M. Gregory Ellies

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding that the individual applicant sexually harassed the respondent by exposing himself to her on two occasions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's factual findings were rational and grounded in evidence, its consideration of male/female power dynamics was appropriate, its conclusion that the respondent was an employee was consistent with jurisprudence, and its damages award was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicants commenced an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent wrote to the court requesting that the application be summarily dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the issue had already been decided in a previous contempt motion.

The court found that the previous request for a vexatious litigant declaration had been abandoned, not dismissed on its merits, and that a prior order requiring the respondent to seek leave to take steps in the proceeding was narrower than a s. 140 declaration.

The respondent's request for summary dismissal was therefore dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his two step-daughters, C.F. and T.A. The Crown and defence jointly submitted a six-year incarceration period, acknowledging it was at the low end of the appropriate range for such aggravating facts.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing the profound importance of a guilty plea in providing validation to victims and demonstrating the accused's remorse and potential for rehabilitation, thereby sparing all participants the ordeal of a trial.

The applicant mother applied under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 to vary a 2015 Alberta child support order.

The original order imputed the respondent father's income at $65,000, but the applicant later discovered his actual income was higher in subsequent years.

The respondent did not appear or file responding materials.

The court granted the application, varying ongoing support and fixing arrears for both ongoing support and extraordinary expenses retroactively to 2016 based on the respondent's actual income.

The defendant, Michel Royer, brought a motion to set aside default judgments totaling over $800,000 obtained against him by multiple plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from indignities to human remains committed by the co-defendant owner of a funeral home where Royer lived and volunteered.

Royer had retained a lawyer to defend the actions, but due to the negligence of his lawyer and the failure of the plaintiffs' lawyer to provide notice before noting him in default, judgments were entered against him.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment, finding that Royer moved promptly upon learning of the judgments, had a plausible excuse for the delay, and possessed an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted and the default judgments were set aside.

The payor brought a motion to change a 1999 spousal support order, seeking to terminate his $700 monthly payments upon his retirement at age 60.

The recipient opposed the motion, arguing she remained disabled and unable to work, and sought an increase in support based on the payor's post-separation income increases.

The court ruled that the recipient's psychiatric expert report was partially inadmissible for failing to comply with the Family Law Rules for litigation experts.

The court found the payor's retirement constituted a material change in circumstances and terminated the spousal support, noting he had paid support for 20 years—well beyond the duration suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for a 12.5-year marriage.

The applicant father moved for summary judgment for sole custody of the parties' two children.

The respondent mother did not respond to the motion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother had counselled one of the children to make false allegations of abuse against the father and had not exercised access in over a year.

The court granted the father sole custody and the mother supervised access, finding it in the children's best interests.

Costs were awarded to the father on a partial indemnity basis.

A jury panel member requested to be excused from jury duty because she had recently become employed as a probation officer.

The court considered whether a probation officer is a 'person engaged in the enforcement of law' under section 3(1) of the Juries Act.

The court reviewed the duties of a probation officer under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act and similar legislation in other provinces.

The court concluded that a probation officer is engaged in law enforcement and is therefore ineligible to serve on a jury in Ontario.

The panel member was excused.

The applicant contractor sought judicial review of two decisions by the City of Toronto: a finding by the Fair Wage Office that it breached the Fair Wage Policy, and a subsequent City Council decision disqualifying it from City contracts for two years.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed both decisions, finding that the applicant was denied procedural fairness.

Specifically, the applicant was not provided with notice, disclosure, or the right to be heard before the Fair Wage Office made its breach determination.

The court declined to award damages, noting it lacked jurisdiction to do so on judicial review.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding them liable for sexual harassment and creating a poisoned work environment, and ordering them to pay $200,000 to the respondent.

The applicants argued the Vice-Chair's approach to credibility was unreasonable and procedurally unfair, particularly regarding the respondent's memory issues and the use of expert evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Vice-Chair's credibility assessments were reasonable, did not improperly rely on oath-helping, and did not subject the applicant's evidence to unequal scrutiny.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an impaired driving charge against the respondent.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the offender because there was no in-court dock identification.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the identification evidence was insufficient.

