Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant sued the directors and auditors of a credit union after losing his $5 million investment, alleging misrepresentations in an offering statement.

Midway through the trial, the appellant sought to amend his statement of claim to allege a new misrepresentation regarding the credit union's failure to obtain property appraisals.

The trial judge refused the amendment, finding it asserted a new cause of action that was discoverable years earlier and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that the proposed amendment relied on a different act and a separate failure to disclose, which was not encompassed by the original pleadings.

Class members who are not representative plaintiffs have no direct right of appeal from an order approving a settlement in a certified class action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the decision in Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada remains good law and has not been superseded by subsequent decisions.

A settlement approval order is neither a judgment on common issues nor a determination of aggregate damages, and therefore class members cannot seek leave to appeal under section 30(5) of the Class Proceedings Act.

Permitting individual class members to appeal settlement approvals would introduce uncertainty into settlement negotiations, undermine the authority of representative plaintiffs and class counsel, and impede the resolution of class actions.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office against the Law Society of Ontario and four individuals involved in investigations and proceedings concerning the appellant over 15 years.

The motion judge found the appellant had failed to provide sufficient particulars of improper purpose or ulterior motive as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the appellant had sufficiently pleaded the elements of both torts through his pleadings and response to the demand for particulars, except as to one respondent against whom no particulars were provided.

The court dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence and vacated the costs order, awarding the appellant partial costs of the appeal.

The bankrupt brought a motion to quash the trustee's appeal from the dismissal of a contempt motion, arguing the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, an appeal from an order of a bankruptcy judge lies to the Court of Appeal regardless of whether it is final or interlocutory.

The Court also granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e) if required, given the serious allegations and issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

In 1931, the respondent's predecessor conveyed land to the appellant's predecessors solely for gravel extraction, with an agreement granting a 'first option to purchase' the land for $1.00 once all gravel was removed.

The appellant brought an application to declare the agreement void under the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the agreement created a right of first refusal rather than an interest in land.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the true intent of the parties was to create an option to repurchase, which gave rise to an immediate equitable interest in the land.

Because the option was not exercised within the perpetuity period, it was declared void.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were in default of a vendor take back promissory note, which triggered an acceleration clause.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to make full quarterly payments and that proper written notice of default was provided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's interpretation of the promissory note and conclusion that notice was properly given were reasonable.

The moving party brought an urgent motion but failed to respond to the respondent's costs submissions.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, noting that costs follow the event and the mortgage terms entitled the mortgagee to reasonable costs.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 all inclusive.

During the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, the appellant and his friends were walking down a public street intending to demonstrate in support of animal rights.

They were stopped by police officers who demanded to search their bags as a condition of proceeding further.

The appellant refused and was grabbed and pushed by an officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the police conduct was not authorized by the common law ancillary powers doctrine, as it was not reasonably necessary to preserve the peace.

The court found that the police violated the appellant's common law right to travel unimpeded and his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court also held that the officer committed the tort of battery, as he lacked lawful authority and the contact was unnecessary.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and perfect the appeal in a class proceeding regarding franchise volume rebates.

The delay was caused by an administrative error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the delay was short and explained, the proposed appeal lacked any merit as it challenged purely factual findings without providing any basis for the appeal.

The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.

He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.

The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.

The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits.

After the insurer terminated her benefits, she signed a full and final release in exchange for a lump sum.

She later sued the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, and mental distress without first returning the settlement funds or proceeding to mandatory mediation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing her action, confirming that her claims were 'in respect of' statutory accident benefits and therefore subject to the mandatory mediation scheme under the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action and granting the respondent bank's counterclaim for monies owed under a residential mortgage.

The appellant argued that as an innocent victim of mortgage fraud, the bank should bear the loss as it was in a superior position to avoid the fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was in the best position to detect the fraud had she read the documents she signed.

Furthermore, the appellant was not entirely innocent, having agreed to serve as an accommodation mortgagor for a stranger for compensation, thereby actively facilitating the fraudulent scheme.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to appeal a Superior Court decision dismissing its appeal from an arbitration award without obtaining leave.

The applicant argued that section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act provided an appeal as of right, despite section 49 of the Arbitration Act requiring leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the specific provisions of the Arbitration Act prevail over the general provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, and therefore leave to appeal is required.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order directing a trustee in bankruptcy to convey its interest in a joint venture agreement and a related lawsuit to the respondent, a discharged bankrupt.

The appellants also challenged the motion judge's decision to make the conveyance retroactive to a date when the respondent was still an undischarged bankrupt.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to return the property.

To address the retroactivity issue, the Court varied the absolute order of discharge to take effect on April 4, 2005, just prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, using its power under section 187(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding a binding employment agreement and awarding damages for wrongful dismissal, including Wallace damages.

The appellants argued the trial judge ignored evidence regarding the agreement and that the respondent failed to mitigate his damages by refusing a consulting arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the respondent was not obliged to accept a demeaning consulting arrangement to mitigate his damages.

The appellant appealed a decision denying his motion to amend his statement of defence to withdraw an admission.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge applied the incorrect legal standard, holding the appellant to the pre-Antipas standard rather than the reformulated three-part test.

The appellant provided a reasonable explanation for the change of position, stating he only realized the plaintiff had not advanced the mortgage funds upon reading the summary judgment materials.

The Court held that the proposed amendment raised a triable issue and that there was no non-compensable prejudice to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was permitted to amend his pleadings.

The appellant appealed a judgment awarding damages to the respondent for breach of a commercial sign lease.

The appellant acknowledged the breach but challenged the quantum of interest on the accelerated payment, argued unconscionability, and claimed a failure to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interest calculation, rejecting the unconscionability and mitigation arguments, and upholding the trial judge's award of solicitor and client costs based on the lease terms.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York while volunteering for post-9/11 relief work.

She sued her New York supervisor, who was driving the vehicle, in Ontario.

The defendant moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, noting the plaintiff's extensive medical treatment in Ontario, the pre-existing relationship between the parties, the defendant's insurance coverage, and the mandatory Ontario venue for the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Minnesota resident injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident, sued her Minnesota insurer in Ontario for statutory accident benefits.

The appeal turned on the effect of a power of attorney and undertaking signed under the reciprocal interjurisdictional automobile insurance scheme.

The Court of Appeal held that the undertaking required the insurer to accept service and appear in Ontario, and that the motions judge erred by failing to give effect to that agreement when granting a stay on forum non conveniens grounds.

Because a stay could deprive the appellant of the juridical advantage of Ontario statutory accident benefits, the stay was set aside and the appeal allowed.

The appellants challenged a substantial personal injury judgment arising from an automobile accident involving catastrophic injuries, including findings on liability, future care, damages, and costs.

The Court of Appeal held that, apart from the statutory issue under s. 116 of the Courts of Justice Act and costs, the appeal was an impermissible attempt to re-try fact-driven issues and adopted the trial judge’s reasons.

On the s. 116 issue, the court held that periodic payments could only be ordered in relation to the award as calculated, and the provision did not authorize the appellants’ proposed item-by-item structured annuity that would reduce the present value award.

The court also declined to interfere with the trial judge’s discretionary costs ruling.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.