Court of Justice

The accused was charged with over 80 and impaired operation of a motor vehicle on April 10, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The Crown and defence agreed that the overall delay until the end of trial would be 17 months and 4 days.

The court found that institutional delay of 13 months and 9 days exceeded the Morin guidelines by approximately 30 percent.

The court identified significant delays in Crown disclosure obligations and an unacceptable three-month gap between trial dates.

The court found actual financial and emotional prejudice to the accused in the moderate range.

Balancing all factors, the court granted the application and stayed both charges.

A youth charged with sexual assault (4 counts), sexual interference (3 counts), and assault (1 count) brought an application to stay the charges pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that although the total delay was just over 13 months, the delay was reasonable when considered holistically in light of the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, institutional resource constraints, and the serious nature of the charges.

The court found that institutional delay of approximately 3.5 to 4.5 months was justified given the case complexity, and that up to nine months could have been reasonable in the circumstances.

A young person was convicted after trial of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against a victim who was six years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased.

The abuse occurred over five years between 1997 and 2002, perpetrated by the accused who was thirteen at the outset and eighteen at the conclusion.

The victim did not report the abuse to police until December 2011.

The court imposed a custody and supervision order of nine months followed by eighteen months of probation, with conditions including no contact with the victim, attendance for sexual offending assessment, and counselling as recommended.

An application for child support under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act brought by a godmother and caregiver residing in North Carolina against the child's mother residing in Ontario.

The respondent sought to reduce her support obligation based on undue hardship.

The court determined the appropriate start date for support, imputed income to the respondent based on her intentional unemployment, and dismissed the undue hardship claim.

The respondent was ordered to pay child support with arrears to be repaid over time.

A young person charged with second degree murder sought a review of his detention order based on material change in circumstances.

The Crown opposed release.

The court addressed significant jurisdictional issues regarding bail review procedures for young persons charged with section 469 offences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that while section 33(9) of the YCJA provides for appellate review through section 680 of the Criminal Code, section 28 of the YCJA incorporates section 523(2)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which permits applications to vacate detention orders in the court where the accused is to be tried.

The court held that the youth justice court has jurisdiction to hear bail review applications based on material change in circumstances, and granted the application for release on surety bail with conditions.

This is a costs endorsement in a child protection status review application.

The Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society sought a finding that a child remained in need of protection and placement in the custody of maternal grandparents.

The father sought placement with his sister and her partner and sought access.

Following a summary judgment motion granting custody to the maternal grandparents, an access trial was directed.

After eight days of trial, the parties resolved the matter by consent, granting the sister and her partner supervised access six times per year for two hours per visit.

Both the maternal grandparents and the father subsequently sought costs from each other.

The court dismissed both costs claims, finding that neither party acted in such an exceptional or unreasonable manner as to warrant a costs award in this child protection proceeding.

Application for judicial interim release of a young person charged with serious gun and drug-related offences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Crown and defence agreed on release conditions with a named surety (a senior pastor), but the court found the surety unsuitable and the proposed conditions inadequate to address the established risk of re-offence.

The court dismissed the application and ordered continued detention, finding that the surety lacked meaningful relationship with the youth and that the home environment presented unresolved supervision concerns.

A 17-year-old youth charged with second-degree murder in connection with a fatal stabbing during an armed robbery sought release pending trial.

The Crown opposed release, arguing detention was necessary for public protection and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while the Crown's case was strong regarding the robbery, viable defences existed to the murder charge.

The court released the youth on a recognizance with sureties, finding that detention was not justified on either the secondary or tertiary ground under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of a videotaped statement given by a young person charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The Crown sought to introduce the statement as evidence of the accused's admission to participation in a jewellery store robbery.

The defence opposed admission, alleging that the statement was obtained through police assault and threats in a holding room prior to the videotaped interview.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily, and therefore excluded the statement from evidence.

This is a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel regarding twin girls born in 2011.

The parents did not oppose the protection finding, and the matter proceeded solely on the issue of disposition.

The society sought Crown wardship without access for purposes of adoption.

The mother had a long history of drug abuse, testing positive for cocaine at the time of the children's birth.

Despite agreeing to drug testing and treatment programs, the parents failed to follow through, missed numerous appointments, and ceased visiting the children for an extended period without credible explanation.

The court found that over fourteen months, the parents had not demonstrated the ability to address their substance abuse issues in a comprehensive and sustained manner.

The court granted the society's motion, making the children wards of the Crown without access for purposes of adoption.

The defendant was charged with obstructing a license plate contrary to section 13(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The evidence showed that the defendant's license plate had faded blue paint, making the numbers difficult to read from a distance.

The Justice of the Peace found that while faded plates should be replaced, the statutory language of section 13(2) contemplates active obstruction by the defendant, not passive deterioration through normal wear and tear.

The court dismissed the charge, finding no evidence of deliberate obstruction.

The court noted that had it been wrong on the law, it would have suspended the sentence given the defendant's financial situation and the fact that he replaced the plates immediately upon being informed of the issue.

The court heard a Status Review Application and Child Protection Application concerning three children.

The Society sought findings that the children remained in need of protection and were in need of protection based on risk of physical harm.

The mother conceded the children were in need of protection but contested the basis.

The court found that the children were not Indian or native persons despite prior findings to the contrary.

The court found all three children remained in or were in need of protection pursuant to section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act based on domestic violence exposure, parental substance abuse, lack of parenting skills, mental health issues, housing instability, and the mother's inability to sustain services.

The court made all three children wards of the Crown and denied access to all respondents.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i)(ii) of the Child and Family Services Act and a dispositional order for crown wardship with a view to adoption.

The respondent father opposed both orders and sought return of the child under a supervision order.

The respondent mother consented to the crown wardship order.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on the finding of need of protection or on the crown wardship order, and granted both.

However, the court determined that the access issue raised complex triable issues requiring a viva voce hearing and ordered a trial of that issue, appointing the Children's Lawyer to represent the child.