Mira R. Pilch

This decision addresses a motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning the temporary care and custody of a child, M.S., following apprehension by the Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County.

The court applied the statutory test under section 94 of the Act, focusing on whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm and whether supervision orders could adequately protect the child.

The evidence demonstrated the mother’s long-standing alcohol abuse, verbal abuse, and uncooperative behavior, which placed the child at risk.

The court ordered the child remain in the father’s temporary care with supervised access to the mother, emphasizing the least disruptive placement consistent with the child’s safety and well-being.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) brought a motion to temporarily place a child (X) with the father's girlfriend (V.P.), or alternatively, arrange graduated access.

The mother opposed this, seeking temporary placement with the maternal grandmother or graduated access.

The court dismissed both motions for temporary placement, finding neither party met the onus under subsection 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to demonstrate that X's best interests *required* a change in temporary placement given the imminent trial and need for stability.

However, the court ordered increased access for X to both V.P. and the maternal grandmother, with the CAS exercising discretion, to facilitate deeper relationships and gather evidence for trial.

The court clarified that X would be the access holder and V.P. and the maternal grandmother would be access recipients, without granting them party status, to avoid derailing the upcoming trial.

The appellant father (B.K.) appealed a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed his children in the care and custody of the respondent mother (D.A.) subject to the Society's supervision.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding who had pre-intervention charge of the children and the children's true wishes, and alleged misconduct by the Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the required standard of being highly relevant and decisive to the children's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order transferring primary care of the parties' two children to the respondent father, which included an initial period of no contact for the mother and a staged increase in parenting time.

The trial judge's decision, made after a 39-day trial, found the mother had intentionally undermined parenting schedules and made false allegations of sexual abuse to terminate the children's relationship with the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's exercise of discretion and factual findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in parenting orders, especially when the decision has already been implemented.

The court found no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her consideration of the Divorce Act regarding family violence, as the mother's allegations were not established.

This case involves two Status Review Applications brought by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto concerning four children.

The Society sought extended society care for all children, while the father sought a twelve-month supervision order for all children to be placed with him.

The mother agreed to extended society care for the children.

The court assessed the children's best interests, considering their special needs, the parents' ability to provide consistent care, and the father's history of non-compliance and undermining placements.

The court found the father unreliable and secretive.

Ultimately, the court ordered extended society care for all four children, with specific access provisions where the children are the access holders, and the parents are the recipients, subject to the children's views and the society's discretion.

The appellant (P.I.A.) sought a stay of a trial judge's order transferring primary care and decision-making responsibility of two children to the respondent (W.S.), pending appeal.

The motion judge applied the three-part test for a stay (serious question, irreparable harm, balance of convenience), with the overriding consideration being the children's best interests.

While a low threshold for serious question was met on one ground (admissibility of expert evidence), the court found no evidence of irreparable harm to the children and determined the balance of convenience favored maintaining the trial judge's order to restore the parenting relationship with the respondent.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The respondent father applied for a mistrial in a child protection proceeding, alleging numerous procedural irregularities and disclosure failures by the applicant agency.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer joined the application, while other parties opposed it.

The court reviewed the established test for mistrial, emphasizing it as a measure of last resort for fatally wounded trial processes.

While acknowledging the applicant's chaotic and haphazard disclosure practices and inefficient trial management, the court found that the cumulative effect of the issues did not fatally compromise trial fairness.

The court ordered certain evidence struck and mandated further disclosure from the applicant, but ultimately dismissed the mistrial application, prioritizing the child's best interests and avoiding further delay.

This is a costs decision arising from a motion heard on August 28, 2020, in which the father sought decision-making authority over vaccination of the parties' child, cessation of day care attendance, a change from private to public school, and a modified parenting schedule.

The parties settled the school issue and certain other matters.

The father succeeded on the vaccination issue but failed on the day care issue.

The court found divided but unequal victory, with the father achieving greater success on the more complex and time-consuming vaccine issue.

The court awarded costs to the father in the reduced amount of $3,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements, taking into account the divided victory and applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

The respondent mother filed a 14B Motion seeking a temporary stay of the court's September 28, 2020 order granting the applicant father decision-making authority over the child's vaccination decisions.

The motion was dismissed on three grounds: (1) the motion was opposed and not appropriate for 14B procedure; (2) there was no urgency or pressing need, as the mother delayed filing the appeal and did not pursue an earlier hearing date in the Superior Court; and (3) insufficient evidence was provided to satisfy the stay test.

The court found that the mother should pursue her stay motion in the Superior Court as scheduled for November 24, 2020.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The respondent mother and father sought costs of $5,819.50 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society following a motion for disclosure of case notes from a meeting between society counsel, society staff, and doctors from the Hospital for Sick Children.

The society initially claimed litigation privilege over the notes but waived privilege prior to the hearing, rendering the motion moot.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that the society acted reasonably in claiming privilege, provided appropriate disclosure to the parents through a subsequent meeting with medical personnel, and that the parents' counsel became unnecessarily fixated on the privileged meeting and engaged in inappropriate conduct toward society counsel.

