Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The court rescinded a previously granted screen order for a complainant testifying virtually, finding it unnecessary given the virtual hearing format.

The ruling emphasized that the virtual setting inherently reduces direct confrontation concerns, and witnesses have personal options (like adjusting Zoom view or physically blocking the screen) if they prefer not to see the accused.

The accused, Aaron Enwright, was charged with failing or refusing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand under the Criminal Code.

At a RIDE check, he initially questioned the police's authority and asserted the demand was unconstitutional.

However, immediately upon being arrested and handcuffed, he offered to provide a sample.

The police officer refused to administer the test, believing the opportunity had passed.

The court found that while the ASD demand was valid, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Enwright unequivocally refused.

His offer to provide a sample, made immediately upon arrest, was deemed genuine and part of a continuous transaction, leading to an acquittal.

A mid-trial Charter application was brought by the accused, Brook-Lynn Beal-Clark, alleging breaches of her fair trial rights (sections 7 and 11(d)) due to significant failures in court recording equipment, resulting in inaudible audio and indiscernible portions of the trial transcript.

The Crown proposed alternative remedies, including an agreed statement of facts or proceeding without certain evidence, or a mistrial.

The court found that the technological failures compromised the fairness of the trial and the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, determining that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy in this "clearest of cases."

This case record indicates that the reasons for the decision are not available at this time.

Therefore, no summary of the legal principles or facts can be provided.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was breached.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated end of trial was 1174 days.

After deducting 400 days of defence delay, the net delay was 774 days (25.4 months), which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic and the complexity of the case.

The court found insufficient evidence to attribute the delay to COVID-19 or case complexity, noting the Crown took no steps to mitigate the delay.

The application was granted, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant and utterances made upon arrest, alleging breaches of s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained significant inaccuracies and misleading information regarding the applicant's residence at the searched unit, leading to a s. 8 breach.

A delay in providing access to counsel also constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct and significant impact on the applicant's privacy and counsel rights warranted exclusion of the evidence and utterances.

The accused was charged with three child luring offences arising from a police sting operation involving an online escort advertisement.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused was the person exchanging text messages with an undercover officer.

The court found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, as there were other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

Furthermore, applying *R. v. Morrison*, the court held that even if identity were proven, the conflicting information about age in the advertisement and text messages was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the person was under 18 or was wilfully blind to that fact.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE program, failed a roadside screening test, and was brought to the station for breath tests.

At trial for an 'Over 80' charge, the sole issue was whether the breath tests were taken 'as soon as practicable' under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, given a delay to consult duty counsel.

The court found the police acted reasonably in revisiting the right to counsel at the station after an ambiguous roadside response, and the accused requested to speak to duty counsel.

The Crown proved the tests were taken as soon as practicable, and a finding of guilt was entered.

An appeal from convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace injury.

The appellant challenged the convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application alleging violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellate court found that the trial judge miscalculated the total delay and incorrectly characterized a significant adjournment period as defence delay.

When properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, and the Crown failed to justify the delay through exceptional circumstances or case complexity.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Child Care and Early Years Act: (1) operating a home childcare with more than the allowable number of children, and (2) obstructing Ministry inspectors in the completion of an inspection.

The trial examined the circumstances of an unannounced inspection on January 24, 2017, and a subsequent search warrant execution on January 26, 2017.

The court found that the Ministry failed to prove either charge beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed both counts.

The judgment critically examined the conduct of the Ministry inspectors and enforcement officers, including issues with the credibility of witness testimony, the lack of documentary evidence, and significant procedural breaches in the execution of the search warrant.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing a breach of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

Although the total net delay, including retrial time, exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the court found the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The parties had relied on the prior Morin framework when the case was proceeding, and the operative delay under Morin guidelines, while exceeding them slightly, was not so egregious as to warrant a stay.

The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by a four-year-old child alleging child abuse.

The statements were hearsay and presumptively inadmissible.

The defence challenged whether threshold reliability had been established, arguing the statements were inconsistent, lacked a promise to tell the truth, and had never been subject to cross-examination.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found the statements substantively reliable based on the circumstances in which they were made, the open-ended questioning, the identity of the recipients as trusted individuals, the temporal proximity to the alleged assault, and corroborating physical evidence.

The court admitted all of the child's utterances, including inconsistent statements, for trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence, alleging that his right to counsel in private was breached when he spoke to duty counsel from a holding cell at the police detachment.

The accused claimed he could hear voices outside the cell and was concerned his conversation could be overheard.

The court found that the accused was in fact afforded privacy, was the only person in the cell block and booking area, and was monitored only by video with no audio recording.

The court rejected the accused's after-the-fact assertion that he reasonably believed his conversation could be overheard, finding his testimony lacked reliability and he took no steps at the time to indicate concern.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed two key issues: (1) whether a discrepancy in dates between the Certificate of a Qualified Technician and the Intoxilyzer Test Record Card undermined the reliability of the Certificate; and (2) whether the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the approved screening device used for the roadside test was in proper working order, thereby justifying the warrantless seizure of breath samples under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the date discrepancy was a typographical error and did not affect the Certificate's reliability.

The court also found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was properly calibrated and functioning correctly based on recent accuracy checks, calibration records, and a self-test.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a complainant in his home after they met at a bar and shared a taxi.

The complainant testified that she was pinned down and forcibly penetrated while repeatedly telling the accused to stop.

The accused testified that all sexual contact was consensual.

The trial judge found the accused's testimony to be deliberately misleading on material points regarding his interest in the complainant and the circumstances of leaving the bar.

However, the judge also found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable due to significant memory loss inconsistent with her alcohol consumption and numerous prior statements to others describing consensual sexual activity that turned rough.

The judge concluded that while the accused's guilt was possible or even probable, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the complainant withdrew consent, and therefore acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for Driving While Suspended, which resulted from a guilty plea entered by his court agent without his knowledge or informed consent.

The appellant was not present at the plea hearing, and the agent failed to review disclosure, advise him of the trial date, conduct pre-trial negotiations, or explain the consequences of the plea.

The court found that the agent's conduct was grossly negligent and constituted a miscarriage of justice, warranting the appeal be allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath sample evidence obtained at the police station.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer failed to make a valid demand for the approved screening device immediately upon forming reasonable suspicion, unlawfully detained the accused at the roadside without informing him of his detention or reasons therefor, and failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with threatening to kill the complainant on December 14, 2012.

The trial took place in Toronto's Integrated Domestic Violence Court.

The complainant and accused had a former romantic relationship and were engaged in a contentious family court proceeding regarding custody and access to their child.

The complainant alleged that the accused threatened to kill her, that she would explode like a balloon, that he would break her, and that he sent a threatening email.

The court found the complainant's credibility was substantially damaged by her prior false affidavit recanting allegations of assault, the suspicious timing of her allegations coinciding with an unfavorable custody recommendation, and her demonstrated determination to obtain sole custody.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery involving an unprovoked, violent attack on the victim in which the accused and a co-accused beat the victim repeatedly, causing physical injury and significant emotional trauma.

The court imposed an eight-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months probation with conditions including abstinence from alcohol and drugs, anger management programming, restitution, and a curfew.

The court balanced mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, early guilty plea, remorse, and supportive family background against the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.