Mark Samuel Dunn

The plaintiff successfully moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant landlord from re-entering the leased premises.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs payable immediately, arguing the defendant's conduct forced the urgent motion.

The defendant argued costs should be in the cause.

The court held that because the merits of the case would be decided shortly at an upcoming application, and most of the evidence on the motion related to the merits, the costs of the motion should be reserved to the judge hearing the application.

The plaintiff tenant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant landlord from exercising a right of re-entry over leased commercial premises.

A dispute had arisen regarding the share of realty taxes payable by the plaintiff, and the defendant had issued a notice of default and attempted to re-enter the premises.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding contractual interpretation, irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business and reputation if locked out, and a balance of convenience favouring the plaintiff.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted.

The applicant tenant sought a declaration that it validly renewed its commercial lease for a five-year term.

The respondent landlord argued the renewal was invalid because the tenant was in default of its obligations to pay common area maintenance and realty taxes when it gave notice.

The court found that the parties had deviated from the strict payment terms of the lease for years, and the landlord could not retroactively assert a default without providing notice.

Furthermore, the lease contained a tenant-friendly renewal clause that allowed the tenant to cure any default and renew even after the initial deadline had passed.

The court granted the declaration that the lease was validly renewed.

In a CCAA proceeding involving a condominium project, the debtor sought to disclaim pre-sale agreements with unit purchasers.

The purchasers brought a motion for the production of an unredacted appraisal report referenced in the debtor's affidavit.

The court held that while the mandatory production requirement under Rule 30.04(2) is subject to discretion in CCAA proceedings, fairness and transparency required production of the unredacted report to the purchasers, subject to a non-disclosure agreement.

Cross-motions by a contingent creditor and real estate brokers for production of the reports were dismissed due to their lesser need and potential conflicts of interest.

Following a trial where the plaintiff law firm successfully obtained a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from disseminating defamatory allegations, the court addressed the continuation of a sealing order and costs.

The court held that the sealing order over the general court record must continue to protect a third party, but lifted the sealing order over the reasons for judgment, finding no serious risk to the plaintiff given their complete vindication.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial indemnity costs of $1,217,365.68 due to the defendant's reprehensible conduct in making unproven allegations of criminal fraud and dishonesty with malice.

The appellants appealed a judgment allowing an oppression application that granted the respondents sole authority to conduct a civil action.

The respondents had sold their shares in a company to the appellants but retained the financial benefit and cost obligations of an ongoing lawsuit.

The relationship deteriorated, and the appellants ceased pursuing the lawsuit and withheld information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellants' conduct violated the respondents' reasonable expectations, nor any error in the remedy granting the respondents control of the litigation.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on a limitation issue, arguing the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred due to discoverability.

The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment related to a cannabis business venture.

The court found that the discoverability issues were contentious and complex, with significant factual disputes overlapping with the merits of the claim.

The record did not allow for the necessary findings of fact with the certainty required for summary judgment.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were fixed in the cause.

Galleria Centre Inc. ("Galleria") applied for an order under s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act ("OBCA") to wind up a co-tenancy agreement or compel Terracap Galleria Centre Inc. ("Terracap") to purchase its interest in a condominium development project.

Terracap cross-applied for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the OBCA, alleging Galleria's refusal to participate was oppressive, and sought to purchase the property on just terms, with proceeds distributed according to the co-tenancy agreement.

The court dismissed Galleria's application, finding its "expectations" were not reasonable and that the co-tenancy agreement provided a mechanism for ending the relationship, rendering s. 207 unnecessary.

Terracap's claim for an oppression remedy was also dismissed, as Galleria's conduct, while potentially a breach of contract, was not oppressive given that contractual remedies were available.

However, Terracap's cross-application was allowed in part, with the court ordering the parties' disengagement to occur in accordance with Article 18 of the Co-Tenancy Agreement, which included the liquidation of assets and the application of Terracap's preferential distribution right.

The plaintiff law firm brought a motion for an order excluding the public from the trial of its action against the defendant and prohibiting disclosure of information relating to the action.

The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from publishing allegedly defamatory statements.

The court dismissed the request for an in camera trial, finding it was not necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, as the allegations were already in the public domain.

Instead, the court ordered a limited publication ban directed at the defamatory statements and continued an existing sealing order.

Alexander Just was found guilty of two counts of production of cannabis marijuana and one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors including the large-scale commercial nature of the operation, the use of foreign workers, and the significant street value of the seized cannabis.

Mitigating factors included his status as a first offender, strong community support, good character, and rehabilitation prospects.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence, while the defence proposed 12 months.

The court imposed a global sentence of 2 years in penitentiary, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation, and declined a probation order.

The respondent, Krates Keswick Inc., purchased and took assignments of three loans made to the appellants and related companies.

