Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant father sought to vary a child support order retroactively and have arrears rescinded after the children ceased to be "children of the marriage" under the Divorce Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, relying on S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction under section 17(1) of the Divorce Act to vary or discharge child support arrears even after children are no longer "children of the marriage," distinguishing the variation provision from the original order provision based on statutory language and child support principles.

The appellant attempted to selectively accept portions of the respondent's settlement offer that favored him while rejecting other essential terms, relying on a severability clause that had been included in error.

The motion judge refused to enforce the partial acceptance, finding it would be blatantly unfair to allow the appellant to cherry-pick favorable terms while requiring the respondent to continue litigating.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision, finding no error warranting interference.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting damages to the respondents for breach of an oral agreement regarding the sale and installation of Shaw Cable packages in Ontario.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal a full indemnity costs award of $144,991.

The motion judge found that the appellants breached the agreement, misappropriated funds, and owed monies pursuant to loans.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding the agreement was not a joint venture, that they breached it, that it was not varied, that one appellant dissipated assets, and that judgment was awarded to a non-party.

The Court of Appeal upheld most findings but varied the judgment to remove a non-party from the damage award.

The court upheld the full indemnity costs award, finding the appellants' conduct—including moving funds out of the country and fabricating evidence—warranted such an award.

The appellants appealed an order staying their action against an Alberta hotel corporation for lack of a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that none of the presumptive connecting factors were met.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Ontario should assume jurisdiction under the forum of necessity doctrine due to the expiry of the Alberta limitation period, noting the appellants made a tactical decision not to sue in Alberta.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a police officer and the police services board, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent police investigation of the respondents regarding stolen auto parts.

The trial judge had determined the standard of care without relying on expert evidence and awarded substantial damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in departing from the general rule that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care for a professional, as the investigation was technical and the police conduct was not egregious.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in formulating the standard of care and failing to consider the respondent's committal for trial.

The judgment was set aside except for an agreed award for damaged property.

The moving parties, comprising approximately 175 lenders, brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed motion for leave to appeal.

The original motion for leave was brought by the appellants regarding an Ontario Securities Commission decision that found they traded securities without registration and ordered disgorgement.

The lenders argued they were not given notice of the leave motion and had a right to be heard on the disgorgement remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to reopen, finding the lenders were not 'affected' by the order dismissing leave under rule 27.14, as the regulatory proceedings were not civil proceedings designed to compensate them directly.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decisions regarding spousal support, child support, section 7 expenses, and the dismissal of his third-party claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental distress against a former neighbour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds except for a conceded error in calculating section 7 expenses, finding that the trial judge's determinations on income calculation, support, and the third-party claims were supported by the record and free from reversible error.

The appellant appealed a decision determining that interest on the principal outstanding under a note runs from the date of issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that without clear language, interest does not run on the balance owed before the note was issued and the payee, principal, and rate were fixed.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the order under appeal was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the lower court's order did not terminate the responding party's rights to seek injunctive relief or to have a notice of sale declared invalid.

As the order was interlocutory, the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The respondent was assaulted by unidentified individuals while sitting in his vehicle at a gas station.

He escaped by driving away and believed he may have run over one of his assailants, claiming both physical and psychological injuries.

The appellant insurer terminated his statutory accident benefits, arguing the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 2(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Court of Appeal held that the physical assault was an intervening act and not an accident directly caused by the use or operation of the vehicle.

However, the court found that the psychological injuries stemming from the respondent's belief that he ran over an assailant while fleeing could constitute an accident, requiring a trial on that issue.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for mortgage, line of credit, and credit card debts.

The appellants argued that 'Bill-Consumer Purchases' documents they submitted were legal tender for their debts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the documents had no commercial value and the debts remained unpaid.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment and a vesting order granted following an uncontested trial, which occurred after his statement of defence was struck for failure to comply with disclosure obligations.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that an appellant must exhaust their remedies to change, vary, or set aside a default order in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

Following an appeal, cross-appeal, and fresh evidence motion where the respondents were successful, the parties made submissions on costs.

The respondents claimed over $98,000 in total on a partial indemnity scale, while the appellants argued no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, a significantly reduced amount.

Applying the Boucher principles, the Court of Appeal fixed costs at $30,000 for the Receiver and $7,500 for the trust company, noting the appellants' alternative of not suing and the trust company's minor role in the appeal.

Following an appeal that ordered a new trial restricted to the respondent's proof of loss for her fine arts collection, the parties made written submissions on costs and the scope of the new trial.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the new trial is restricted to the fine arts collection proof of loss and that the trial judge may consider punitive damages and section 129 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant, having been successful in obtaining a new trial, was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $50,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The respondent's home was destroyed by fire, and she claimed against her insurer, the appellant, for the loss of the home, contents, jewelry, and a large fine art collection.

The insurer denied coverage, alleging arson and material misrepresentation in both the application and the proof of loss.

The trial judge rejected the insurer's defences and awarded over $4.5 million in damages plus punitive damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the application misrepresentation and the application of s. 124 of the Insurance Act to the insurance binder.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial restricted to the proof of loss, finding that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to explain how he resolved significant credibility issues regarding the respondent's evidence of her fine art losses.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal, a 5% equity interest in two corporations, an oppression remedy, exemplary damages, and damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-month notice period for wrongful dismissal and the award of exemplary damages against the employer corporation due to the egregious circumstances of the termination.

The Court also upheld the respondent's entitlement to a 5% equity interest in the employer corporation and the oppression remedy.

However, the Court set aside the equity interest in the holding company, the damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil, finding no legal basis to hold all defendants jointly and severally liable.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent contractor damages for breach of contract related to a sewer construction project.

The appellant argued the contract required concrete casing and the respondent bid using steel at its peril.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had advised steel was acceptable and accepted the bid on that basis.

The respondent's cross-appeal for punitive damages was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for production of documents from non-parties.

The motion judge found that the respondent had no ownership interest or authority over the non-party corporation, the documents were not germane to the litigation, and it would not be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test or exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability following an accidental shooting where a 13-year-old was severely injured by a 15-year-old friend playing with a firearm at his father's house.

The trial judge had apportioned 50% liability to the 15-year-old, 25% to his father, and 25% to the injured party (conceded), while finding the mother, aunt, and uncle not liable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of no liability for the mother, aunt, and uncle, as they had no knowledge of the firearms and exercised reasonable supervision.

However, the majority allowed the appeal regarding the father's liability, increasing it to 45% (and reducing the 15-year-old's to 30%) because the father failed to secure the firearms, failed to inform the caregivers about the weapons, and demonstrated a prolonged lack of supervision.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that summary judgment is generally inappropriate when the rule of discoverability is central to a limitation issue and facts are in dispute.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not related to a claim for malpractice in respect of professional services and is therefore not subject to the limitation period in the Regulated Health Professions Act.