Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ODC

The applicant brought a motion for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of three interlocutory decisions made by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice in a criminal proceeding.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, raising concerns that the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because the court lacks jurisdiction over criminal matters.

The court dismissed the motion, confirming that its judicial review powers under the Judicial Review Procedure Act do not extend to criminal orders, which fall under federal jurisdiction and the Criminal Code.

The court declined to make an order restricting the applicant's access to the courts at this time.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) upholding the dismissal of his complaints against seven police officers.

The complaints alleged police misconduct related to investigations of conflicts arising from a family law dispute, including recording an incorrect witness name, failing to meet disclosure obligations, and failing to enforce COVID-19 protocols.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the OIPRD reasonably concluded the officers acted in good faith and within their discretion.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Parole Board refusing to order a new hearing for her temporary absence permit application.

Prior to the judicial review hearing, the applicant was granted parole, rendering the application moot.

The applicant argued the court should still hear the matter to provide guidance to the Board on the proper framework for assessing temporary absence cases.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the application, applying the doctrine of mootness and emphasizing that the court's role on judicial review is to assess the reasonableness of specific decisions, not to impose analytical frameworks on administrative decision-makers.

The application was dismissed.

The College of Veterinarians appealed a decision of its Discipline Committee excluding evidence against a veterinarian accused of possessing child pornography.

The evidence was obtained by police during a criminal investigation that was later withdrawn due to a conceded s. 8 Charter breach.

The Discipline Committee excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, relying on a case (Viscomi) to find the police search warrant application was materially misleading.

The Divisional Court held that the Committee's reliance on Viscomi was wrong in law, rendering its s. 24(2) Grant analysis unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant Commissioner of the OPP sought judicial review to quash an order by the respondent Independent Police Review Director requiring a misconduct hearing for an OPP officer.

The officer was charged with neglect of duty for failing to disclose in an Information to Obtain (ITO) and during testimony before a Legislative Committee the reason why a suspect refused to provide a statement.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the officer's conduct could not possibly constitute neglect of duty.

The court held there is no duty to include irrelevant information in an ITO, and the officer answered the Committee's questions truthfully without a duty to volunteer extraneous information.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography.

He had a lengthy criminal record including sexual assaults on children and a prior conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender declaration.

The court accepted a joint submission for a two-year penitentiary sentence to allow the offender to participate in an intensive sex offender treatment program.

The court also declared the offender a Long Term Offender and imposed an eight-year long-term supervision order with stringent conditions, including psychiatric treatment and restrictions on internet access.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the evidence of the refusal under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by providing an inadequate summary of the right to counsel while waiting 8 to 9 minutes for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) to arrive.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to determine the threshold issue of whether the ASD demand was valid, specifically whether the 'forthwith' requirement was met and if there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the wait.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, as the essential factual findings regarding the validity of the demand had not been made.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of $9,616.98 seized from an individual arrested for marijuana possession.

The application judge had dismissed the application, finding the Attorney General failed to prove the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity and that forfeiture would not be in the interests of justice due to withdrawn criminal charges and potential Charter breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by disregarding the individual's prior drug record, the lack of an innocent explanation for the funds, and the individual's consent to forfeiture.

The Court further held that withdrawn charges and potential Charter breaches do not render forfeiture clearly not in the interests of justice.

The Attorney General applied for forfeiture of $5,545 seized during a drug investigation under the Civil Remedies Act.

The respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavit that referred to his criminal record and past drug-related activity, arguing it was inadmissible propensity evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that similar fact evidence of bad character is admissible in civil forfeiture proceedings where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, as it is relevant to whether the seized money is proceeds of unlawful activity.

The appellant sought compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for physical and sexual abuse suffered at a training school as a youth.

The Board denied compensation, taking into account the appellant's subsequent criminal behaviour, including a conviction for rape.

