M. Gregory Ellies

Mr. Shultz applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code for a review of a detention order.

The original detention was based on the secondary ground (public safety) due to a lengthy criminal record with violent offences.

A new release plan was proposed with a childhood friend as surety.

The court found the new plan inadequate, citing the proposed surety's lack of awareness of the accused's record and the unreliability of a third party involved in the employment plan.

The court also found detention necessary on the tertiary ground (public confidence in justice administration) due to the gravity of the offences (aggravated assault, attempted drowning) and the Crown's intention to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite imprisonment.

The application for review was dismissed.

The accused faced a judge-alone trial on historical sexual offence allegations involving a complainant who was a child at the time of the alleged incidents.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court accepted the accused's denial evidence and found that, in any event, the complainant's testimony contained significant inconsistencies, improbabilities, and reliability concerns, with related supporting evidence also not accepted in material respects.

The court held that the Crown had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board (GSB) decision regarding a grievance for a poisoned work environment.

The GSB found that the grievor's rights were violated but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to award damages for mental stress, stating the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (WSIA) was the appropriate forum.

The applicant argued the GSB's decision was unreasonable because it simultaneously found the employer's conduct fell within the WSIA's 'employment function' mental stress exclusion while directing the grievor to the WSIA scheme.

The Divisional Court agreed, allowed the application, and remitted the matter back to the same GSB arbitrator to properly determine whether the exclusion applied.

Ms. Smith appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit, alleging breaches of her Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The trial judge had rejected her evidence regarding these breaches and found no Charter violations.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the trial judge properly evaluated the conflicting evidence and that the officer had reasonable grounds for the stop and ASD demand.

The court also affirmed that the right to counsel is suspended during a valid highway traffic stop and that Ms. Smith did not request specific counsel at the police station.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

In this motion for temporary child support, the respondent mother sought an order for child support for the two children of the marriage, which the applicant father resisted.

The parties shared parenting time, necessitating the application of section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Due to conflicting financial information and a lack of child expense budgets, the court imputed incomes for both parents and calculated a set-off amount.

The court then adjusted this set-off to account for the father's higher standard of living and debt burden, ultimately ordering the father to pay $300 per month in temporary child support.

The court declined to award costs due to unnecessarily lengthy affidavits containing irrelevant information.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on unaccepted offers to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10(2) did not entitle the plaintiffs to substantial indemnity costs because they were the responding parties on the motion, and the motion was dismissed.

However, exercising its discretion under Rule 49.13, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs, increased to $3,500 to recognize their efforts to resolve the matter.

This case addresses the jurisdictional limits of a provincially appointed Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) judge to vary a support order made by a federally appointed judge under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 (ISOA), particularly when the applicant resides outside Ontario.

The court clarified that an OCJ judge's power to make a provisional variation order under ISOA s. 26(2) is restricted to situations where the applicant resides in Ontario and the reciprocating jurisdiction requires such an order (ISOA s. 30(1)).

Consequently, the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to make a provisional order in this case, as the applicant resided in Alberta.

The Superior Court of Justice quashed the OCJ's provisional order and assumed jurisdiction over the variation application, requiring further information on the merits of the support variation.

The defendants moved to compel the plaintiffs to produce unredacted banking records and additional documentation to trace the source of funds.

The plaintiffs had redacted portions of bank statements, asserting irrelevance and privacy, and resisted requests for further documentation.

The court allowed the motion for unredacted bank statements, finding the plaintiffs failed to meet the high threshold for redaction, which requires both clear irrelevance and a "good reason" for non-disclosure (e.g., significant harm or public interest infringement).

However, the court denied the motion for additional documentation to trace the source of funds, as the defendants did not establish its relevance beyond an improper fishing expedition.

The court also addressed the procedure for filing sealed documents, granting a temporary sealing order to allow the plaintiffs to formally apply for a sealing order.

The defendant moved to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) registered against his property, which was issued following a failed real estate transaction where the plaintiffs sought specific performance.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs made full and fair disclosure in their ex parte CPL application, the property was sufficiently unique to support a claim for specific performance, and the alternative claim for damages did not warrant discharging the CPL under the Courts of Justice Act.

The parents appealed a summary judgment order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed their child in extended Society care with no access.

The Superior Court found that the motion judge erred in applying the summary judgment test by relying on outdated legal principles (e.g., "clearest of cases" test) and failing to properly assess and weigh conflicting evidence.

