M. Gregory Ellies

M. D. was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against his granddaughter, M. V., alleged to have occurred in 2008.

The complainant testified that the defendant sexually assaulted her while she was watching television.

The defendant denied the allegations, citing his severe mobility issues due to Paget's disease, which would have made the alleged actions physically impossible within the described timeframe.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding credibility and reasonable doubt.

While finding the complainant believable, the court found the defendant's and his son's evidence regarding his physical limitations credible, creating a reasonable doubt as to whether the incident could have occurred as described.

The defendant was acquitted.

Richard Wight moved to terminate a child support order and expunge arrears.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS), as assignee of the support order, opposed this and brought a motion for extensive financial disclosure from Wight, including tax returns from 1978.

The court applied the proportionality principle, finding MCSS's disclosure requests disproportionate given the age of the order and the limited amount of outstanding arrears.

Wight was ordered to provide consents for MCSS to obtain information directly from CRA and FRO, and to provide a copy of a related Owen Sound order, but the broader disclosure requests were dismissed.

The applicant wife sought temporary spousal support based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs).

Entitlement was conceded by the respondent husband, but quantum was disputed.

The court found the SSAGs inappropriate due to the unknown income of the high-earning respondent and the potential for a radically different lifestyle for the applicant.

The court imputed no income to the applicant temporarily due to mental health issues but considered her actual needs and pre-separation lifestyle.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $8,500 per month in temporary spousal support, an increase from the $5,000 voluntarily paid but significantly less than the SSAGs suggested.

The defendants, Dr. L., Dr. S., and Hospital A, brought motions to strike portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim, for partial summary judgment, and to bifurcate the trial in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by Dr. L. for treating J.O. despite knowing or ought to have known of her incompetence, and for failing to disclose past medical errors and complaints.

The court partially granted the motion to strike, removing allegations of failing to disclose general information and past medical errors/complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons, but allowed claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty based on Dr. L.'s knowledge of her own deficiencies to proceed.

The motions for partial summary judgment and bifurcation were dismissed.

The court also ordered J.O. to provide consent for police records related to a Family Law Act claim.

The appellants appealed two orders: a dismissal of an application for financial disclosure and a finding of contempt for breaching a prior court order by placing a clown with a crucifix on their lawn and yelling at neighbours.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal of the dismissal order for lack of jurisdiction.

The court upheld the contempt finding against the husband but set aside the finding against the wife, as there was no evidence she actively placed the clown on the lawn.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to review a single judge's order requiring him to post $10,000 in security for costs for his pending appeal of a Small Claims Court decision.

The Divisional Court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had insufficient assets to pay a costs award.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of two costs orders made by FSCO adjudicators after her claim for a $1,378.68 medical assessment expense was dismissed due to her failure to attend a required medical examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application regarding the first-instance costs order as premature because an internal appeal was still pending.

The court dismissed the application regarding the appeal costs order on its merits, finding the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and justified given the applicant's complete lack of success and conduct that prolonged the proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision reducing her spousal support, arguing the motions judge erred by not directing a trial and by failing to properly account for the compensatory nature of her support.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of her historical tax returns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings, including the finding that the appellant had cohabited with her new partner prior to marriage, and correctly applied the law regarding material change in circumstances.

The applicant sought a contempt order against the respondent for failing to comply with a previous court order requiring a pension valuation, an up-to-date financial statement, and supporting documentation.

The court found the respondent in contempt for willfully failing to file an up-to-date financial statement in the correct Form 13.1, despite being explicitly instructed by a prior judge.

However, allegations regarding the pension valuation and supporting documentation were dismissed, as the former was not proven to be a willful breach and the latter was deemed too vague in the original order to establish deliberate non-compliance.

The court imposed an order for the respondent to file the correct financial statement and supporting documents within 14 days, with a conditional fine and imprisonment for non-compliance, and fixed costs payable to the applicant.

The accused, J. A. V., was charged with seven sexual offences involving three complainants, all under 16.

The court considered similar fact evidence for most allegations.

The court found the accused guilty on two counts related to M. H. (first and fourth incidents of sexual touching while M. was asleep), and not guilty on the remaining five counts involving B. D. and T. G., as well as the "lounge chair" and "penis stroking" incidents involving M. H., due to reasonable doubt regarding credibility, reliability, and implausibility of the complainants' or accused's evidence.