The uncontroverted circumstantial evidence, including the arresting officer's lifelong knowledge of the respondent and the signing of a Promise to Appear, was sufficient to prove identity.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the termination of a nurse who misappropriated narcotics from the respondent hospital.

The arbitrator found that the nurse was addicted to narcotics and would not have engaged in the misconduct 'but for' her addiction, yet dismissed the grievance.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the arbitrator unreasonably applied an outdated legal test for prima facie discrimination rather than the established three-part test confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The award was set aside and the grievance remitted to a new arbitrator.

The plaintiff, Steele Industrial Supplies Inc., sued its former bookkeeper, Sharon Elliott, and the estate of her late husband for damages arising from theft and unjust enrichment.

Steele moved for summary judgment, while the defendants cross-moved to dismiss the action on the basis that it was statute-barred by the limitation period.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the limitation period commenced when Elliott confessed to the theft, not when the fraud was merely suspected.

The court allowed Steele's motion in part, establishing Elliott's liability for the misappropriated funds and the Estate's liability for unjust enrichment, but determined that the precise quantum of damages required a trial due to conflicting expert evidence.

A trial management conference was ordered to address the damages issue and costs.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of a corporation under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge had granted leave on a nunc pro tunc basis.

The Divisional Court held that the motion judge erred in applying the doctrine of nunc pro tunc to cure an expired limitation period, following the Supreme Court's decision in the CIBC Trilogy.

The court varied the order to state that derivative claims arising more than two years prior to the filing of the motion for leave are statute-barred, but allowed the grant of leave to stand for continuing breaches within the limitation period.

This decision addresses an in camera hearing under s. 278.6 of the Criminal Code, following an accused's successful application for production of a complainant's counsellor records.

The court determined which portions of the records should be disclosed to the accused.

It ruled that Crown and defence counsel should be excluded from the in camera hearing, as their participation would be futile without prior access to the records and counter-productive to privacy.

The judge ordered disclosure of relevant excerpts pertaining to the counsellor's role in the complainant's police statements and the identity of the perpetrator, while balancing the complainant's privacy interests.

The applicant sought an order declaring Notices of Sale issued by the respondent condominium corporation against its units null and void, alleging non-compliance with the Condominium Act, the corporation's declaration, and by-laws.

The applicant argued that a special assessment was improperly levied without a budget, the notice of assessment lacked required information and was misleading, and funds were misappropriated.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the corporation had adopted a prior budget, the notice provided sufficient reasons for the assessment, the alleged misinformation was due to the applicant's non-payment, and no misappropriation of funds occurred as payments were reimbursements for expenses incurred on behalf of the corporation.

D.H. was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm, failing to provide necessaries of life, and assault causing bodily harm related to injuries sustained by a 28-month-old child, B.V. The Crown alleged D.H. assaulted B. or showed wanton disregard for B.'s safety, and deterred B.'s mother from seeking medical attention.

The court found D.H. not guilty on all charges, concluding that the child's severe head injuries were likely caused by a subgaleal hematoma, possibly from hair combing, rather than assault.

The court also found the mother's testimony not credible, noting she changed her story to improve her child protection case, and criticized the police investigation for failing to disprove D.H.'s consistent statements.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision denying him loss of earnings benefits.

The Tribunal had found that the applicant's inability to work was due to his personality rather than his compensable chronic pain disorder, basing this on negative credibility findings.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable because it substituted its own opinion for uncontroverted medical evidence and failed to account for the Board's own policy describing the symptoms of the applicant's condition.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe head injury after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs sought to extend the time to set the action down for a non-jury trial to assess damages, while the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, and the decision was upheld on appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit bifurcation of a non-jury trial without consent.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 did not abolish the court's inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials in exceptional cases without consent.

The applicant insurers applied for judicial review of an Umpire's decision under s. 128(3) of the Insurance Act regarding the value of a loss following a house fire.

The Umpire valued the Actual Cash Value at $338,800, which significantly exceeded both the insured's appraisal of $210,000 and the insurer's appraisal of $185,000.

The Divisional Court found the Umpire's decision unreasonable as it exceeded the range of possible acceptable outcomes and lacked reasons to justify the departure from the policy provisions.

The decision was set aside and the matter remitted to a new Umpire.