Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

This appeal concerned the application of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, specifically when the respondent knew that a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy for unpaid invoices.

The appellant, a condominium corporation, argued the action was time-barred, asserting the trial judge erred in applying discoverability principles and finding a running account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the limitation period began when the respondent was informed the condominium corporation was not obligated to pay invoices, rather than earlier.

The court upheld the running account finding and the application of discoverability principles, noting the defendant's assurances delayed the plaintiff's understanding of the need for litigation.

This is an appeal from a trial judge's decision to discharge a mortgage.

The appellant claimed a loan was secured by a mortgage on the respondent's home, which was later re-loaned but remained secured.

The trial judge, unable to determine witness credibility, relied on documentary evidence to find the mortgage had been repaid and effectively redeemed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the issue of redemption was properly before the court via counterclaim, that the appellant waived technical compliance by admitting repayment, and that the trial judge was entitled to rely on documentary evidence given credibility issues.

The appellants, a police officer and the police services board, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent police investigation of the respondents regarding stolen auto parts.

The trial judge had determined the standard of care without relying on expert evidence and awarded substantial damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in departing from the general rule that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care for a professional, as the investigation was technical and the police conduct was not egregious.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in formulating the standard of care and failing to consider the respondent's committal for trial.

The judgment was set aside except for an agreed award for damaged property.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the appellant's costs for the underlying action.

The court awarded the appellant costs of the underlying action, including summary judgment motions but excluding costs associated with a cross-claim, on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $65,231.79.

The court declined to make an order regarding additional costs sought by the appellant's shareholders' counsel.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent vehicle owner.

The driver, who was impaired and caused a fatal accident, admitted he did not have the owner's consent to drive the vehicle.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a purely subjective test for implied consent and by not directing a trial of the issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered all evidence and credibility, and correctly concluded he could resolve the dispute on summary judgment.

The appellant, a former police officer, sued for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation after criminal charges against him were withdrawn pursuant to a negotiated resolution agreement requiring his resignation.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the criminal proceedings did not terminate in the appellant's favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the withdrawal of charges was a bona fide quid pro quo for the appellant's resignation, not an abandonment of prosecution or an abuse of power.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a Rule 21 motion seeking to strike a condominium corporation’s action arising from alleged construction defects, including sanitary sewer failures and exterior cladding water penetration.

The court held that although Tarion’s warranty denial decisions were judicial and final for issue estoppel purposes, applying issue estoppel would work an injustice given the consumer protection purpose of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, the permissive language of the tribunal appeal provisions, the procedural limits of Tarion proceedings, and the advantage of resolving all claims in one forum.

The court further held that the civil action was not an impermissible collateral attack, that Tarion could be sued for payment from the guarantee fund, that the sanitary sewer allegations were not plainly outside the definition of major structural defect, and that the EIFS limitation argument failed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employee suffered a mental breakdown and sued her employer for negligent infliction of mental suffering and negligent supervision, following a period of workplace restructuring, denial of a promotion, and disciplinary actions for absenteeism.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the employer's actions were reasonable responses to declining performance and that the employer was unaware of the employee's mental illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if a free-standing tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering exists in the employment context, the trial judge's factual findings precluded liability.

The appellant's action was dismissed by the motion judge for failure to post security for costs in accordance with a Master's order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant had not appealed the Master's order, had not complied with it, and had adduced no evidence of his alleged impecuniosity.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her solicitor negligence claim, arguing the respondent law firm failed to ensure she received independent legal advice before mortgaging her home for a family business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant was a partner in the business and knowingly mortgaged her home to provide funds for it.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, specifically a memorandum containing foundational information for the final opinion of an expert retained by the respondents.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal ordered the production of the memorandum under Rule 31.06(3).

The respondents moved to set aside this order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that Rule 31.06(3) applies only to the discovery stage of litigation and does not entitle a party to obtain disclosure after trial, especially when the party knew of the expert's final opinion prior to trial but failed to seek discovery of the foundational information at that time.

The appellant commenced a second action against the respondents to realize on a judgment for deposit monies obtained in a prior action.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, filing five affidavits while the appellant filed no evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial as the appellant failed to put its 'best foot forward' by filing evidence or conducting cross-examinations.

The court also declined to interfere with the motion judge's costs award.

The added parties appealed an order striking out their pleadings for willful failure to obey court orders.

They sought to adjourn their appeal to be heard with the husband's appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined the adjournment and dismissed the appeal on two grounds.

First, the appeal was moot because the respondent had proceeded to an uncontested trial and obtained a final judgment, and the appellants had not sought a stay of the order striking their pleadings.

Second, the appeal was dismissed due to the appellants' ongoing and deliberate refusal to comply with numerous court orders.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The parties were involved in a joint venture agreement to develop land.

When the lender demanded repayment of its loan, the appellants did not pay their share.

The respondents used a non-arm's length company to purchase the loan and foreclose on the lands, appropriating the appellants' investment.

The appellants sued for breach of the joint venture agreement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that none of the parties relied on the agreement's provisions and instead pursued self-interest outside its terms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, ruling that a party cannot enforce an agreement it has demonstrated an intention not to be bound by.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding joint or several liability and the rate of prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not precluded from pursuing the action against the appellant after obtaining default judgment against a numbered company, as the causes of action were independent.

However, the Court agreed with the appellant that prejudgment interest should have been calculated at 5% per annum rather than 2% per month.

The appeal was dismissed subject to the variation of the prejudgment interest award.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their solicitor's negligence claim and awarding substantial indemnity costs to the respondents.

They also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias and negligence grounds, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported by the evidence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to $35,000, while maintaining the substantial indemnity scale due to the nature of the allegations made by the appellants.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no costs of the appeal.

The Attorney General for Ontario moved for a stay of an order requiring the production of a videotaped police statement in a civil action, pending an application for leave to appeal.

The videotape was made by the plaintiff regarding sexual assault allegations against a former teacher of the defendant school, and had already been disclosed to the accused in the related criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding the Master's jurisdiction or the application of litigation privilege, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the parties in the civil action.

The appellants appealed a finding of liability in a medical malpractice case, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent's trial expert witness had subsequently pleaded no contest to professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether to admit the fresh evidence, finding that even without the expert's testimony, the other evidence on record—including the respondent's own testimony and other medical evidence—supported the trial judge's conclusions on causation and informed consent.

The appellants called no evidence at trial to refute this.

The court also upheld the quantum of damages and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendant driver.

The defendant later brought third party proceedings against two municipalities, alleging snow banks obstructed her view.

The plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim to add the municipalities as defendants after the three-month limitation period under the Municipal Act had expired.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application of the discoverability principle to postpone the limitation period is a question of fact to be determined at trial.

The municipalities were added as defendants with leave to plead the limitation period.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank appealed a trial judgment declaring that all debts under a line of credit extended to the respondents were discharged and ordering the discharge of a collateral mortgage.

The respondents had obtained a line of credit secured by a second mortgage on their home, along with life insurance that would repay the loan if either died.

The bank improperly calculated monthly interest payments, leading to an apparent default, and subsequently demanded repayment.

This demand automatically terminated the life insurance policy.

When one of the respondents later died, the insurance company denied coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bank's appeal, finding that the bank's breach of the loan agreement by taking more than the minimum monthly payment led directly to the default and the subsequent demand, which in turn caused the termination of the life insurance policy.