Submissions were requested for a potential stay on the guilty counts and disposition of two remaining Criminal Code breach counts.

The applicant, a road paving contractor, sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's decision to debar it from bidding on municipal contracts for four years.

The debarment was based on the applicant's ongoing litigation against the municipality, health and safety violations including a workplace fatality, and a history of poor contractual performance and abusive behaviour.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the initial debarment decision lacked procedural fairness, the defect was cured by a subsequent bona fide reconsideration process.

The court further held that the municipality's by-law was valid and the debarment decision was reasonable.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and attempt to obstruct justice after breaking into a home and repeatedly stabbing three victims who had implicated his brother in a previous crime.

The Crown sought 6 to 8 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 3 to 5 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The court emphasized the devastating impact on the victims and the need for public protection, sentencing the offender to 8 years imprisonment less enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with multiple historical sexual offences against twin sisters who frequented his convenience store when they were youths.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual contact occurred before the complainants turned 14, or that one of the complainants was sexually assaulted.

However, the court found that the accused was in a position of trust towards one of the complainants when they began a sexual relationship after she turned 14.

As a result, her consent was legally irrelevant, and the accused was found guilty of sexual exploitation.

The plaintiff, a self-represented minister of the Church of the Universe, sued the Attorney General of Canada for damages and an injunction after being acquitted of possessing cannabis, which he claimed was a religious sacrament.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment, and the defendant moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion as premature.

The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the claims for Charter damages, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and negligence, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend his claim for a constitutional exemption under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed an interim order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy and evicting him for rent arrears.

The appellant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because he had commenced a Superior Court action claiming a 50% ownership interest in the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the appellant was a tenant and to order eviction, as he was not a registered co-owner and no final court determination of co-ownership existed.

The Court also upheld the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment, finding no denial of procedural fairness where the appellant voluntarily chose not to attend the hearing.

The appellant appealed a final order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy and evicting him so the landlord could demolish the building.

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by determining he was not a co-owner of the property, an issue he had raised in a concurrent Superior Court action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the appellant was a 'tenant' under the Residential Tenancies Act, which required assessing if he occupied the unit as a co-owner.

The Court held the Board's conclusion was reasonable and would not cause a multiplicity of proceedings, as the Board only determined legal ownership for tenancy purposes, leaving the Superior Court to adjudicate the appellant's claim for an equitable interest.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for non-earner and housekeeping benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued that the insurer's failure to promptly respond to his application created a deemed entitlement to benefits, and that the arbitrator erred in applying causation principles given his multiple accidents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator reasonably concluded that the insurer's delay did not create a deemed entitlement where the insured failed to prove entitlement.

The court also upheld the arbitrator's factual findings that the applicant failed to prove the accident caused his impairments or a complete inability to carry on a normal life, noting his condition was essentially unchanged from pre-existing injuries.

This decision addresses the certification of a common issue regarding the aggregate assessment of damages under s. 24(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in a class action concerning improper access to personal health information.

Following the certification of the class action itself, the court considered whether a 'base amount' or 'minimum award' of damages could be determined in the aggregate for all class members, without individual proof of loss.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that aggregate damages were only applicable to causes of action with a deterrence element or that the case was factually distinguishable from precedent.

It concluded that a common issues trial judge could determine a base amount of damages given that every class member's privacy was breached in the same manner.

The appellant father appealed an order denying his application for periodic or lump sum dependant support for his minor daughter from her deceased mother's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The mother had left life insurance proceeds in a bare trust for the daughter.

The application judge found the father's budget included expenses not attributable to the child and ordered funds paid into court to be administered by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's consideration of the statutory factors, his assessment of the evidence, or his decision to utilize the Minor's Fund Program to manage the support payments.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent summary judgment, which dismissed his motion to change a previous child support order.

The appellant argued the previous order did not comply with the Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the original judge was entitled to make an order based on Minutes of Settlement even if it deviated from the Guidelines, provided reasonable arrangements were made.

To vary the order, the appellant had to show a material change in circumstances, which he failed to do.