Court of Justice

A youth was charged with firearms offences after a loaded handgun was discovered in the foot well of a taxi cab in which the youth was a passenger.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude the firearm as evidence, arguing the youth was arbitrarily detained contrary to section 9 of the Charter and that possession could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the youth was arbitrarily detained during the investigative phase when directed to exit the vehicle and subjected to a pat-down search, but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was not sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion.

The court found the Crown proved possession beyond a reasonable doubt based on the location of the firearm and the reasonable inference that the youth attempted to dispose of it upon seeing police.

The Children's Aid Society sought a "with prejudice" section 51 order placing a child in interim care.

The child had been in care for over 554 days, exceeding statutory limits.

The respondent mother sought return of the child or placement with her mother; the respondent father sought placement with his mother.

The court found that while the parents had made some progress in addressing personal and parenting issues, the risk of harm remained.

The court ordered interim placement of the child with the maternal grandmother under Society supervision, finding the risk manageable under reasonable conditions.

The court also ordered separate supervised access for the respondent father and paternal grandmother, and directed the Society to conduct a home assessment of the maternal grandmother's residence.

A youth charged with first degree murder in connection with the death of Terence Pringle, who was killed during a home invasion and beating on November 26, 2016.

The accused admitted to participating in an unlawful assault but contested the Crown's allegation that he possessed the requisite intent for murder.

The court found that while the accused struck the victim with a bat, the evidence established that the original plan was to administer a minor beating as a message, not to kill.

The court rejected uncorroborated testimony from accomplices regarding post-incident statements allegedly made by the accused claiming responsibility for multiple strikes with the bat.

Based on the totality of the evidence, the court found the accused not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of the lesser included offence of manslaughter.

The applicant sought a judicial recount of votes cast in the Electoral District of Brampton Centre in the June 7, 2018 Ontario provincial election.

The applicant, who received 12,803 votes, lost to Sara Singh of the Ontario New Democratic Party, who received 12,892 votes—a margin of 89 votes.

The applicant raised five grounds for a recount: non-citizens voting, discrepancies between tabulation forms, irregularities in "Bingo Sheets" unreliable witness testimony regarding missing votes, and disparities in ballot rejection rates between manual and electronic counting methods.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 71(1) of the Election Act.

The court held that while the threshold for establishing grounds for a recount is modest, the applicant must still present credible evidence that could affect the election outcome.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion seeking an addendum to a prior decision making two children Crown wards, requesting an order for sibling access between the children at a minimum of once every two weeks.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, arguing the court was functus officio and that an access order would impair the children's adoption prospects.

The court found it had jurisdiction to address the matter under Rule 25(19)(c) as an issue before the court but not decided.

The court granted the motion, finding both prongs of the test under section 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act were satisfied: the sibling relationship was beneficial and meaningful to the child, and the access order would not impair adoption opportunities.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography and luring a child under section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offences occurred between August 1 and September 9, 2011, involving online sexual communications with a 13-year-old child.

The offender, an Aboriginal man with a history of childhood sexual abuse and bullying, claimed he intended to help the child avoid similar victimization.

The sentencing decision balanced denunciation and deterrence against principles of restraint and restorative justice, particularly given the offender's Aboriginal status and the relatively limited nature of the offences compared to typical child exploitation cases.

The defendant was charged with speeding—98 kilometres per hour in a posted 60 kilometres per hour zone, contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded over three dates.

The Crown presented evidence from Police Officer Mike Hunchak, who used a Decatur Genesis II Select radar device to measure the defendant's speed.

The defendant testified that he was driving cautiously due to heavy cargo and was travelling at less than 60 kilometres per hour when stopped.

The court found that the radar device was properly tested and operated, and that the Crown had established a prima facie case.

The court concluded that the defendant's evidence, while credible, did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society to vary a temporary care and custody order and place the child in society wardship was dismissed.

The court found that the society's evidence, consisting primarily of multiple layers of hearsay regarding allegations of sexual impropriety by the father, was insufficient to meet the statutory test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child consistently denied any inappropriate conduct by her father, and all criminal charges against the father had been withdrawn.

The court ordered the child returned to the temporary care and custody of her father, subject to society supervision and specified conditions, finding that the best interests of the child and the paramount purposes of the statute favored reunification.