Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The moving parties, Paige Power and Darcy Dixon, sought an extension of time to file their notice of appeal after missing the deadline by about an hour due to being unaware of the 4:00 p.m. court day cutoff.

The Court of Appeal considered the relevant factors for an extension, found no prejudice to the respondent, and noted confusion in the underlying proceedings involving multiple actions and applications.

The court required the respondent to provide an explanatory statement of all pending matters and granted the extension, allowing the notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of receiving the statement.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision to partially allow an appeal and award damages to the appellant.

The appellant sought trial costs of $750,000 and prejudgment interest of over $2.3 million, compounded annually.

The respondent conceded entitlement to trial costs but argued for a lower amount due to the appellant's limited success and for a reduction in prejudgment interest due to an 18-year delay in prosecuting the claim, also opposing compounding.

The Court fixed trial costs at $475,000 and prejudgment interest at $600,000, denying compound interest and reducing the amount due to the unexplained and unreasonable delay.

The appellant employer terminated the respondent's employment and made several termination-related payments, including a mistaken payment in November 2018.

The parties subsequently attended mediation and executed minutes of settlement requiring the employer to pay $150,000 'in addition to amounts already paid'.

The employer's representatives at mediation were unaware of the November payment and later sought to deduct it from the settlement amount.

The motion judge enforced the settlement, finding no ambiguity and no fraud by the respondent regarding the employer's unilateral mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the subjective, uncommunicated knowledge of the employer's representatives did not form part of the factual matrix for contractual interpretation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim on a construction contract for an airport refurbishment.

The motion judge found that the respondent municipality was entitled to rely on a waiver clause signed by the appellant, which precluded compensation for delays or uncompleted work if the project was halted due to public concerns or funding withdrawal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence that public outcry and a superseding joint project triggered the waiver clause.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable either as guarantors or on a promise to purchase promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement based on the context and intention of the parties.

The court also refused to interfere with the trial judge's costs order and awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a former employee, which the motion judge had found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The former employee had previously blown the whistle on alleged irregularities in the appellants' affairs, leading to a prior settled action and a release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the current action was brought for an improper purpose, specifically to harass the respondent and suborn her testimony in an ongoing oppression proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for breach of a 1988 agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent's obligations under the agreement were predicated on the registration of a new plan of subdivision.

Since the respondent made reasonable efforts but the plan was never approved, the obligations were never triggered, and there was no breach of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment order.

The president and CEO of the appellant corporation had pledged shares as security for a loan advanced by the respondent, representing that all was in order despite a notice of restriction on the transfer of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 19 of the Business Corporations Act, the corporation could not rely on its own non-compliance with its articles and by-laws to defeat the claim, as there was no evidence the respondent knew or ought to have known of the non-compliance.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposing three months for contempt and an additional six months for the permanent loss of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in law for the six-month sentence for loss of evidence and struck it down.

However, the court upheld the three-month sentence for contempt, noting the trial judge's sustainable findings that the contempt was egregious and intentional.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion for a stay of action, arguing that California had exclusive jurisdiction and Ontario was not the appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to establish exclusive jurisdiction was supported by the evidence.

The court deferred to the motions judge's discretionary finding that Ontario was the more appropriate forum and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision, which was based on the credibility of witnesses, surveillance video, and the appellant's failure to disclose relevant information to his doctors and on his CPP application.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $4,500.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Swinton.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to comment on the standard of review and agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge which adequately dealt with the grounds of appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The respondents settled a personal injury claim arising from a bar fight and subsequently brought an action against the appellant for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act.

The trial judge found the appellant 80% liable and ordered him to pay $380,000.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability but held that the trial judge erred in apportioning fault without regard to the findings in the first trial.

The Court reduced the appellant's contribution to $162,555.50 to ensure the respondents did not obtain a better result in the second action than they could have in the first.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle collision at an intersection and alleged the accident was caused by overgrown brush obscuring a stop sign.

The intersection had been transferred from the Regional Municipality to the City 108 days prior to the accident.

The Region successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the transfer of jurisdiction completely extinguished its liability for non-repair.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the transfer of the road did not instantly absolve the Region of potential liability for prior negligence in maintaining the road, and that factual issues regarding the City's opportunity to inspect and repair required a trial.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's construction of the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly construed the Minutes of Settlement and that the appellant's explanation was not in the material before the motion judge and could not be considered.

The appellant developer appealed a judgment granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential condominium unit.

The application judge had found the developer breached the agreement by improperly setting confirmed occupancy dates and terminating the agreement due to delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in interpreting the agreement and in making factual findings based on inference without a trial.

The judgment was set aside, and the application was converted into an action to proceed to trial on the disputed factual issues.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict that dismissed his motor vehicle accident claim, finding no negligence on the part of the respondent driver and assessing damages at zero.

The appellant argued the verdict was perverse and that the trial judge made several procedural and instructional errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence based on credibility issues and that the trial judge made no errors in the conduct of the trial or her instructions to the jury.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for wrongfully dismissing the respondent employee.

The employer argued that the trial judge interfered in the conduct of the trial to such an extent that the image of judicial impartiality was destroyed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge unduly intervened by redirecting lines of questioning, extensively cross-examining the employer's witnesses, and requiring the production of a policy manual that was not part of the pleadings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff insurance broker appealed the trial judge's refusal to award pre-judgment interest and costs after successfully suing a former producer for the purchase price of her book of business.

The defendant cross-appealed the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement and the dismissal of her counterclaim for withheld commissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding ample support for the trial judge's interpretation.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by depriving the successful plaintiff of costs and interest simply because the agreement was poorly worded, especially since the plaintiff had made an offer to settle for the amount the defendant claimed was owed.

The insurer appealed a trial judgment granting disability benefits despite findings of material misrepresentations about health and income.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider recklessness as a basis for civil fraud under the governing test, and further held that on reinstatement of the policy the insured had a positive duty to disclose facts plainly bearing on insurability, including the absence of any insurable income, even where the insurer did not insist on a written reinstatement application.

Because the nondisclosure at reinstatement occurred within two years, the incontestability clause did not protect the insured.

The policy was voidable and the action was dismissed.