Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This is an appeal from a medical malpractice judgment where the trial judge found the appellant physician negligent in treating a stroke victim, leading to permanent injuries.

The core issue on appeal was causation: whether the trial judge erred in finding that the physician's negligence caused the injuries, specifically by not requiring the plaintiff to establish precisely which treatment option would have prevented the unfavourable outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's robust and pragmatic application of the "but for" causation test, particularly in the context of an evidentiary gap created by the defendant's negligence.

The appellant, OZ Optics Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its action against two former general counsel, Diane Lesley Evans and Samuel Edgar Schwisberg, following a successful motion for summary judgment.

The action alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and negligent performance of service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the bench, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims were amenable to summary judgment, that Evans's actions did not constitute a breach or cause loss, and that Schwisberg's obligations under a holdover clause were absolved by the appellant's actions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's dismissal of their action for damages against the City of Hamilton, which arose from a motorcycle accident caused by a pavement discontinuity.

The trial judge had found the City established a defence under the Municipal Act, 2001, by meeting Minimum Maintenance Standards (MMS).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in determining the height of the discontinuity, as the City failed to meet its onus to prove compliance with MMS.

The Court also found a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of contributory negligence, attributing 100% fault to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed, and judgment was granted for the appellants.

The appellants sought to re-open their appeal of a decision dismissing their action against the respondent for terminating a commercial contract.

The appellants sought to advance a new legal argument based on repudiation, which had not been raised at trial or on the initial appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it would be unfair to permit a new legal issue after more than 10 years of litigation and that re-opening the appeal was not in the interests of justice.

The appellant, Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, appealed a decision regarding the calculation of amounts payable to the respondent non-utility generators under long-term power purchase agreements.

The dispute centered on whether a new government regulation reallocating the Global Adjustment Mechanism (GA) altered the calculation of Total Market Costs (TMC) under the agreements.

The application judge found that the new GA calculation was inconsistent with the definition of TMC, which required costs to be allocated pro rata to consumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not decide the case on an unargued issue, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and properly interpreted the agreements without improperly implying a term.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow on the driveway of a rented residential property.

He sued the landlord and later added the tenant as a co-defendant.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against both defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the tenant, finding the claim was statute-barred because the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he discovered his claim on the date of the accident.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the landlord, finding genuine issues for trial concerning the interplay between the lease terms, the Occupiers' Liability Act, and the landlord's maintenance obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant purchased 51.5 acres of land from the respondents, with an agreement to use 'best efforts' to obtain a severance of a one-acre parcel containing the respondents' home.

The trial judge found the appellant breached this obligation and ordered specific performance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the evidence and erred in awarding specific performance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record and the award of specific performance was reasonable given the unique nature of the property.

The appellant, a non-party to the proposed action, appealed an order directing it to produce certain documents to the respondent.

However, the documents were produced before the appeal was launched, rendering the appeal moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issue was not one that would evade appellate review in the normal course and that the order under appeal was discretionary based on specific facts.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that the respondent lawyer breached the deemed undertaking rule by sharing information about a writ against the appellant with another respondent.

The application judge found no breach because the assignment of the writ occurred before the correspondence disclosing the writ and settlement negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings.

The court declined to award costs, noting that the respondent lawyer should not have appeared as counsel since he was a named respondent and his conduct was central to the case.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to address the specific requirements of section 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, particularly section 5(1)(a)(iv).

The judgment below was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The self-represented appellant purported to appeal a costs-only order following the dismissal of his underlying action.

The Court of Appeal held that there is no right of appeal from a costs order and that leave is required.

Treating the materials as an application for leave to appeal costs, the Court refused leave and awarded costs of $1,000 to each of the four responding groups.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing an Indemnity Agreement and collateral demand mortgages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the Indemnity Agreement was a specialty subject to a 20-year limitation period and that the action on the collateral mortgages was brought within the 10-year limitation period, which commenced when moneys were advanced under the primary indemnity obligation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred by granting judgment on the mortgage covenants for an amount in excess of the primary indemnity debt, as the mortgages were collateral security.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside orders authorizing collection procedures and the issuance of a further notice of garnishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the orders as the respondent held a valid Ontario judgment against the appellant.

The court held that the appellant was improperly attempting to re-litigate previously made orders.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action for negligent misrepresentation.

They alleged the respondents negligently misrepresented that a property severance had been obtained in 1996.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the representation was made, the appellant knew nothing had been registered.

Under the Planning Act, registration is required for a valid severance.

The court held that the appellants' loss was caused by their own error of law, for which the respondents could not be held accountable.

The moving parties brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which refused an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal.

The moving parties had claimed at trial that they intended only to provide a character reference for the main borrowers, but the trial judge rejected their evidence.

Their appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the single judge that there was no basis for granting an extension of time, as the proposed leave motion raised only issues of credibility and had no chance of success.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action following the death of Emilio Spirito, naming several hospitals, doctors, and 'Doctors AB, CD, EF, GH'.

After the two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act expired, the plaintiffs sought to amend the claim to substitute the appellants for Doctors AB and CD.

The motion judge allowed the amendment, finding it was a case of misnomer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that correcting a misnomer does not constitute adding a party, and therefore s. 21 of the Limitations Act, 2002 does not bar the amendment.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested costs for a motion for a stay, despite no costs being requested in relation to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs of the motion for a stay to the Attorney General, fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of whether she could recover no-fault medical and rehabilitation benefits beyond the 10-year benefit period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, provided the need for such expenses was established with certainty within the 10-year period.

The Court of Appeal held that the plain meaning of section 6(1) of the SABS requires that the expenses result within the benefit period.

Therefore, expenses for treatments and services provided beyond the 10-year anniversary of the accident are not recoverable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) brought a motion for a stay of an order restraining its members from picketing at courthouses during a lawful strike, pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

OPSEU argued that peaceful informational picketing is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and that a total ban was unnecessary.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for granting a stay.

While tentatively accepting jurisdiction as a single judge to hear the motion, the court dismissed the motion on the balance of convenience branch.

The court held that the public interest in ensuring unimpeded access to the courts, as established in BCGEU, outweighed the harm flowing from the infringement of the picketers' constitutional rights.

The self-represented appellant appealed four Certificates of Assessment of Costs issued by an assessment officer following the dismissal of his earlier appeal.

The appellant raised numerous objections, including allegations that the respondents' claims for costs were fraudulent, that one corporate respondent did not exist, and that the assessment officer demonstrated bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the assessment officer's duty was to assess costs in accordance with the court's order, not to look behind it or review the underlying basis of the claims.

The court found no foundation for the appellant's allegations of fraud or bias.