The motion judge granted judgment against the appellants on all three loans, granted possession of the Marko Lands to the respondent, dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, and refused to stay enforcement of the judgment.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the motion judge's decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on all three loans and the dismissal of the counterclaim.

However, the court partially allowed the appeal by staying enforcement of the judgment relating to the two secured loans pending determination of what credit, if any, the appellants might be entitled to based on the value of the Marko Lands, which had been subject to a resulting trust determination in subsequent proceedings.

Enforcement of the unsecured loan was not stayed.

The applicant, standing in the shoes of a bankrupt corporation, sought a declaration that four properties registered in the names of the respondents (former shareholders) were held on resulting trust for the corporation.

The respondents claimed they purchased the properties personally.

The court found the respondents' evidence regarding their intentions and the corporate accounting to be unreliable and self-serving.

The court held that the corporation paid for the properties, maintained them, and acted as the owner throughout, thereby establishing a resulting trust in favour of the applicant.

The accused, a vegetable farmer, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence of a large marijuana grow operation found on land he rented.

Police had trespassed on the rented land to make initial observations, which were then used to obtain search warrants.

The court found that the initial trespass violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights and that the warrants could not have been issued without the unconstitutionally obtained information.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, including Romijay Enterprises Ltd., sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants, led by 11 Yorkville Partners Inc., from holding a unit owner meeting to approve the sale of their condominium property.

The defendants, owning over 80% of the units, intended to sell the property to a non-arm's-length purchaser for redevelopment, relying on section 124(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The plaintiffs invoked the oppression remedy under section 135 of the Act, arguing that the forced sale of their unit, which held significant personal and emotional value to its controlling mind, Robert Berman, constituted oppressive conduct.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the plaintiffs' reasonable expectation that their unit would not be sold to a non-arm's-length purchaser without their consent, that they would suffer irreparable harm due to the unit's unique value, and that the balance of convenience favored preserving the status quo.

Following a summary judgment finding bribery, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty after the employee became a full-time employee, the plaintiff moved to correct the disgorgement amount before entry of judgment.

The court held that it had omitted two invoices from the original calculation and that this constituted an error justifying variation of the unentered order.

However, the court refused to entertain further defence evidence said to show that one invoice had not been paid, holding that reconsideration is not a vehicle for evidence deliberately not provided on the original motion.

The disgorgement award was amended to €324,100 converted into Canadian dollars.

The applicants, Dr. Bernstein's corporations, moved for judgment against Norma Walton, Ronauld Walton, and their companies for $66.9 million, alleging civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought a declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy.

The Waltons brought a counter-application for damages and a cross-motion for a trial on the fraud issue.

Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and Gideon and Irene Levytam also sought relief regarding their investments.

The court found the Waltons liable for civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, awarding the applicants $66.9 million plus interest, and declared the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA.

The Waltons' counter-application was struck as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicants' claims against Schedule C Companies for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were dismissed.

DeJong was granted constructive trusts over specific Schedule C properties for their investments due to the Waltons' breach of fiduciary duties.

In an ongoing insolvency proceeding, the DeJong appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their cross-motion for a constructive trust and the cancellation of shares, while granting constructive trusts over certain properties to the Bernstein applicants.

The appellants argued the motions judge failed to adjudicate their requested relief, erred in applying tracing principles for constructive trusts, and failed to apply the correct legal test under the Assignments and Preferences Act regarding a proposed settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's tracing analysis, his refusal to grant the requested relief to avoid preferring the appellants over other creditors, or his conclusion that the proposed settlement agreement constituted an unlawful preference.

The appellants, who held a first mortgage on a commercial property, appealed the dismissal of their motion to vary a receivership order that granted the receiver-manager super-priority charges over their mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to move 'forthwith' under Rule 37.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the appellants had acquiesced to the manager's appointment and taken the benefit of its work before attempting to vary the order months later.

In a Commercial List proceeding, the court considered a motion by a court-appointed manager seeking approval of its disallowance of a creditor claim submitted in a claims process order.

The claimant alleged losses arising from a landlord’s breach of a lease relating to delays in providing electrical power to commercial premises.

The court held that the claimant bore the onus of establishing error in the manager’s determination, similar to an appeal from a trustee’s disallowance in bankruptcy proceedings.

The court found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and further held that the claimant’s execution of an estoppel certificate and failure to provide adequate proof of damages independently justified disallowance.

The manager’s decision was upheld.

The court-appointed Manager moved for approval of its fees, its counsel's fees, and a proposed Fee Allocation Methodology to distribute the costs among various properties in a complex real estate receivership.

Several mortgagees and lien claimants opposed the fee approval and the allocation methodology, arguing that time was not docketed on a property-by-property basis and that the methodology was unfair.

The court approved the fees and the methodology, finding that strict property-by-property accounting would be cost-prohibitive and that the proposed allocation was fair and equitable.

The court also rejected arguments that the Manager's charge should be subordinated to prior liens or subject to the doctrine of marshalling.