Megan Petrie

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had ruled that the breath samples were not taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and concluded that the Crown could not rely on breath test results or a toxicologist’s report to prove the offence.

On appeal, the court held that failure to establish the “as soon as practicable” requirement only deprives the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity and does not render breath evidence or expert toxicology evidence inadmissible absent a Charter application.

The court further held that the trial judge had no obligation to raise a potential Charter breach on his own motion where the accused was represented and no timely Charter application was brought.

Because the evidence clearly established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the acquittal was quashed and a conviction substituted.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The trial judge had found that the appellant, who was highly intoxicated, drove the vehicle with a flat tire during a 911 call placed by a passenger.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in excluding hearsay statements from two witnesses claiming one of them had been driving and in misapprehending the 911 call evidence.

The court held the hearsay statements were properly excluded because the defence made no reasonable efforts to secure the witnesses’ testimony and therefore failed to establish necessity under the principled hearsay exception.

The court also held that the trial judge reasonably inferred from the 911 call and surrounding evidence that the appellant had driven the vehicle.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from a domestic relationship, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider consent and self-defence, misapprehended evidence, and provided legally insufficient reasons.

The court held that neither consent nor self-defence were live issues at trial, the alleged misapprehension did not constitute reversible error, and the reasons satisfied the functional requirements for appellate review.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentencing judge should have apportioned pre-sentence custody across the convictions.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part to apportion pre-sentence custody equally among the assault convictions.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for the offence of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge excluded evidence of a roadside field sobriety test on the basis that the police officer had not been qualified as an expert witness.

The appeal court held that this was an error of law because the Criminal Code regulatory scheme does not require officers administering field sobriety tests to be qualified as experts under the Mohan framework.

The court emphasized that such tests are investigative tools used to establish reasonable grounds for a breath demand and are not admissible to prove guilt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, having been convicted of impaired driving and driving over 80, sought a stay of his two-year driving prohibition pending his appeal.

He argued that the prohibition caused significant hardship to his businesses and personal life.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appeal had borderline merit but the applicant failed to demonstrate real hardship, as opposed to mere inconvenience, and that the public interest weighed against granting the stay.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

The applicant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and fled the scene, leaving the victim helpless on the ground.

Shortly after, a reversing tractor-trailer ran over the victim, causing his death.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred in applying the test for causation, asserting the tractor-trailer was an intervening act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's failure to remain was inherently dangerous and carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm, establishing a legal basis for causation.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'Over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the arresting officer failed to turn his mind to the issue of mouth alcohol before administering an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer's grounds could not be assessed objectively, materially misapprehended the evidence by interrupting the Crown's re-examination, and erred in her s. 24(2) Grant analysis by drawing unwarranted inferences about police training.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, an alternative medicine practitioner, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against female patients and received a 23-month conditional sentence with strict house arrest.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting an exception for work or education purposes.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where denunciation and deterrence are paramount, a punitive condition precluding work or education exceptions is appropriate and entitled to appellate deference.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and the resulting conditional discharge.

He argued that he received ineffective representation from a law student agent at Downtown Legal Services, and that the trial judge erred in various evidentiary and substantive rulings, including the application of the de minimis doctrine.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant received effective representation, the trial was fair, and the sentence was fit given the domestic context of the assault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute where he was found to have pushed a garbage bag into his wife's face.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant of more serious assault allegations from the same incident due to credibility concerns but convicted him on the garbage bag incident.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to adequately explain why he could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on one part of the incident but not the other, and expressed concern over the trial judge's application of the standard of proof.

The conviction was set aside and, given the circumstances and time passed, no new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for assault causing bodily harm, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the consequences of an NCR finding and that the trial judge erred by not conducting a plea inquiry.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a plea inquiry for a proceeding that was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding trial counsel had properly advised the appellant, and concluded there was ample psychiatric evidence to support the NCR finding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order by failing to report to his probation officer.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant based on a failure to notify of a change of address, an offence with which he was not charged.

