Naomi M. Lutes

The appellant, Kevin Bedard-Morin, appealed his 22-month sentence for receiving material benefits from the commission of an offence under the Criminal Code.

He argued the sentence was excessive, citing an expectation of time served due to pre-sentence custody, the non-violent nature of his offence compared to cited cases, and insufficient credit for harsh COVID-19 conditions during pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that pre-sentence custody attributed to an unrelated Quebec offence could not be double-counted for the Ontario offence.

The court found the sentencing judge properly considered aggravating factors, including exploitation of three complainants over months, significant material benefit, and the appellant's criminal record, and appropriately weighed mitigating factors like the guilty plea and COVID-19 conditions.

The appellant, convicted of firearm-related charges, appealed his conviction.

While released pending appeal, he failed to surrender into custody as required by his release order on the day of the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that his whereabouts were unknown.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal as abandoned, citing his repudiation of the court's jurisdiction by absconding and the terms of his release order.

A warrant for his arrest was issued.

The appellant, Dennis Rhodes, appealed his convictions for voyeurism, prowling, and indecent act, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal concerned Charter challenges related to arbitrary detention (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), specifically regarding the search of his vehicle and cell phones.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 9 appeal as abandoned and found no error in the application judge's Garofoli review or nexus analysis for the search warrants.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 18-month custodial sentence appropriate given the serious invasion of privacy.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant (L.S.) met on a dating app.

The trial judge found the appellant had an honest but mistaken belief that L.S. was 18, but failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain L.S.'s age, leading to conviction.

On appeal, the appellant argued errors in the fault element analysis and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction.

The court clarified that while the trial judge's reasoning on the "alternative pathway to conviction" was erroneous in light of new authorities (R. v. Morrison, R. v. Carbone), the ultimate conclusion of guilt was proper.

The failure to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, combined with recklessness, was sufficient to establish the mens rea for sexual interference.

The misapprehension of evidence claim also failed to meet the stringent threshold for appellate intervention.

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.

The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.

The Law Society of Ontario investigated the appellant lawyer for failing to promptly and completely produce documents related to his firm's structure and referral fee practices, breaching Rule 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division found professional misconduct, which was upheld by the Appeal Division and the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that the lower courts erred by applying a purely objective test to "good faith" in the duty to cooperate, effectively creating an absolute liability offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the test for failure to cooperate is a mixed subjective and objective one, considering all circumstances and good faith efforts, but clarified that ignorance of record-keeping obligations cannot serve as a "good faith explanation" for delay.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal court found that the trial judge made several errors, including mischaracterizing the primary issue as a credibility contest, improperly relying on a prior consistent statement to bolster the complainant's credibility, applying an incorrect standard of consent (requiring "informed consent" in criminal law), and misapprehending expert evidence regarding the medical indication for the breast examination.

These errors led to a negative assessment of the appellant's credibility and potentially shifted the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Marc Vickers, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking a new trial based on fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of unsworn, unrecorded hearsay statements from C.B. (the victim's son, also convicted of the murder) recanting his trial testimony and claiming sole responsibility for the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the admissibility requirements of necessity and reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, nor the cogency requirement.

The court emphasized that C.B. was available to testify, and his inconsistent recantations lacked inherent trustworthiness and adequate procedural safeguards.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed his conviction on the basis that his guilty pleas were uninformed.

He was unaware of the serious immigration consequences of his pleas, specifically that he would be deported without a right of appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearm-related offences and possession of cocaine.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel did not adequately inform the appellant of the specific immigration consequences, and that the appellant would have proceeded to trial had he been aware of the deportation consequences.

The court found the appellant satisfied both prongs of the test for setting aside a guilty plea: lack of awareness of a legally relevant consequence and prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The offender, a 19-year-old international student, was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for second-degree murder.

The offender returned to the victim's home after an initial altercation and assaulted the victim, causing a fatal rupture of the victim's vertebral artery.

The court found the assault was a planned and premeditated ambush in the victim's home, elevating the moral blameworthiness of the offence.

