Patrick Hurley

The plaintiff, Peter St. Marthe, sued the defendant for injuries sustained in a bicycle-car collision.

The defendant admitted liability, leaving the court to determine damages, contributory negligence, whether the plaintiff met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and if the action was statute-barred.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was not statute-barred, he met the permanent serious impairment threshold, and was not contributorily negligent.

Damages were awarded for non-pecuniary loss, past and future income loss, and future housekeeping and home maintenance expenses.

In a commercial joint venture dispute over four waterfront land developments, the moving party sought appointment of a receiver-manager or, alternatively, an interlocutory injunction preserving its principal's role as project manager and restraining enforcement of related debt obligations.

The court held that the claimed breaches of the joint venture agreements and asserted fiduciary duties raised serious issues, but not a strong prima facie case, and that any loss was compensable in damages rather than irreparable.

Applying the interlocutory receiver and injunction frameworks, the court found the balance of convenience strongly favoured the responding parties, particularly because the requested relief would effectively rewrite negotiated contractual rights and jeopardize project completion and marketability.

The court also held that a constructive trust notice had been improperly registered under the Land Titles Act, discharged it subject to a 30-day opportunity to seek a certificate of pending litigation, and dismissed the action against one individual defendant.

The applicants, participants in a syndicated mortgage, sought payment out of court of surplus funds from a municipal tax sale after the mortgage went into default.

They had previously settled litigation against their investment advisor for a substantial sum.

The respondents, also mortgage participants, contended that the applicants must account for these settlement funds, which would alter the distribution of the surplus.

The court found no obligation for the applicants to account for the settlement funds, as these were damages from third-party litigation, not proceeds from the mortgage or land.

The court granted the applications for payment out of court based on the First Priority lenders' interests, dismissing the respondents' accounting claim.

The defendants, CP REIT Ontario Properties Limited and Arcturus Realty Corporation, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The plaintiff was struck by a car in a shopping plaza managed by the defendants.

The court considered conflicting expert opinions regarding site safety and pedestrian "desire lines" and the impact of a jury notice on summary judgment motions.

The court found that a genuine issue for trial existed, as a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find the defendants liable for breaching the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

The defendant insurer, Trisura, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend the plaintiff, John Van Huizen, a real estate appraiser, in three underlying lawsuits.

These lawsuits arose from a negligent appraisal prepared by David Barkley, an alleged employee or agent of Van Huizen's business, Hastings Appraisal Services.

Van Huizen, also an insured under the same professional liability policy, sought a declaration that Trisura did have a duty to defend him.

The court found that the insurance policy provided coverage for Van Huizen's vicarious liability as an employer, interpreting the "Wrongful Act" definition consistently with the "Claim" and "Insured" definitions.

The court dismissed Trisura's motion and granted partial summary judgment to Van Huizen, affirming Trisura's duty to defend.

The applicant estate trustee sought the court's opinion on which of two promissory notes executed by the respondent to her late mother was valid.

The first note required repayment of a $142,000 loan, while the second note, produced by the respondent after her mother's death, stated the loan was forgiven upon death.

The court found that the deceased did not change her mind to forgive the loan, relying on the evidence of two lawyers and rejecting the respondent's evidence, including a purportedly forged email.

The court concluded that only the first promissory note was valid and enforceable.

The applicant, an inmate serving a sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his security reclassification from minimum to medium and his subsequent involuntary transfer.

The reclassification occurred after the applicant was found to have breached institutional rules by arranging for his spouse to drop off contraband tobacco at his work release location.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the warden's decision was procedurally fair, within statutory jurisdiction, and reasonable given the applicant's duplicitous conduct and breach of trust required for minimum security placement.

The applicant's section 7 Charter challenge was also dismissed.

The plaintiffs loaned money secured by a mortgage, allegedly relying on a property appraisal prepared by the defendant.

The borrower defaulted immediately, and the property was eventually sold at a loss.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant appraiser for negligence and breach of contract.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding the plaintiffs knew they would suffer a loss and had sufficient facts to sue more than two years before commencing the claim.

The moving party (former husband) brought a motion to change seeking to terminate child support and gain sole custody.

The responding party (former wife) sought increased child and spousal support, and an extension of spousal support beyond the previously ordered termination date.

The court dismissed the request to extend spousal support, finding no material change in circumstances and that the responding party was capable of working.

However, the court found the moving party's claimed business expenses were unreasonable and imputed his income at 50% of his gross professional income, ordering retroactive and ongoing increases to child and spousal support.

The plaintiffs, a mayor and a town councillor, sued the defendant for defamation over several Facebook posts criticizing their conduct in municipal governance.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant's expressions related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant had no valid defence of fair comment for most of the posts, and the court concluded that the public interest in protecting the defendant's political expression outweighed any harm to the plaintiffs' reputations.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering it to pay $3,600.77 for unpaid electrical and excavation work.

The debts had been assigned to the respondent debt buyer.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding a contract existed, accepting hearsay evidence, and awarding costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's contractual interpretation and factual findings.

The court also refused to grant leave to raise new arguments about the validity of the assignments, noting it would cause substantial prejudice to the respondent.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of robbery and disguise with intent.

The Crown's case relied on DNA evidence found on two pieces of clothing used as a disguise, which were discovered near the scene of the robbery shortly after it occurred.

The applicant argued that without proof of when the DNA was deposited, there was insufficient evidence to commit him.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding it was open to the preliminary inquiry judge to conclude there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict.

Following the settlement of a family law application regarding custody and mobility, the respondent sought costs on the basis that he was the successful party and had made an informal offer to settle.

The applicant opposed the costs claim, arguing she had proposed a private assessment early on and voluntarily agreed to pay child support.

The court found that neither party could be declared a clear winner and that the respondent's informal offer did not meet the strict requirements of Rule 18.

To encourage the judicious settlement of family disputes, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.