Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

6044402 NB Ltd. ("604") brought a motion to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of a previous decision (Benzacar v. Terk, 2023 ONCA 773) concerning its obligations in a garnishment proceeding. 604 sought to recalculate the amount payable to the sheriff, arguing for a lower sum based on new mathematical arguments.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding no arguable merit in the request, that it was an attempt to reargue matters already in issue during the original appeal, and that the interests of finality strongly favoured rejection, especially given 604's unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

This addendum was issued by the Court of Appeal for Ontario to clarify the total outstanding costs owed by the responding parties to the moving parties, Harsha Rathod and Bluekat Capital Corp. It consolidates costs orders from previous decisions by Roberts J.A. and a three-judge panel, specifying the combined amounts due to each moving party.

The appellants failed to appear for their scheduled appeal hearing before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, despite attempts by the court and respondent's counsel to contact them.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's refusal to enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The jury found the defendant physicians negligent and that their negligence caused the plaintiff's severe disabilities.

The trial judge ordered a new trial, finding the jury's answers on causation insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to enter judgment.

The court emphasized the high standard for setting aside jury verdicts and the presumption that juries understand and apply judicial instructions, even if their answers are conclusory.

The judgment of $14.9 million in damages was reinstated.

This motion concerned an application by The Class Action Clinic, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law, to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal brought by Donald Parker.

Parker's appeal challenged an unsuccessful motion for an extension of time to opt out of a class action against Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario, concerning medical care for inmates.

The Clinic sought to provide a framework for determining extensions of time to opt out of class actions.

The court granted the Clinic's motion to intervene, finding that the Clinic could make a useful contribution to the appeal's resolution without prejudicing the parties, given the unsettled legal considerations regarding opt-out extensions in class actions.

Mark Couper appealed a judgment ordering him to pay legal fees and disbursements to Rueters LLP.

The appeal was based on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the applications judge, an alleged error in finding Rueters had good reason to withdraw as counsel without court approval, and the invalidity of a compromise compensation agreement (CCA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that Rueters had good reason to withdraw (client caused breakdown, no prejudice, no court approval needed as client agreed), and that the CCA was valid and enforceable (new issue not raised below, and found fair and reasonable).

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order transferring his damages claim to the Small Claims Court and striking his claim for declaratory relief regarding professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the transfer as the damages claimed were within the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The Court also upheld the striking of the declaratory relief claim, noting that allegations of professional misconduct are properly matters for the Law Society.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a defamation claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for reasons given in a related file.

The court also noted that a non-party making allegations against the respondent physician had no standing in the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a motorcycle accident.

In a related civil action, he was examined for discovery and testified he had no memory of the accident.

At his criminal trial, he gave a detailed account of the accident.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on his discovery evidence to impeach his credibility, finding that s. 13 of the Charter did not apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that under R. v. Henry, prior compelled evidence is inadmissible against an accused even for the purpose of challenging credibility.

The appellants' action was dismissed by a motion judge because they were two days late in paying an $8,000 costs award mandated by a peremptory scheduling order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge exercised her discretion unreasonably by failing to consider the justice of the case, the lack of prejudice to the respondents, and the minor nature of the breach.

The Court extended the time for compliance and reinstated the action.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against a defendant law firm.

The respondent conceded the motion judge erred in concluding the claim did not plead a cause of action, as the claim pleaded 'knowing assistance' in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motion judge's order, and granted the appellant leave to amend the statement of claim to provide sufficient particulars regarding the law firm's actual knowledge of the trust and participation in the breach.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Crown for failing to comply with the notice requirement in s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that notice under s. 7(1) must be in writing.

The court also declined to interfere with the motion judge's $1000 costs order.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she signed a $50,000 guarantee in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant argued that her signature was forged by her common-law husband in collusion with bank employees, and alleged transcript deficiencies, a missing exhibit, and trial judge bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the appellant's allegations and concluding that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence, including expert testimony.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial mortgage, prompting the respondent mortgagee to issue a Notice of Sale and accept an offer to purchase the property.

The appellants subsequently obtained a higher offer and sought to enjoin the sale, arguing the Notice of Sale was defective and the accepted offer was improvident.

The application judge declined to enjoin the sale, and the sale closed before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Notice of Sale was reasonable and the mortgagee could not be restrained from exercising its power of sale after entering into a binding agreement in good faith.

The moving party brought a motion seeking to review or reopen the court's previous disposition of her appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion without an oral hearing, finding a lack of merit and a lack of jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The court noted that the proper remedy for dissatisfaction with the disposition of the appeals was to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court ordered that the moving party may not file further motions in respect of these appeals.

The appellant appealed the order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal and agreed with the motion judge's reasons.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $500 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant developer appealed a judgment granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential condominium unit.

The application judge had found the developer breached the agreement by improperly setting confirmed occupancy dates and terminating the agreement due to delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in interpreting the agreement and in making factual findings based on inference without a trial.

The judgment was set aside, and the application was converted into an action to proceed to trial on the disputed factual issues.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a settlement she made with the defendants.

The motion judge found that the appellant fully understood the legal effect of her actions and that the $20,000 settlement was not unconscionable given a previous $72,000 payment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action for lost profits and expenses against the respondent, who supplied a wood finishing product.

The trial judge had dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to prove the product was defective, caused the delamination, or that damages were proven.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellant was acquitted of robbery and subsequently sued the respondent police officers for malicious prosecution.

At trial, the jury found the officers lacked reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution but found they were not actuated by malice.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions on malice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury that malice could be inferred from the officers' reckless indifference to evidence of the appellant's innocence.

Rather than ordering a third trial, the Court exercised its jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act to enter judgment for the appellant in the amount of $75,000 as assessed by the jury.