Specifically, the motion judge did not adequately consider the mother's alleged dependency on the father, the father's criminal history, the parents' efforts to access services, and the reasons for missed access visits.

The court also noted procedural unfairness due to short timelines and the motion judge's failure to consider all relevant affidavit evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for redetermination before a different judge.

The accused, C.F., applied under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code for the production of records from a school counsellor concerning the complainant, K.W., in a sexual offence case.

The accused sought production due to a material inconsistency between the complainant's police statements and her preliminary inquiry testimony regarding an act of cunnilingus.

The court found the records likely relevant and their production necessary in the interests of justice, balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy rights.

The court ordered the records produced for judicial review.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant brought a motion at the court's direction to determine whether the self-represented respondent was a 'special party' under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules.

The court reviewed the respondent's demeanor, communications, and former counsel's opinion, finding him incapable of understanding the issues or appreciating the consequences of his decisions.

The court declared the respondent a special party and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as his legal representative.

The court considered the defendant's request for costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interim injunction.

The plaintiff, acting in person, resisted costs, claiming to be a "pauper." The court applied the principles of indemnity and access to justice, noting that the plaintiff's motion was unmeritorious and not brought in the public interest, especially given the imminent passage of the Cannabis Act.

The court found the defendant's requested costs of $3,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable, despite the defendant's actual costs being higher.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $3,000 in costs.

The defendant, Kayne Robinson, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime (cash over $5,000).

A third charge of cannabis possession was withdrawn.

The Crown's case relied on police observations during a search warrant execution and expert testimony regarding drug dealing practices.

The defence argued that the cocaine was not in Robinson's possession and highlighted inconsistencies in police testimony, a gap in surveillance, and lack of forensic evidence.

The court found Robinson not guilty of the cocaine-related charges due to reasonable doubt arising from the inconsistencies in police evidence and Robinson's credible testimony.

The court also provided guidance on the Superior Court's jurisdiction over summary conviction offences when charged alongside indictable offences, noting that the Superior Court generally lacks jurisdiction for standalone summary offences and that reconstituting as a summary conviction court would be unwise due to potential appellate conflicts.

The Crown sought an order of certiorari to quash a justice of the peace's purported cancellation of an officer-in-charge (OIC) undertaking, which the Crown argued was beyond the justice's jurisdiction under s. 508(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the justice of the peace did not cancel the undertaking but merely refused to confirm it, an act also outside their jurisdiction.

Since the justice of the peace merely refused to perform an unauthorized act, there was no jurisdictional error to quash.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a motion where the applicant was awarded temporary spousal support.

The applicant sought $4,470.85 in costs, while the respondent sought $8,391.

The court found the applicant to be the more successful party in the underlying motion, as she obtained spousal support despite seeking a higher amount, and the respondent's counter-proposals were not adopted.

The court rejected the applicant's arguments of bad faith against the respondent.

Considering the reasonableness and proportionality of the parties' conduct and offers to settle, the court noted that both parties' offers were far from the ultimate award.

The applicant's costs were reduced to reflect the discrepancy between her initial request and the final outcome.

The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant $3,500 in costs, all-inclusive.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to conclude that a recording of the complainant was made for a sexual purpose and misapprehended evidence regarding sexualized conversations.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge acquitted the accused based on a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused intended to make *any* recording, not merely whether the purpose was sexual.

The court held that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome and that the factual findings and inferences drawn were reasonable, warranting deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, and the imposed sentence of 18 months incarceration.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons for conviction were inadequate or unreasonable, and that the sentence was excessive.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review and reasonable based on the evidence.

The court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's criminal record and the aggravating circumstances of the offences.

The accused, Sean Leblond, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay in his trial for five sexual offences.

The total delay from information sworn to estimated trial end was 1305 days (43 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts as per R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed six periods of potential defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

After deducting 341 days of defence delay and 95 days for an unexpectedly prolonged preliminary inquiry (characterized as a discrete event), the net delay was calculated at 869 days (28.5 months), falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the Crown failed to prove readiness to proceed for one period of alleged defence delay.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a minister of the Assembly of the Church of the Universe, sought an interim injunction to prevent prosecution under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act, arguing that such prosecutions infringed his right to freedom of religion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, particularly in light of the recent legalization of cannabis for personal use.