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Mandamus refused; no prima facie case for defamatory libel in private prosecution.
A self-represented applicant sought mandamus with certiorari in aid compelling a justice of the peace to issue process on a private information alleging defamatory libel arising from statements posted on Facebook during a family property dispute.
The justice of the peace had refused to issue process after a pre‑enquête hearing, finding no prima facie case.
The Superior Court held that issuing process requires evidence of each essential element of the offence, including proof that the impugned statements were false and that the accused knew they were false.
The record from the pre‑enquête hearing disclosed no evidence capable of establishing those elements.
As no jurisdictional error was demonstrated, the court declined to intervene.
Appeal dismissed; self-represented accused received adequate judicial assistance at trial.
The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, failing to advise him of the availability of a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, and inadequately assisting him as a self-represented accused.
The court held that the refusal of an adjournment was reasonable given the lengthy delay, the prior peremptory trial date, and the absence of a realistic prospect of retaining counsel.
It further found that the circumstances did not support a likely successful Rowbotham application because the case was straightforward, short, and carried no probability of imprisonment.
Reviewing the full trial transcript, the court concluded that the trial judge provided extensive and appropriate assistance to the self‑represented accused while maintaining judicial neutrality.
The appellant therefore received a fair trial and no miscarriage of justice occurred.
Uttering threats conviction upheld under objective test for threatening.
The appellant appealed a conviction for uttering threats under s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge drew an unreasonable inference of animus from after-the-fact conduct and failed to apply the proper objective test for the actus reus of threatening.
The appeal court held that the inference of intent to intimidate from subsequent conduct was reasonable and properly open on the evidence.
Although the trial judge appeared to misunderstand the effect of a Supreme Court decision and did not expressly apply the governing objective test from leading authorities, the appellate court concluded that it could determine the legal issue based on the factual findings made at trial.
Applying the established objective test, the court found that a reasonable person would interpret the accused’s words and conduct as a threat of bodily harm.
The conviction was therefore upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Sentence appeal dismissed; judge properly rejected joint submission as manifestly inadequate.
The appellant appealed a sentence imposed in the Ontario Court of Justice after pleading guilty to stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.
The parties had made a joint submission proposing a $2,000 fine and probation without a driving suspension.
The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and instead imposed the fine together with a 12‑month driving suspension, concluding the proposed sentence was manifestly inadequate given the admitted conduct of driving approximately 190 km/h and weaving through traffic.
On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge properly recognized the high threshold for rejecting joint submissions and provided counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.
The court found no error of law and declined to interfere with the sentence.
Pre-trial Charter applications to stay historical sexual offence charges and invalidate former gross indecency provisions dismissed.
The accused, charged with historical sexual offences including gross indecency, brought pre-trial applications seeking to declare former s. 157 of the Criminal Code invalid under s. 15 of the Charter and s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights.
He also sought a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 11(a) of the Charter due to delay in being informed of the specific offences.
The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Charter did not apply retrospectively to the historical offences, the former Code provisions did not violate the Bill of Rights, and the delay was largely attributable to the defence's tactical decisions without establishing prejudice to fair trial interests.
The court imposed the maximum 18-month summary conviction sentence on a serial domestic offender to prioritize denunciation and specific deterrence.
The accused was convicted after a summary trial of three counts of assault, one count of forcible confinement, one count of threatening bodily harm, and one count of failing to comply with probation.
All offences occurred on May 4, 2012, and involved a series of altercations between the accused and his wife.
The accused had a lengthy criminal record documenting predisposition for violence towards intimate partners, with four prior domestic violence convictions since 2004.
The court imposed an 18-month jail sentence, the maximum available, along with three years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the victim, mandatory counselling for substance abuse, anger management, and domestic violence, and a strong recommendation for residential treatment.
The accused was acquitted of refusing a breath sample because the officer lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the screening device was properly calibrated.
The accused was charged with refusing to provide a roadside screening device (ASD) sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.
The Crown alleged the accused made multiple unsuccessful attempts to provide a breath sample after being lawfully demanded to do so.
The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on two grounds: (1) the delay between formation of reasonable suspicion and the demand, and (2) the officer's opinion that the ASD was in proper working order.
The court found the demand unlawful because the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe the device would produce a proper analysis, as it lacked the required calibration sticker and the officer had not verified the device's testing status.
The accused was acquitted.
Third‑party records reviewed; none linked accused to complainant’s mental health issues.
The accused applied under ss. 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code for production of various third‑party records relating to the complainant in a historic sexual assault prosecution.
At Stage 1, the court assessed whether the requested records were likely relevant and whether production to the court was necessary in the interests of justice.
The judge found likely relevance only for limited records from the Hospital for Sick Children, the Ontario Disability Support Program, and the complainant’s family medical clinic, and ordered those records produced to the court for review.
After reviewing the records at Stage 2, the court concluded that none contained information linking the accused to the complainant’s mental health issues or assisting with the timeline of events, and directed that the matter proceed by agreed statement of facts reflecting that absence.
An intoxicated first offender who fired a shotgun at work received a 90-day intermittent sentence.
The defendant pleaded guilty to careless use of a firearm and causing a disturbance by being drunk in a public place.
The offences occurred when the defendant, intoxicated after drinking with co-workers, returned to his workplace with a loaded shotgun and fired one shot into the ceiling in the presence of witnesses.
The court imposed a custodial sentence of 90 days on an intermittent basis, followed by 15 months of probation with conditions including alcohol counselling, community service, and a weapons prohibition.
The court balanced mitigating factors (guilty plea, first offender, good work history, remorse) against aggravating factors (dangerous conduct, presence of others, combination of guns and alcohol) and determined that deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence despite the defendant's low risk to reoffend.
Historical sexual abuse charges dismissed due to reasonable doubt.
The accused, a grade 8 teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference alleged to have occurred in the mid‑1990s against a student.
The complainant described repeated sexualized conduct including kissing and masturbation during tutoring sessions and other interactions, while the accused denied any sexual contact.
The court accepted that certain inappropriate conduct occurred, including hand‑holding and expressions of affection, but identified reliability concerns in the complainant’s evidence, including inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the role of therapy‑recovered memories.
Applying the criminal standard of proof and the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court concluded the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The accused teacher was acquitted of historical sexual offences due to reasonable doubt stemming from reliability concerns over the complainant's recovered memories.
The accused, a former elementary school teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a student during the 1994-95 school year when the complainant was 13-14 years old.
The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in inappropriate sexual contact including kissing, hand-holding, and masturbation over several months.
The accused denied all allegations, claiming his conduct was limited to appropriate academic support and encouragement.
The trial judge found significant reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding recovered memories obtained through therapy and the provenance of an Italian pendant allegedly given as a gift.
Although the judge found the complainant's testimony generally credible and preferred it over the accused's evidence, the judge concluded that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to these reliability concerns and reasonable doubt arising from the accused's testimony.