The appellant appealed, arguing that subsequent conduct should not be considered under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's broad discretion to consider 'all relevant circumstances' includes the claimant's subsequent criminal conduct.

The appellant, who was severely assaulted in his home, appealed the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board's decision denying him compensation.

The Board had found that the appellant's involvement in drug dealing inherently risked violence and thus barred his claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board erred in law by failing to properly apply the proportionality principle under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Board was required to weigh the severity of the injuries against the contributory conduct and consider a reduced award rather than an automatic complete denial.

A reporter sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to records of communications among Ministry of the Attorney General officials regarding an ongoing, high-profile criminal prosecution of police officers.

The Ministry refused, relying on the exclusion in s. 65(5.2) for records relating to an ongoing prosecution.

An adjudicator ordered the records produced for an inquiry, interpreting the exclusion narrowly to require a 'substantial connection' and limiting it to documents in the Crown brief.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the order, holding that the adjudicator erred in law by reading in a substantial connection requirement and that the exclusion applied broadly to protect the integrity of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review challenging the Crown's decision to withdraw criminal charges he had initiated as a private prosecutor.

The matter was transferred to the Divisional Court by a Superior Court judge.

Both parties brought a motion to remit the application back to the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application was criminal in nature and, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules, should be heard by a judge of the Superior Court.

The applicant professional regulatory body issued a summons to the respondent police chief for the production of a Crown brief related to criminal charges against a physician.

The respondent refused to comply, arguing that the screening process from D.P. v. Wagg applied.

On a stated case, the Divisional Court held that the public interest principles identified in Wagg apply to a summons issued by the regulatory body.

While the specific civil screening process is not strictly required, the lack of notice to the Attorney General and an opportunity to raise public interest concerns constitutes a lawful excuse for refusing to comply with the summons.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the disclosure of police records.

The Ministry argued the records were exempt under s. 19(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because copies of the records were contained in the Crown brief.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that s. 19(b) does not exempt records in the possession of the police that were created during an investigation merely because copies later became part of the Crown brief.

The defendant, Ontario, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and refusing to strike the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff's claim alleged that detaining individuals in jail while awaiting a psychiatric hospital bed under a Criminal Code assessment order violated Charter rights and breached fiduciary duties, relying on the decision in R. v. Hussein.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification decision because the motion judge accepted the plaintiff's legal interpretation of Hussein as a pleaded fact, and because individual issues regarding the separate purposes of detention and assessment could overwhelm common issues.

The moving defendant, an assistant Crown Attorney, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment in a malicious prosecution action.

The plaintiff had been charged with murder, but the charges were withdrawn after new evidence surfaced implicating another individual.

The motion judge found that while reasonable and probable grounds existed initially, there were disputed facts regarding the reasonableness of continuing the prosecution after the new evidence emerged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflict of principle or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting a non-suit and dismissing his claims for false arrest, unlawful search, and Charter breaches against the police.

The appellant had been arrested for possession of property obtained by crime after police observed him with multiple bicycles and parts late at night.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant's own evidence established the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, meaning no prima facie case was made out.

The respondent's registration as a motor vehicle dealer and salesman was revoked due to odometer tampering.

He later re-applied for registration, but the Registrar proposed to refuse the application based on his past misconduct, including criminal fraud convictions.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal restored his registration, accepting his argument that the fraud was due to bad paperwork and a dishonest employee.

The Registrar appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred fundamentally by allowing the respondent to relitigate the essential element of criminal intent from his fraud convictions.

The Tribunal's decision was set aside and the Registrar's proposal to refuse registration was restored.

The Crown brought a motion to introduce evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct in a trial for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The proposed evidence involved prior incidents with the complainant, and a subsequent incident with a second complainant.

Applying the Handy framework, the court admitted the prior evidence involving the complainant, finding it highly probative of consent and animus, but excluded specific inflammatory details.

The court excluded the evidence involving the second complainant, concluding that despite its striking similarities, its highly inflammatory nature and prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.