A father brought a motion seeking decision-making authority over his almost 10-year-old son's vaccinations, requesting the child not return to private school and day care, and seeking an equal time-sharing arrangement.

The mother opposed all three requests.

The court granted the father decision-making authority over the child's publicly funded vaccinations, finding it in the child's best interests based on the child's good health, expert medical evidence, and the mother's failure to provide any credible medical evidence supporting her position.

The court dismissed the father's requests regarding day care and deferred the parenting schedule issue to trial.

The court applied a best interests test rather than requiring the father to demonstrate material change in circumstances or exigent circumstances.

A child protection motion concerning the placement of a newborn infant in the temporary care and custody of the mother, subject to a supervision order.

The Society sought an order requiring the mother to reside at Rosalie Hall Maternity Home as a condition of the child remaining in her care, or alternatively, that the child be placed in the Society's care.

The mother opposed this requirement and proposed an alternative plan involving residence in the father's apartment with support from paternal family members.

The court found that the mother lacked adequate parenting skills, had an inconsistent history with her older child, and did not have a solid support plan.

The court ordered that the child remain with the mother on condition that she reside at Rosalie Hall, with the alternative being placement in the Society's care.

The Society brought a motion to vary a temporary child protection order to permit unsupervised access between the mother and two children (ages 12 and 8).

The children had been placed in the father's care following allegations that the mother and her sisters subjected them to physical discipline during fundamentalist religious practices.

The mother faced criminal charges which were resolved through a peace bond.

The court found sufficient change in circumstances to warrant expanded access, including the resolution of criminal charges, the mother's participation in counselling and parenting courses, removal of the aunt primarily responsible from the home, and the children's expressed desire to see their mother more.

The court ordered a phased approach to access beginning with day visits, progressing to overnight weekend visits, with various protective terms and conditions including restrictions on prayer, contact with the removed aunt, and compliance with COVID-19 protocols.

The mother brought an urgent motion seeking in-person access to her infant son, who was placed in the care of the maternal grandparents following serious non-accidental injuries sustained while in parental care.

The child was hospitalized with traumatic brain injuries, including subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and bruising.

The society opposed the motion, seeking to maintain virtual-only access due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns, particularly given the child's medical vulnerability.

The court dismissed the mother's motion and upheld the suspension of in-person access, finding that the child's fragile medical condition and the evolving pandemic risks outweighed the benefits of face-to-face contact at that time.

This is a status review application in a child protection matter involving an 11-year-old child who had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society for 33 months.

The court determined that the child was in need of protection and that intervention through a court order was necessary.

The applicant sought extended society care with access at the agency's discretion.

The respondent mother sought placement of the child in her care subject to a supervision order.

The court found that the mother's mental health issues, lack of insight, combative behaviour, and failure to address protection concerns made her unsuitable to care for the child.

The court ordered extended society care with access to the mother at the agency's discretion.

A temporary care and custody motion brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto concerning five children.

The society sought placement of the youngest child (L.O.), born in 2018, in its care due to severe failure to thrive and developmental delay, and placement of four older children with their mother subject to supervision.

The mother opposed removal of the youngest child and sought dismissal of the protection application.

The court found overwhelming evidence of neglect, including the youngest child's severe malnutrition and developmental delay, and a long history of chronic neglect spanning multiple jurisdictions.

The court granted the society's motion, placing the youngest child in the society's care and the four older children with the mother under strict supervision orders.

This appeal concerns a mother's request for access to three of her six children in extended care following their apprehension by the Children's Aid Society in 2015.

The motion judge granted Crown wardship without access.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision but applied the old Child and Family Services Act rather than the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the transitional provisions of the new Act applied, the record was insufficient to satisfy the expanded access test, the children's Indigenous heritage was not properly considered, and the approach to summary judgment in child protection matters was misapplied.

The matter was remitted to Superior Court for determination under the new legislation.

A child protection trial involving four children of C.D. The Children's Aid Society of Peel sought protection findings and various disposition orders.

The court found all four children to be in need of protection based on evidence of physical discipline and inadequate supervision.

The court ordered: M. (globally developmentally delayed) into extended Society care; twins Aa. and As. into the custody of their father G.B.; and D. into the temporary care of a kin caregiver C.S. for six months.

The mother's position that she had never hit her children was rejected based on the totality of evidence, including prior proceedings and the children's statements to police.

A status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning a child found in need of protection.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought a final order of extended society care without access to the mother to facilitate adoption.

The mother sought return of the child under a supervision order or, alternatively, access.

The court found that the mother repeatedly breached supervision orders by maintaining contact with her biological father, a registered sex offender with a history of child sexual abuse.

Despite opportunities to address the risk through counselling and support services, the mother demonstrated poor judgment, lack of credibility, and inability to comply with court-ordered conditions.

The court granted extended society care but permitted limited access through cards and letters with the child as the access holder.