Furthermore, there was no admissible evidence that the appellant knew he was required to report upon his release from custody, as the evidence relied upon was hearsay.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an exemplification of the probation order without notice, as it is admissible at common law.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for uttering threats against a correctional officer and the 90‑day consecutive custodial sentence imposed.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended the significance of video evidence and improperly relied on opinion evidence regarding intent.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge materially misapprehended the video evidence by treating it as directly contradicting the appellant’s account when it merely lacked audio and did not capture all interactions.

Because credibility was central and the video evidence was heavily relied upon in the reasoning process, the misapprehension constituted a reversible error.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, while the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving arising from a single-vehicle crash.

At trial, breath samples and incriminating statements were excluded due to Charter breaches, including violations of ss. 8 and 10(b), but police observations of intoxication and erratic driving were admitted.

The appellant argued that all evidence obtained during detention should have been excluded and that the trial judge misapprehended the identification evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court held that there is no automatic exclusion of all evidence following an unlawful arrest and that the remaining evidence, including civilian and police observations, supported the conviction.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the guilty verdict.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The trial judge had found that the accused was not in 'care or control' of his vehicle because it was mechanically inoperable after breaking down in a live lane of traffic.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to recognize the realistic risk of danger posed by an intoxicated person remaining in the driver's seat of a vehicle stranded in a live lane of traffic.

Findings of guilt were entered and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

Two self‑represented applicants sought mandamus with certiorari in aid challenging decisions of justices of the peace who refused to issue process following private informations laid against store security guards after a shoplifting incident.

The court considered the statutory framework governing private prosecutions under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code and the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Court on judicial review.

It found that one applicant had been denied procedural fairness during the pre‑enquete because the justice of the peace failed to assist an unrepresented litigant and prevented a fair opportunity to present evidence on several charges.

It also held that the second justice of the peace erred by refusing to issue process after finding a prima facie case while relying on irrelevant factors such as a perceived limitation period and available civil remedies.

The matter was remitted for fresh pre‑enquete hearings before a different justice of the peace on certain charges, while other requested relief and costs were dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for assault with a weapon and breach of probation, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant argued that counsel failed to properly advise him about the decision not to testify and inadequately cross‑examined Crown witnesses.

Fresh evidence was admitted including affidavits from the appellant and trial counsel, 911 recordings, and the appellant’s criminal record.

The court applied the three‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel and found the appellant failed to establish incompetence or resulting miscarriage of justice.

Trial counsel’s tactical decisions regarding testimony and cross‑examination were within the range of reasonable professional judgment, and there was no reasonable probability the verdict would have differed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault simpliciter arising from an incident during spiritual counselling in which the accused placed his genital area against the complainant’s head while she was prostrated in prayer.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused of sexual assault but convicted him of the lesser included offence of assault and imposed a suspended sentence with probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged rulings on a s. 11(b) Charter application, the admission of similar fact evidence relating to a prior incident with another parishioner, several evidentiary rulings during trial, the reasonableness of the verdict, and the sentence.

The court held that there was no unreasonable delay, no error in admitting the similar fact evidence, and no reversible error in the evidentiary rulings.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

Self‑represented applicants sought mandamus with certiorari in aid compelling a justice of the peace to issue process on several private informations alleging child abduction, perjury, conspiracy, and accessory offences against a Children’s Aid Society worker, school principal, and other officials.

The justice of the peace had refused to issue process following a pre‑enquête hearing.

The court held that mandamus is available only where jurisdictional error is established, such as a failure to exercise jurisdiction or breach of natural justice.

The applicants were not denied a fair hearing and the justice considered the materials before him.

Even if some evidence arguably supported a perjury allegation, the proposed prosecution was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to assault with a weapon and failing to appear.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission recommending a 60‑day intermittent sentence and probation and instead imposed consecutive six‑month custodial sentences after the appellant failed to attend for sentencing.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by effectively sentencing the offender for the later failure to appear, disregarding the joint submission without explanation, and imposing a sentence far outside the appropriate range.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a probation order and in refusing to make mandatory ancillary orders, including a DNA order and consideration of a weapons prohibition order.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence reduced to time served, and a probation order and ancillary orders were imposed.