After weighing the aggravating factors against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and rehabilitative prospects, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 53 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused, a medical doctor, was charged with sexual assault of a patient.

This was a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal following a previous conviction.

The complainant testified to various sexual acts by the accused during a medical appointment.

The accused denied all allegations, citing a severe right hand injury at the time that would have made the alleged actions excruciatingly painful.

The defence also presented "fresh evidence" from other patients and a tenant who claimed to have overheard the complainant and her sister discussing fabricating an allegation for financial gain.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness but disbelieved the accused's testimony.

However, considering the medical evidence regarding the accused's hand injury and the "fresh evidence" from defence witnesses, despite its suspicious nature, the court found that a reasonable doubt existed.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed convictions on 14 counts arising from three separate incidents: a June 2013 driving incident involving dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and intimidation; a June 2013 arrest incident involving dangerous driving and escaping lawful custody; and various incidents involving neighbours and school-related matters.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments, arguing insufficient reasons, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and misapplication of the W.D. test.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed and thorough, credibility findings were properly grounded, and no reversible errors occurred.

Robert Barra and Shailesh Govindia were convicted of agreeing to bribe the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

Barra, CEO of Cryptometrics US, retained Govindia to facilitate a $500,000 bribe for a facial recognition software contract with Air India, with potential for an additional $1.5 million.

Govindia, however, misappropriated the bribe funds, leading to the scheme's failure and no contract award.

The Crown sought 4 years for Barra and 3 years for Govindia, while the defence proposed 2 years for both.

Considering mitigating factors such as no prior criminal records, the unsuccessful nature of the bribe, and economic hardship, alongside aggravating factors like financial motivation and the seriousness of the offence, the court imposed a sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment for each offender.

The appellant, Furkan Karatekin, appealed his conviction and nine-month imprisonment sentence for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's credibility findings were fundamentally flawed due to misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence testimony, and improper use of the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's cellphone number explanation, ankle injury, and police statement was deemed problematic.

The cumulative effect of these palpable and overriding errors rendered the conviction unsafe.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused applied for a mistrial due to the Crown's late disclosure of information, including an agreement not to use a witness's statements against him and email exchanges questioning the authenticity of an exhibit.

The court applied the Stinchcombe and Dixon principles on disclosure and the right to make full answer and defence.

The court found that while disclosure was late, the accused failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the late disclosure affected the trial's outcome or fairness, or impaired their ability to make full answer and defence.

The remedy granted was to prevent the Crown from calling reply evidence, including recalling the witness to change his testimony, thereby preserving the accused's tactical position.

The Municipality of Halton Hills and the Province sought orders regarding Charlie, a Rottweiler owned by Robert Berry and Victoria Mary Sciberras.

The dog had bitten another dog (Houston) on June 8, 2016, and a young person (JA) on October 31, 2016, causing serious injury.

The court found that Charlie's behaviour constituted a menace to public safety but declined to order destruction.

Instead, the court ordered the defendants to surrender Charlie to either the Ontario Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals or a suitable rescue shelter, and prohibited the defendants from owning any dog for three years.

The court also addressed Charter delay arguments and found no breach of s.11(b) rights.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his patient during a medical examination.

On appeal, the appellant sought to admit fresh evidence consisting of affidavits from four independent witnesses who observed the complainant and her sister after the alleged assault.

The witnesses testified that they overheard conversations suggesting the complainant and her sister were planning to fabricate allegations against the appellant for financial gain.

The Court of Appeal found the fresh evidence met the Palmer test for admissibility, as it was reasonably capable of belief, bore on the decisive issue of credibility, and could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

Three appellants convicted of first and second degree murder appealed their convictions.

Two were convicted of first degree murder and one of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as inconsistent and unreasonable, and raised multiple grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury charge, including issues regarding post-offence conduct instructions, circumstantial evidence instructions, and the treatment of various pieces of evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed on the acquittal of one appellant on first degree murder.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts neither inconsistent nor unreasonable, and that the trial judge committed no errors in her charge to the jury.