Megan Petrie

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition that detained an NCR accused who had been under the Board's jurisdiction for over a decade following a finding of not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Board determined the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety despite fresh evidence from a clinical forensic psychologist indicating low risk on stalking-specific assessment tools.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, holding that the evidence fell short of establishing a significant threat to public safety and that the Board had effectively reversed the burden of proof by relying solely on a moderate-risk HCR-20 V3 assessment without proper expert contextualization.

A young person was charged with sexual assault of a 19-year-old complainant following an incident in a wooded area behind apartment buildings in Scarborough in the early morning hours of July 30, 2016.

The complainant was heavily intoxicated at the time.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant neither had the capacity to consent nor did she express any consent to the sexual activity.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a correctional facility where he punched the complainant 25 to 30 times in the head.

The sole defence at trial was self-defence.

The trial judge found that the Crown had disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the appellant had launched a pre-emptive attack to maintain his status as the "heavy" rather than in genuine self-defence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the prison context and the "inmate's code." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the prison setting must be considered as a contextual factor, it does not override the Criminal Code's legal definition of self-defence.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition order that continued the detention of an NCRMD accused with a term permitting community living in approved accommodation.

The appellant challenged both the Board's finding that she remained a significant threat to public safety and the appropriateness of the detention order as opposed to a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but criticized the Board's brevity in addressing key issues, particularly the lack of rigorous analysis regarding the significant threat finding and the failure to explain why detention was necessary and appropriate rather than a conditional discharge.

The court noted that while the Board's decision was not unreasonable on the evidence, it failed to meet standards of transparency and intelligibility in its reasoning.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove he was presented to a breath technician 'as soon as practicable' following the breath demand.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that presenting an accused to a breath technician 'as soon as practicable' is not an essential element of a valid demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code for the purposes of a refusal charge.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The appellant, an anti-abortion activist, appealed her convictions for mischief and breach of probation arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic.

She argued that a foetus is a human being and sought to challenge the constitutionality of section 223 of the Criminal Code, asserting defences of defence of others, necessity, and mistake of fact.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to decline a full evidentiary hearing on the biological status of a foetus, as binding appellate jurisprudence establishes that a foetus does not possess legal personhood or Charter rights.

The court also affirmed that the appellant's proposed defences were unavailable in law and that her probation conditions were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's reliance on inadmissible evidence, an error in finding an unequivocal refusal, and an error in finding the incident was not a "single transaction." The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the entire video evidence was admissible as it was tendered without limitation, the trial judge's finding of an unequivocal refusal was supported by evidence and entitled to deference, and the appellant's late inquiry about providing a sample did not constitute an unequivocal offer or part of a "single transaction" to mitigate the initial refusal.

The Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to comply with a recognizance.

The grounds of appeal included unreasonable verdict, errors in finding breach of recognizance and mens rea, failure of the trial judge to ensure full answer and defence for a self-represented accused, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact and mens rea were reasonable, that the assistance provided to the self-represented appellant was adequate, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to prove his counsel pressured him or acted incompetently.

The court concluded the appellant's claim was merely 'buyer's remorse' and that his counsel's advice to plead guilty was reasonable given the evidence and the favourable joint submission for a suspended sentence.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams.

At trial, her counsel abandoned Charter applications regarding the breath demand and right to counsel.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant attempted to raise these Charter issues for the first time.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, applying the general rule against raising new issues on appeal, noting the trial record did not support the alleged violations and the Crown would be prejudiced.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, inadequately explained credibility findings, placed too much emphasis on the complainant's demeanor, and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application under ss. 8 and 9.

The appellant contended the police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him and demand breath samples after observing him driving the wrong way on a ramp and exhibiting signs of impairment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded the officers had the necessary subjective and objective reasonable grounds.

The court further held that even if a Charter breach had occurred, the breathalyzer results would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on firearms offences, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence of knowledge and control.

The underlying evidence included a submachine gun and ammunition concealed in a barrel in a bedroom, along with documents bearing the accused’s name and the address of the residence.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the accused on a drug trafficking charge but committed him on the firearms offences.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the limited weighing approach required for circumstantial cases and correctly assessed whether the evidence was capable of supporting the Crown’s inferences.

There was some evidence linking the accused to the bedroom and residence sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The trial judge had found that the appellant, who was highly intoxicated, drove the vehicle with a flat tire during a 911 call placed by a passenger.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in excluding hearsay statements from two witnesses claiming one of them had been driving and in misapprehending the 911 call evidence.

The court held the hearsay statements were properly excluded because the defence made no reasonable efforts to secure the witnesses’ testimony and therefore failed to establish necessity under the principled hearsay exception.

The court also held that the trial judge reasonably inferred from the 911 call and surrounding evidence that the appellant had driven the vehicle.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from a domestic relationship, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider consent and self-defence, misapprehended evidence, and provided legally insufficient reasons.

The court held that neither consent nor self-defence were live issues at trial, the alleged misapprehension did not constitute reversible error, and the reasons satisfied the functional requirements for appellate review.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentencing judge should have apportioned pre-sentence custody across the convictions.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part to apportion pre-sentence custody equally among the assault convictions.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for the offence of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge excluded evidence of a roadside field sobriety test on the basis that the police officer had not been qualified as an expert witness.

The appeal court held that this was an error of law because the Criminal Code regulatory scheme does not require officers administering field sobriety tests to be qualified as experts under the Mohan framework.

The court emphasized that such tests are investigative tools used to establish reasonable grounds for a breath demand and are not admissible to prove guilt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, having been convicted of impaired driving and driving over 80, sought a stay of his two-year driving prohibition pending his appeal.

He argued that the prohibition caused significant hardship to his businesses and personal life.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appeal had borderline merit but the applicant failed to demonstrate real hardship, as opposed to mere inconvenience, and that the public interest weighed against granting the stay.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

The applicant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and fled the scene, leaving the victim helpless on the ground.

Shortly after, a reversing tractor-trailer ran over the victim, causing his death.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred in applying the test for causation, asserting the tractor-trailer was an intervening act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's failure to remain was inherently dangerous and carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm, establishing a legal basis for causation.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'Over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the arresting officer failed to turn his mind to the issue of mouth alcohol before administering an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer's grounds could not be assessed objectively, materially misapprehended the evidence by interrupting the Crown's re-examination, and erred in her s. 24(2) Grant analysis by drawing unwarranted inferences about police training.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, an alternative medicine practitioner, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against female patients and received a 23-month conditional sentence with strict house arrest.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting an exception for work or education purposes.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where denunciation and deterrence are paramount, a punitive condition precluding work or education exceptions is appropriate and entitled to appellate deference.