Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant, Natalie Mouralian, brought a motion for a stay of the Court of Appeal's decision pending her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved a failed real estate transaction and the forfeiture of a $70,000 deposit, with the Superior Court and Court of Appeal having previously denied relief from forfeiture.

The motions judge denied the stay, finding that the issues raised by the appellant were factual, not legal, and therefore unlikely to meet the Supreme Court's stringent leave criteria for public or national importance.

The judge also noted the respondent's counsel's improper release of the deposit funds despite notice of intent to seek leave, though this did not affect the merits of the stay motion.

The respondent school board expropriated the appellant's property to build a new secondary school.

The board later authorized a land swap with the city to facilitate a joint development on the site.

The appellant argued this triggered section 41(1) of the Expropriations Act, requiring the board to offer the property back because it was no longer needed for the board's purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the board had not abandoned its purpose of building a school and related amenities.

However, the court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the application judge's costs award to the partial indemnity amount originally sought by the board.

Following a successful appeal based on the respondent's failure to properly serve the originating documents, the parties could not agree on the disposition of costs below.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs below, fixed at $100,000, be in the cause of the new application, provided the respondent proceeds with the application within three months.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and not tainted by palpable and overriding error.

The court noted that although the respondent did not prove one particular of fraud (participation in a fraudulent discharge), the other proven particulars supported the judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim that the steam rate under a 1994 Steam Sale Agreement should be based solely on nuclear-generated steam, rather than including oil-fired steam.

The trial judge interpreted the phrase 'full reasonable cost recovery principle' to allow the respondent to recover its actual costs, including those from an oil-fuelled back-up boiler.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the factual matrix or her application of contract interpretation principles.

The Bank of Nova Scotia brought a motion to quash the appellant's Notice of Appeal on the basis that it was filed approximately five months late.

The appellant brought a cross-motion seeking an extension of time to serve a fresh Notice of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash and dismissed the cross-motion, finding that the appellant had been notified of the time limit, the appeal lacked merit, and the interests of justice did not warrant an extension of time.

The appellant sued his former spouse's divorce lawyer, alleging the lawyer maliciously advised the spouse to fabricate criminal charges against him to gain an advantage in matrimonial litigation.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim under Rule 21 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pleaded facts were capable of supporting claims for intentional torts such as false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy, which are not defeated by the rule that a lawyer owes no duty of care to an opposing party.

The appellants sued their former solicitor for negligence, alleging he failed to properly calculate their damages in a real estate action and negligently advised them to accept a settlement.

The trial judge dismissed the claim and awarded the solicitor substantial indemnity costs from the date of a settlement offer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if the solicitor misunderstood the damages calculation, the settlement amount was a fair compromise and the appellants suffered no damages.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the trial costs to a partial indemnity basis, as the negligence claim was not frivolous and did not constitute misconduct.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Backhouse.

The Court of Appeal found that, assuming it had jurisdiction, the appeal was moot in light of a subsequent judgment by Justice Siegel, except for the issue of costs.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the costs order and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $2,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against her family physician.

She alleged a lack of informed consent when the physician prescribed birth control pills without adequately discussing the risk of blood clots, after which she developed deep vein thrombosis.

The trial judge found a lack of informed consent but concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's position would have taken the pill anyway, meaning the lack of disclosure did not cause her injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the objective test for informed consent.

In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal as abandoned.

Costs for the cross-appeal were fixed at $1,500.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claims for damages after the appellant slipped and fell in her apartment building's parking lot.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting hospital and ambulance records regarding the mechanism of the fall, allowing them to be used as prior inconsistent statements, and in instructing the jury on the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the records were properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of prior inconsistent statements and the jury instructions on reasonable care were appropriate.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal claim against the individual respondent, a corporate officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts giving rise to an independent claim against the officer in his individual capacity.

The allegations of inducing breach of contract and tortious misrepresentation were deemed insufficient to establish personal liability.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's dismissal of a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The appellant had previously sought to adduce the same evidence before the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal and refused to reconsider its decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the current appeal, finding that the admissibility of the evidence had already been determined and that the proposed evidence did not meet the requirements for admission, as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result at trial.

The appellant law partnership, a creditor of a bankrupt management company, brought an action under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act to set aside a transfer of assets to a related company.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding it was barred by the six-year limitation period in the Limitations Act or by the equitable doctrine of laches.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is neither an action on a simple contract nor an action upon the case, and thus is not caught by the six-year limitation period.

The Court also found a triable issue regarding whether the respondents suffered prejudice sufficient to establish the defence of laches.

Following the release of the main decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario received further submissions on costs.

The Court ordered that the costs of the application for leave, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal be awarded to the appellant in the cause.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Guatemala involving an uninsured driver.

He sought recovery under the uninsured automobile coverage provision of the Insurance Act.

The motions judge found the respondent was entitled to coverage, holding that the territorial limit in the policy was inconsistent with the Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, finding no ambiguity or conflict between the policy limitation and the legislation.

The Court held that the territorial limit in the policy applied to preclude coverage for the accident in Guatemala.

A foreign judgment creditor appealed the dismissal of a petition for a receiving order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act based on an unpaid Ohio civil judgment arising from a fatal boating collision.

The Court of Appeal held that the bankruptcy judge erred in treating the foreign plaintiffs as a single creditor and in requiring the petitioning creditor to exhaust other civil enforcement routes before invoking the bankruptcy regime.

The court found there were at least three creditors, substantial unpaid liabilities under a final foreign judgment, and evidence of suspicious asset transfers that made bankruptcy remedies appropriate.

The appeal was allowed, the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and a trustee was appointed.

The appeal concerned whether weekly no-fault benefits paid under s. 13 of the pre-1994 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule were deductible from an award of general damages in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

Applying the no-double-recovery approach from prior appellate authority, the court held that deductibility depends on whether the statutory benefit is akin to the same head of loss as the damages award.

The court concluded that s. 13 benefits are more akin to damages for loss of income than to general damages because they are weekly, age-linked, coordinated with income loss benefits, and directed at those prevented from seeking employment or education.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was quashed, and the motions judge's order was restored.

This appeal arose from a cottage purchase involving an alleged septic system defect and a warranty that the system had operated satisfactorily and, to the best of the vendors’ knowledge, was installed according to local health authority requirements.

The court upheld the trial judge’s finding that there was no breach of warranty and no negligence by the real estate brokerage in failing to obtain or draft a broader warranty.

The court allowed the solicitor’s appeal, holding that where counsel is retained after a binding agreement of purchase and sale has been signed, there was no duty on these facts to advise the purchaser to attempt to negotiate a price abatement for a concluded deal.

The claim against the solicitor was dismissed, and the purchaser’s appeal against the other respondents was dismissed.