Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a counterclaim brought against them by the respondents.

The motion judge found that the appellants' expression did not relate to a matter of public interest, failing the initial threshold for an anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that the appellants' expressions were primarily concerned with private property interests (e.g., tree protection, fencing, sightlines) related to an adjacent retirement facility development, rather than broader public concerns, despite the development itself having public interest aspects.

The court affirmed the deferential standard of review for a motion judge's finding on whether an expression relates to public interest and confirmed that the motion judge did not err by considering the context of the expressions without impermissibly assessing motivations.

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granted against them, which included full indemnity costs under a second mortgage, and the striking of their statement of defence and counterclaim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants were liable under the mortgage, their pleadings were unparticularized, and that other outstanding claims did not justify delaying judgment.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend due to the unintelligible nature of the pleadings and the appellants' failure to seek amendment or provide proposed amended pleadings.

The appellant, Payman Khanlari, appealed a summary judgment order that found him liable for unjust enrichment.

He argued that he was treated unfairly as a self-represented litigant and that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment due to credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding unfair treatment, noting the appellant's familiarity with legal proceedings.

However, the court found that the motion judge erred in quantifying the unjust enrichment by not accounting for payments admittedly made by the appellant to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed to vary the judgment amount.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of Minutes of Settlement signed by family members to resolve three lawsuits involving property and personal injury claims.

The lower court dismissed motions to enforce the settlement, finding a misunderstanding regarding specific equipment (a tractor and snowmobiles) based on subjective intentions.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in principle by relying on subjective evidence rather than an objective interpretation of the contract.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the Court clarified the terms for the tractor (correcting a typographical error) and snowmobiles, concluding that a valid agreement existed.

The appellant sought to appeal a lower court judgment that recognized two Florida judgments requiring him to pay the respondent approximately $1.6 million (Canadian).

The sole issue on appeal was whether the application judge erred in declining the appellant’s request to adjourn the hearing, which was made nine days after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the application judge's decision, noting that the appellant's previous counsel had already filed an application record and factum, and the judge ensured all grounds were addressed.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

This appeal concerned an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant, a medical resident, sued an investigation firm and its investigator for defamation based on executive summaries of a workplace harassment investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the summaries related to a matter of public interest, were protected by qualified privilege, and lacked evidence of malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the expressions related to public interest due to the nature of the educational institution, media attention, and public safety concerns, and were protected by qualified privilege.

The appellant, Antonio Duscio, appealed a 16-month imprisonment sentence for contempt of court, which was imposed shortly after a previous 12-month contempt sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's analysis of relevant legal principles or extensive factual findings.

The court noted that the appellant could secure early release by purging his contempt or providing a complete accounting of dissipated funds and assets.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's determination that its automobile insurance policy, which included an OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement, provided uninsured motorist coverage to the spouse of an employee.

The employee was a delivery driver with a flexible schedule who had discretionary access to the company van during business hours.

The spouse was struck by an uninsured motorist after the company opened for business but before the employee arrived at work.

The court held that the van was available for the employee's "regular use" at the time of the accident, satisfying the temporal nexus requirement under section 2 of the endorsement.

The spouse qualified as an "insured person" under section 1.6(b) of the endorsement.

The appellant, a dermatological clinic, appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against a respondent who posted negative online reviews claiming the laser resurfacing treatments caused volume loss to her face.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that while the appellant met the threshold under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could view the respondent's claims as factual statements rather than protected opinion, the appellant failed to satisfy the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) by not establishing that the harm suffered was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the respondent's expression.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the tortfeasors, their insurer, and her own insurer under an OPCF 44R endorsement.

The tortfeasors' insurer took an off-coverage position and settled with the appellant for the $200,000 statutory minimum.

The appellant's insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the tortfeasors' policy limits were never legally reduced and the release barred the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an insurer's off-coverage position and settlement do not reduce liability limits 'by operation of law' without a legal determination.

However, the appellant's action against her own insurer could proceed, wherein she would bear the burden of proving the tortfeasors' policy breach.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to plead damages directly resulting from the respondent's actions and did not suffer any damages as a consequence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant supplied construction materials to the respondent and signed an agreement acknowledging full payment.

The appellant later discovered it had failed to bill for several deliveries and sought to recover the outstanding amount, arguing the agreement should be set aside for common mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement allocated the risk of mistake to the appellant, the mistake was the appellant's fault, and the respondent had altered its position.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court Judge, which had struck his appeal from a Master's order on the basis that the Master's order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, confirming that the Master's order was interlocutory and that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed an order denying him costs and expenses incurred in realizing on a mortgage security.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that there had been no default by the mortgagors and no waste committed, meaning the costs were not recoverable.

The court also dismissed the appellant's claims of procedural errors and bias, and upheld the denial of a certificate of pending litigation.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed, deleting a $5,000 payment previously awarded to the appellant for expenses, as there was no default to justify it.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an insurance claim for economic loss following a fire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to reject a financial planner's letter and his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove economic loss for the period beyond the policy coverage based on tax returns.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the allegations in the statement of claim to be confusing, difficult to follow, and legally untenable, with some relating to the Federal Crown and decades-old criminal dispositions.

Finding no error in the motion judge's reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order striking their statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the plea of fraudulent misrepresentation was untenable, the factual allegations were capable of establishing an absence of good faith.

The court held that the novel cause of action in negligence was not plain and obvious to fail, and permitted it to proceed.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside an ex parte order.

The ex parte order had dismissed their underlying motion regarding entitlement to sale proceeds because they failed to deliver expert material by the deadlines set in two consent scheduling orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his supervisory discretion over the receivership and correctly emphasized the need for compliance with court orders and the integrity of the Commercial List.

The appellants appealed an order allowing the plaintiffs to substitute Dr. Petrasek for a 'John Doe' defendant under Rule 26.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim did not point the 'litigating finger' at Dr. Petrasek, as there was no evidence he was responsible for the positioning of the plaintiff for surgery.

The motion to substitute was dismissed.