud earlier.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, considering the professional relationship and the defendants' ameliorative efforts.

It found the limitation period did not begin until the plaintiff received independent accounting advice in January 2016, making the July 2017 action timely.

The motion was dismissed.