Court of Justice

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual touching of a person under 16 years of age.

The Crown alleged that between December 2018 and April 2019, the accused engaged in oral sex with a 14-year-old girl, and on July 5, 2019, was found in bed with the same girl who was then 15 years old and pregnant.

The accused claimed he believed the complainant was 17 years old and that his conduct on July 5, 2019 was motivated by concern for her pregnancy.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, determining that he did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and that his evidence was not credible.

This is a costs endorsement following a two-day trial concerning parenting and child support arrangements for a ten-year-old child.

The mother was the successful party, obtaining primary residence and custody with specified access to the father, and securing an increase in child support.

The father's unreasonable conduct throughout the litigation, including failure to comply with disclosure timelines, refusal to participate in a Children's Lawyer investigation, and delay in agreeing to support, influenced the costs award.

The court fixed costs at $15,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable at $400 per month commencing May 1, 2020.

The court allocated 15% of the costs award as a support order enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Children's Aid Society sought to vary a temporary access order to suspend in-person visits between a 16-month-old child and his parents during the COVID-19 pandemic, proposing to replace them with video access only.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing that the Society was applying a blanket policy inappropriate to their specific circumstances.

The court found that while COVID-19 constituted a significant change in circumstances, the Society failed to establish that complete suspension of in-person access was proportionate.

The court granted the motion in part, permitting in-person access to continue under strict COVID-19 safety protocols, while suspending the weekday visits at the Society's offices and replacing them with video access.

The reasons for judgment in this criminal matter are not available at this time.

The case involves the Crown against Jordan in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondent brought a motion to change the final custody and access order from 2014, seeking to establish a fixed 50/50 summer parenting schedule for the child.

The applicant opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent failed to establish a material change in circumstances required to vary the 2014 consent order.

The court determined that the parties had established a negotiation-based process for determining summer access that was consistent with the 2014 order and that this process, while sometimes difficult, had not negatively affected the child.

The court also found that the respondent was barred by action estoppel from relitigating the summer access issue, which had been addressed in prior proceedings through settlement negotiations.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the plea and sentencing could proceed by audioconference rather than in person or by video.

The accused had been in custody since March 2019 and wished to plead guilty expeditiously.

The court ruled that both subsection 650(2)(b) and section 715.23 of the Criminal Code provided authority for the plea to proceed by audioconference, distinguishing the case from R. v. Candelaria on the basis that the accused was represented by counsel and had expressly waived his right to appear in person or by video.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death following a collision on May 15, 2018, that resulted in the death of Jonas Mitchell.

At the preliminary inquiry, the court found that while the Crown could establish the actus reus (the dangerous act of entering an intersection on a red light), it could not establish the required mens rea (mental element) of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The court discharged the accused, finding that momentary inattention for approximately nine to ten seconds, without evidence of speeding, deliberate red-light running, or erratic maneuvers, did not constitute the criminal fault required for dangerous driving.

The court emphasized that carelessness alone is insufficient for criminal liability and that the consequences of the accident, while tragic, cannot drive the charge when the manner of driving does not meet the criminal threshold.

This is a costs endorsement following a temporary child and spousal support motion.

The applicant sought costs of $7,067.02 after obtaining a more favourable result than her settlement offer.

The respondent acted in bad faith by deliberately avoiding financial disclosure, unduly delaying proceedings, stopping support payments despite ability to pay, and misrepresenting his income.

The court found the respondent's offer to settle was more favourable than the motion result, triggering full recovery costs consequences.

The court also found bad faith conduct warranting full recovery costs under the Family Law Rules.

The respondent's costs were fixed at $7,067.02, payable immediately.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 116(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to vary a December 10, 2018 order placing a 12-year-old child in the mother's care.

The society sought to place the child in its temporary care and custody.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to retain custody or alternatively place the child with her sister (the maternal aunt).

The court found that the mother had breached substantially all terms of the supervision order, including failing to maintain stable housing, refusing to sign consents for the society to communicate with medical professionals, and failing to cooperate with the society.

The court determined that the child's best interests required removal from the mother's care and granted the society's motion for temporary custody with access in the society's discretion.

