Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to challenge the validity of his deceased mother's will.

The motion judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to comply with a previous order requiring him to serve a notice of change of solicitor or a notice of intention to act in person within 30 days.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the dismissal was a final order.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 15.04(9) given the appellant's pattern of delay and non-compliance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party (guarantor) sought an extension of time to appeal a partial summary judgment of $1.8 million.

The motion judge's endorsement was not received by the parties for over 18 months.

The court granted a brief extension, finding that the guarantor demonstrated an intention to appeal within 30 days of receiving the endorsement, the delay was relatively brief and partly attributable to the court's delay and the lender's conduct, and despite remote chances of success on appeal, the interests of justice favored granting the extension given the unusual circumstances of the endorsement's late release.

This appeal addressed the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction to appoint a representative defendant for an unincorporated association, specifically a trade union, in a wrongful termination claim.

The appellants argued that the Small Claims Court Rules contained an "omission" regarding such orders, precluding reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the Small Claims Court Rules themselves provided the necessary authority for such orders, and that reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure was discretionary but not essential.

The court found no legislative intent to exclude unincorporated associations from the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction, emphasizing the court's role in facilitating access to justice.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 16, 2018.

The appellants did not appear at the hearing of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and fixed costs in the amount of $6,830.52 inclusive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent bank based on her default under a mortgage on a condominium property.

The appellant had stopped making principal, interest, and common element fee payments.

The appellant raised defences including that her name had been expropriated and that she was a tenant rather than an owner.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion for a finding that the respondent was in contempt of court for failing to comply with a disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal held that an order dismissing a motion for contempt is interlocutory, not final, as it is not binding on the trial judge.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order finding her in contempt of court for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law contrary to a previous court order and section 50 of the Law Society Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments and agreeing with the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant's conduct and prepared documents transgressed both the court order and the governing statute.

The court directed that the penalty phase proceed before the motion judge and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellants sought to examine a representative of the trustee in bankruptcy regarding its reports and an order permitting the assignment of thousands of leases without customer representation.

The motion judge adjourned the motion, directing the parties to exchange written questions and answers first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly exercised his discretion to adjourn the motion and await the trustee's answers before adjudicating the merits, including whether an affidavit is required under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant appealed an order, seeking to compel the respondent to execute a proposed agreement.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed agreement was not executed by the required date, rendering the proposal expired and null and void.

Consequently, the court held that no purpose would be served in ordering the execution of the agreement and dismissed the appeal as moot.

The appellants appealed an order regarding their right to renew a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that not being in default was a condition precedent to the privilege to renew.

As the mortgage was and remained in default, the appellants could not renew it.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a confidentiality regime in Advocis disciplinary proceedings.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to hold the parties to their undertaking to be bound by the confidentiality regime, subject to specific exclusions defined in their agreement.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the appellants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay compensation to the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty in a failed restaurant venture.

The trial judge found the appellant breached his duty by causing his solely owned corporation to enter into a secret lease agreement with the partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Partnership Act did not preclude the respondent from suing in his own right, the respondent had not elected an exclusive remedy, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a breach of fiduciary duty or in the remedy awarded.

The Court also significantly reduced the respondent's costs claim, finding it excessive.

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their statement of defence and counterclaim which claimed equitable set-off against the respondent personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no connection between the struck paragraphs and the allegations of set-off.

However, the Court deleted a paragraph of the order that appeared to prohibit future amendments, clarifying it was merely commentary.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its reasons for judgment released on September 7, 2005.

Following correspondence from CGU Insurance Company of Canada, the court amended paragraph 5 of the reasons to clarify that CGU's concession at the hearing was directed specifically to the trial judge's obiter concerning the absence of an explicit forfeiture provision in the instructions to tenderers, and did not relate generally to the trial judge's interpretation of the bid bond.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly stated the applicable principles and reasonably concluded that the delay was inordinate, raising a presumption of prejudice.

As the appellants provided no evidence to explain the delay, the Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding liability for a gas spill.

The appellant had accepted responsibility for the spill, made substantial payments, and indicated that only damages needed to be quantified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's words and conduct reasonably led to the conclusion that it would not rely on the limitation period.

The appellant, a unionized employee, sued his former employer and union executive for allegedly misrepresenting the terms of an early retirement agreement.

The employer and union successfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the dispute arose from the interpretation and application of the collective agreement and the union's duty of fair representation.

Under the Weber principle and the Labour Relations Act, such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator or the labour relations board, not the courts.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his claim for nervous shock arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a triable issue as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the deceased's conduct could result in damages to an innocent driver involved in the accident.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that nervous shock was not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application for failure to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision, noting that because the required security was not provided, the lower court had no choice but to dismiss the application.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant insurance company appealed an order refusing to bifurcate the trial of the plaintiffs' action on an insurance contract and for bad faith punitive damages.

The appellant argued bifurcation was necessary to protect it from disclosing privileged communications in the bad faith claim that could prejudice the contract claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that there was no evidence the appellant would actually suffer the alleged prejudice, but left open the possibility of a further motion on appropriate evidence.