Court of Justice

The applicant society brought a motion to terminate the father's access to three children in child protection proceedings due to his persistent posting of identifying information about the children on the internet in violation of section 45(8) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The father had posted over 200 videoblogs containing references to family court proceedings, children's aid society involvement, and information that could identify the children through basic Google searches.

The court suspended the father's access and ordered him to remove all identifying postings from the internet, including 22 specific videoblogs and any material that would result in a "hit" when the children's names were entered into Google.

Access could resume only upon compliance with the removal order.

A motion brought by the respondent mother to extend time for filing an Answer in a child protection proceeding.

The mother had been granted multiple extensions to file her Answer but failed to comply on three separate occasions.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that further delay would be harmful to the best interests of the very young children involved.

The court emphasized the statutory urgency requirements in child protection matters and the prejudicial effects of delay on children's welfare and permanency planning.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a RIDE spot check on November 28, 2009.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath test evidence under section 8 and a stay of proceedings under section 7, alleging breaches related to the arrest and late disclosure of video evidence.

The court found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving based on the totality of circumstances including the accused running the spot check, admission of alcohol consumption, odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and staggering gait.

The court rejected the section 8 application.

Regarding the section 7 application based on late disclosure preventing participation in the ignition interlock program, the court found no breach as driving is a privilege not a right protected by the Charter, and the accused had no enforceable right to participate in the discretionary program.

A young person was charged with public mischief under section 140(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for allegedly making a false statement to police accusing another person of sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an apology letter in which the accused appeared to admit lying about the allegations.

The court found that the letter was obtained through reprehensible tactics involving manipulation and coercion by the accused person and his lawyer, who used false promises of employment to pressure a third party to obtain the letter.

The court also found that the accused's original statement to police was not substantially false when compared to security video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

Applications by Uber Canada Inc. and alleged Uber driver Ersan Zukic for stays of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on alleged violations of their right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The defendants were charged with bylaw offences under the City of Mississauga Public Vehicle Licensing By-law 420-04.

The court applied the new analytical framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which establishes presumptive ceilings of 18 months for provincial court proceedings.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 24-26 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling and that the prosecution failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance did not apply as the prosecution failed to prove reasonable reliance on the pre-existing law.

Stays of proceedings were granted for all three charges.

The Crown brought an application under section 540(7) of the Criminal Code to admit a videotaped police interview with a witness who subsequently died.

The witness had been interviewed regarding his role as a taxi driver transporting individuals allegedly involved in a first-degree murder.

The court declined to admit the statement, finding it did not meet the threshold of being credible or trustworthy, and exercising its discretion to refuse admission given that the declarant would be unavailable for cross-examination at trial and the evidence would therefore be inadmissible at trial unless it met the principled hearsay exception standard.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial addressed two issues: whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption, and whether the accused's rights to counsel were violated by police failing to provide legal advice in Korean.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, rejecting the accused's explanations for observed signs of impairment and finding no Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

Two young persons charged with robbery and assault causing bodily harm brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charges arose from an incident in which the victim was assaulted and robbed at a high school.

The applicants were arrested on July 25, 2011, and the matter was set for trial on August 14, 15, and 17, 2012—a total delay of 12 months and 21 days.

The court applied the four-factor Morin test and found that while the total delay exceeded ideal timelines for youth cases, the systemic delay attributable to Crown and institutional factors was only 5.6 months, falling within administrative guidelines.

The court found no substantial prejudice beyond that inherent in being charged and concluded that society's interest in having the serious charges tried on their merits outweighed the applicants' interest in a prompt trial.

The application was dismissed.

This is a temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children, R.N. (age 15) and J.N. (age 10).

The Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto sought to continue temporary orders placing J. in the care of his father and R. in the care of a foster family, with access to both children at the society's discretion.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and sought placement of both children in her care.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe that both children would suffer harm if returned to the mother's care, based on a long history of documented conflict between the mother and the children, the mother's unresolved mental health issues, and the mother's failure to take responsibility for her role in the family dysfunction.

The court ordered that J. remain in the father's care and R. remain in foster care with a reunification plan contingent on the mother engaging in therapy with R.

A youth charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and assaulting a police officer brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(b), and 12.

The court found breaches of the right to counsel under section 10(b) and the right against unreasonable search under section 8.

The police failed to facilitate the youth's right to counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so over a sixteen-minute period.

A strip search was conducted as a matter of routine policy without proper authorization, documentation, or regard for the youth's age and rights.

The court granted a stay of proceedings, finding the violations were systemic in nature and no other remedy could address the prejudice to the justice system.

A young person was charged with possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking after police officers discovered drugs during a search conducted under the guise of a Liquor Licence Act investigation.

The accused was initially observed holding a beer bottle and was 14 years old.

During a pat-down search ostensibly for additional alcohol, officers discovered the drugs in the accused's jacket pocket.

The court found that the search was not authorized by law and constituted an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded all evidence obtained during the search under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.