The society was directed to investigate a kinship placement with the maternal aunt.

A show cause hearing on bail for a defendant charged with numerous firearms offences arising from an incident on April 15, 2019.

The defendant was alleged to have fled from police while carrying three loaded handguns, which were abandoned in publicly accessible locations.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The defendant proposed a strict release plan with a 24-hour curfew and four proposed sureties.

The court found the defendant met his onus on the primary ground but failed to overcome the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court was particularly concerned with the credibility of the proposed sureties, the defendant's apparent criminal lifestyle, and the absence of evidence of the defendant's commitment to supervision.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic context and expert evidence regarding jail conditions, but concluded that the serious nature of the allegations and likelihood of conviction outweighed the health concerns.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking resumption of parenting time with his three-year-old child and police enforcement of a court order during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The parties had reached a binding agreement on February 19, 2020, providing for alternate weekend access and mid-week overnight access.

Following the closure of the child's daycare and implementation of emergency health measures, the applicant mother unilaterally withheld access from March 11 to April 3, 2020.

The court found that the mother failed to satisfy her onus to prove COVID-19 related reasons for changing the access schedule and that unilateral modifications to binding agreements cannot be condoned.

The court ordered a modified access schedule that maintained the essential structure of the parties' agreement while accommodating the daycare closure and the mother's partner's availability for exchanges.

A self-represented accused in custody sought to enter a guilty plea by telephone during the COVID-19 pandemic when the courthouse had extremely limited video link capacity to the detention centre.

The court held that the Criminal Code does not permit a self-represented accused to plead guilty by telephone.

The default requirement is physical presence, with the only exception being appearance by video.

The court rejected arguments that section 650(2)(b) could be used to permit telephone appearance or that the accused could waive the statutory requirement of presence.

The court emphasized sound policy reasons for requiring in-person or video appearance for guilty pleas, including the need to ensure voluntariness and the importance of the human element in sentencing.

The Crown applied to designate the accused as a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The accused argued that his future treatment prospects were compelling and that a Long-Term Offender Supervision Order would be appropriate.

The court found that the accused's pattern of sexual violence over a 17-year period, his persistent denial of responsibility, his anti-social personality traits, and his failure to benefit from previous treatment demonstrated that his threat to public safety was intractable.

The court designated the accused as a dangerous offender under multiple provisions of the Criminal Code.

The applicant (father) sought an order for the return of the child after the respondent (mother) breached a temporary custody order by refusing to return the child following weekend access.

The respondent, facing criminal charges related to the applicant, filed extensive material and a cross-motion to change custody to her home.

The court found that the respondent deliberately disobeyed the court order without plausible justification and that her actions demonstrated she was willing to prioritize her own needs over those of the child.

The court maintained the existing arrangement whereby the child resides with the applicant and the respondent has weekend access, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant mother brought a motion for contempt against the respondent father for denying her access to the two minor children (ages 15 and 13, both with special needs) beginning in March 2020, citing COVID-19 concerns.

The father had also allegedly failed to facilitate electronic communication and discussed litigation with the children.

The court found that neither parent believed the other posed a health risk.

The parties consented to a temporary without prejudice order reinstating the access schedule, with both parents to encourage the children to attend visits and communicate electronically at least three times weekly.

The court emphasized the need for parental cooperation during the pandemic crisis.

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple firearm-related offences including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a handgun and ammunition for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, knowingly occupying a motor vehicle containing a restricted firearm, uttering a threat to cause death, and breaches of a section 109 firearms prohibition order and probation order.

The court imposed a global sentence of 1825 days, with 1305 days remaining to be served after crediting pre-sentence custody at an enhanced rate of 1.5:1.

The court rejected arguments for a time-served sentence and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for firearm offences.

The accused applied under section 278.93 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant and to use records of communications between them.

The application concerned two counts of sexual assault.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence of prior sexual activity constituted impermissible twin-myth reasoning and was not capable of being admissible.

The court held that the evidence did not address how consent was communicated and therefore could not support a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

Additionally, regarding the allegation involving digital penetration while the complainant was asleep, the court found the evidence irrelevant to consent as an unconscious person cannot provide the required affirmative consent.