Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

Datawind Inc. appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice registering a costs order from the United Kingdom High Court of Justice under the Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

Datawind argued that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over it as a third party to the original proceeding, that the costs order was not for a definite sum, and that it was denied natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the foreign court had jurisdiction, that the interim payment on account of costs constituted a registrable judgment for a definite sum, and that no denial of natural justice occurred.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for a beneficial interest in the family home or equitable damages for services rendered to his mother, as well as the dismissal of his application to revoke his sister's power of attorney.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in allocating the burden of proof for unjust enrichment by requiring the appellant to prove a 'net benefit'.

Applying the correct framework from Kerr v. Baranow, the Court awarded the appellant $438,113 in equitable damages for domestic services.

The Court also admitted the trial judge's findings of undue influence as fresh evidence and revoked the sister's power of attorney.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her professional negligence action against her former lawyers.

Her action was dismissed under Rule 57.03(2) after she failed to pay a $10,400 costs award from an unsuccessful summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly balanced the competing interests, noting the appellant provided no evidence of her alleged impecuniosity or the merits of her claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought directions on how to reopen a dismissed civil action based on fresh evidence allegedly undermining trial credibility findings in an employment placement fraud dispute.

After his appeal had already been dismissed, he relied on rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and tendered a broadcast said to show the respondents making representations inconsistent with their trial evidence.

The court held that the rationale of rule 59.06(2)(a) survives the dismissal of an appeal because the rule addresses orders later shown to be wrong due to fraud or subsequently discovered facts, rather than reversible trial error.

The motion to introduce new evidence had to be brought in the Superior Court, but not necessarily before the original trial judge.

Service was validated against one respondent who had notice but failed to respond in writing.

The plaintiff commenced two identical actions for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police and the Crown.

Both actions were dismissed by the registrar as abandoned due to delay.

Almost two years later, the plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal orders under Rule 37.14.

The master dismissed the motion, finding inordinate delay and deemed prejudice to the defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the second action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal and restored the master's order, holding that the master did not err in finding that the expiry of a limitation period gives rise to presumptive prejudice, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident during the course of his employment and applied for workers' compensation benefits.

He subsequently elected to proceed with a civil action against the responsible third party.

His employer's long-term disability insurer denied his claim for benefits, arguing he was no longer entitled after his election.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant satisfied the policy's condition precedent by applying for workers' compensation benefits and was therefore entitled to long-term disability benefits.

However, the insurer was entitled to reduce the monthly benefit by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the appellant would have received had he not elected to sue.

The appellant was wrongfully charged with second-degree murder based on an autopsy performed by the respondent pathologist.

After the charges were withdrawn, the appellant sued the respondent for negligent investigation and misfeasance in public office.

The respondent successfully moved at the Divisional Court to strike the claims based on absolute witness immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claims related to the respondent's role as a public official investigating a suspicious death under the Coroners Act, not merely his testimony.

The Court found that the scope of witness immunity in this context is unsettled law and must be determined at trial on a full factual record.

The appellant appealed an order finding her in contempt of court for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law contrary to a previous court order and section 50 of the Law Society Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments and agreeing with the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant's conduct and prepared documents transgressed both the court order and the governing statute.

The court directed that the penalty phase proceed before the motion judge and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondent bank, as the holder of the appellants' guarantee, was not a 'secured creditor' under section 2 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge, finding that the respondent was not required to give the appellants notice under section 21(1) of the Act before commencing an action on the guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a civilian employee of the RCMP, brought a civil action against a co-worker, a supervisor, and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging harassment and failure to provide a safe working environment.

The motion judge dismissed the action against the supervisor and the Attorney General, finding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and the Public Service Staff Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that courts must defer to the statutory grievance procedure for matters involving employment relations and workplace safety.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The purchasers had invoked a provision of the agreement when the vendor was unwilling or unable to comply with outstanding work orders.

The Court of Appeal found that the purchasers did not act capriciously or arbitrarily, and upheld the trial judge's finding that the agreement was null and void, entitling the purchasers to the return of their $5,000 deposit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed from a judgment enforcing a settlement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law by the motion judge in enforcing the settlement and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent to be deducted from the settlement funds.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment determining the ownership of a property in favour of the Estate of Samuel Lallman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence or the admission of discovery evidence.

The court also upheld the relief granted against a non-party to one of the proceedings and rejected the defence of laches.

The insurer sought an order to videotape the examination of three expert witnesses to preserve their evidence regarding the cause of an infant's injuries, as the limitation period for the infant to sue would not expire until 2021.

The motion judge granted the order relying on the court's inherent jurisdiction and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insured's appeal, holding that Rule 36.01 does not authorize the preservation of evidence before an action is commenced, and section 146 of the Courts of Justice Act cannot be used to create such jurisdiction where the Rules intentionally restrict it to existing proceedings.

The insurer sought an order to preserve the evidence of three expert witnesses regarding the cause of an infant's injuries, anticipating a future motor vehicle accident claim.

Because the infant's limitation period extended to 2021, the insurer feared the experts might become unavailable.

The application judge granted the order under Rule 36.01 and s. 146 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insured's appeal, holding that Rule 36.01 only applies after a proceeding has been commenced, and s. 146 cannot be used to create jurisdiction where none exists.

The parties were involved in a joint venture agreement to develop land.

When the lender demanded repayment of its loan, the appellants did not pay their share.

The respondents used a non-arm's length company to purchase the loan and foreclose on the lands, appropriating the appellants' investment.

The appellants sued for breach of the joint venture agreement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that none of the parties relied on the agreement's provisions and instead pursued self-interest outside its terms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, ruling that a party cannot enforce an agreement it has demonstrated an intention not to be bound by.

The appellant appealed an order staying his Ontario contract action against the respondents on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and Florida was the most convenient forum.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by relying on a privileged letter, finding the agreement contained a Florida arbitration provision, and failing to consider the risk of a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the Muscutt test, the letter was not privileged, and the factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited her long-term disability benefits and assessed her wrongful dismissal notice period at 12 months.

The respondent cross-appealed the calculation of short-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to mitigate her disability by not seeking medical assistance.

The court increased the notice period to 18 months based on the Bardal factors.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, affirming that short-term benefits should be calculated on base pay and commissions.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a commercial lease dispute.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his defamation claim.

The motion judge had applied the test from Mantini and concluded that the words complained of were not capable of bearing the defamatory meaning attributed to them by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal with costs.