Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

This is an appeal from an anti-SLAPP motion.

The appellant, VAC Developments Limited, sought to overturn the dismissal of its $1.5 million defamation counterclaim against the respondent, Agin Williams.

Williams had publicly alleged that VAC failed to address racist threats and dismissed him in reprisal for involving the police.

The motion judge dismissed VAC's counterclaim under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding VAC had not shown substantial merit or sufficiently serious harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting Williams' expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that VAC failed to demonstrate sufficiently serious harm, which is a critical component of the public interest balancing test in anti-SLAPP motions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondents (defendants in the original action) on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant (plaintiff) sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that removed his counsel of record.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that an order for the removal of counsel is interlocutory and must be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision to partially allow an appeal and award damages to the appellant.

The appellant sought trial costs of $750,000 and prejudgment interest of over $2.3 million, compounded annually.

The respondent conceded entitlement to trial costs but argued for a lower amount due to the appellant's limited success and for a reduction in prejudgment interest due to an 18-year delay in prosecuting the claim, also opposing compounding.

The Court fixed trial costs at $475,000 and prejudgment interest at $600,000, denying compound interest and reducing the amount due to the unexplained and unreasonable delay.

The appellant sought to overturn a motion judge's order declining to restore their action to the trial list, dismissing it for delay, and discharging a certificate of pending litigation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the delay in prosecuting the action was entirely the appellant's responsibility, was unexplained, inordinate, and inexcusable.

The court agreed that an inference of prejudice arose from the lengthy delay, jeopardizing the likelihood of a fair trial due to the passage of time, impact on witness memories, and lack of proper discoveries.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal and subsequently addressed costs.

The respondents sought costs for the appeal and for pre-appeal motions that did not proceed.

The appellants argued for no costs due to divided success or novelty, or a reduction.

The court found the respondents wholly successful on appeal, rejecting claims of divided success or novelty.

It awarded $15,000 for the appeal costs and a reduced amount of $5,000 for the motions, acknowledging costs were incurred despite the motions not being argued.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a fraudulent scheme involving the sale of used vehicles.

The trial judge found the appellant garage liable for conversion of five missing vehicles and awarded damages of $40,792.

The trial judge dismissed conversion claims regarding consigned vehicles, finding the parties acquired them in good faith without notice of defects in title.

The appellants challenged the findings regarding stolen vehicles, mitigation of damages, quantum of damages, and the failure to adjudicate certain counterclaims.

The respondents cross-appealed the mercantile agent finding and the costs award.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, with limited relief granted for a contribution and indemnity claim against one defendant.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, but the Court of Appeal found that the evidence was not in a form that could be considered.

As a result, the lower court judgment dated December 5, 2018 was to be enforced according to its terms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his civil action as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant had been charged with stunt driving and related offences under the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in the seizure of his vehicle for seven days.

He subsequently sued for $75,000 in punitive damages and $2,100 in travel expenses, alleging the seizure constituted theft without his consent or court order.

The motion judge found the claim had no legal merit and dismissed it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the claim was incapable of success on its face and rejecting arguments that the seizure violated Charter rights or the property rights of the vehicle owner.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a motor vehicle accident case, alleging various trial errors constituted a miscarriage of justice, including leading questions by plaintiff's counsel, mention of independent medical examinations, discussion between counsel and plaintiff after cross-examination, mention of insurance, admission of opinion evidence from a body shop manager regarding vehicle speed, and the trial judge's charge excluding a zero award of general damages.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the costs award, alleging the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the leave to appeal on costs, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the trial events or costs decision.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed his appeal of a small claims court judgment.

The small claims court had awarded damages to the respondent arising from a margin trading account dispute, finding the appellant's defence had no basis in fact or law.

The Divisional Court upheld the judgment, and the appellant failed to file his notice of motion for leave to appeal within the prescribed 15-day period.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The panel affirmed this dismissal, finding the defence had no merit and the appeal lacked any scintilla of merit.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed additional material filed by counsel at the court's request and determined that the appellant's submissions did not raise an issue on which leave to appeal the costs order should be granted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeal from an order requiring her to submit to a mental capacity assessment.

The respondent condominium corporation opposed the extension, arguing that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court found that the order was indeed interlocutory in nature, as it was procedural and did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.

The court refused to grant the extension, finding that it would not be proportionate or in the interests of justice to prolong proceedings given the enormous costs incurred relative to the amounts in issue, and that the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court.

The appellant was dismissed without cause from his employment as a senior vice-president and part-owner of the respondent company.

The trial judge awarded 5 months' pay in lieu of notice and fixed the share repurchase trigger date at the end of the notice period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased the notice period to 9 months, finding the trial judge overemphasized short service and underemphasized the character of employment and availability of similar employment.

The Court also allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the share repurchase trigger date was the date of termination, not the end of the notice period.

Finally, the Court adjusted the trial costs order, finding that a second settlement offer revoked the first.

The appellants were injured in a bus collision in 2000 and commenced an action against several defendants in 2001.

In 2006, after the expiry of the former two-year limitation period under the Highway Traffic Act, they sought to add a doctor as a party defendant.

The Court of Appeal held that the transition provision in s. 24(3) of the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, which barred the proceeding.

While the court confirmed that the common-law doctrine of special circumstances remains available to extend a former limitation period under the transition provisions, it upheld the motion judge's finding that no special circumstances existed because the appellants had made a deliberate decision not to sue the doctor before the limitation period expired.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order that dismissed his claims against his former employer regarding changes to his compensation structure and unpaid trailer fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the limitation period barred claims respecting changes to the compensation structure.

However, the Court found that the limitation period did not apply to the limited claim for trailer fees earned by the appellant and received by the employer in the first quarter of 2000 before his departure.

The appeal was allowed in part against the corporate respondent only.

The appellant, a wholesale distributor of fresh fruit, suffered produce spoilage due to a widespread power failure that caused its refrigeration equipment to stop working.

The respondent insurer denied the claim based on exclusion clauses for mechanical/electrical breakdown and changes of temperature.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the insurer and refused the appellant's request for an adjournment to file evidence on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the refusal to grant an adjournment would not have affected the result and that the change of temperature exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous.

The appellant passenger was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and was found 35 per cent contributorily negligent by a jury for failing to wear an available shoulder harness, despite wearing a lap belt.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury's assessment was unreasonable, as contributory negligence solely for failing to wear a seatbelt should not exceed 25 per cent.

The court substituted an assessment of 5 per cent contributory negligence, noting the appellant complied with the statutory requirement to wear a lap belt and the shoulder harness was a non-retracting type that was commonly worn improperly.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike out his claims against the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario and the Crown defendants.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim against the Association was properly struck out.

The Court also found that the claim against the Crown defendants did not make out a cause of action outside the reach of s. 7(1) of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against the respondents.

The appellant argued that he met the one-year limitation period by advising the respondent of his claim within one year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that notice of a claim does not satisfy the statutory requirement that a 'suit is brought' within the limitation period.

The court also found no evidence that the respondent's conduct estopped them from relying on the limitation period.