Lynne C. Leitch

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order confirming the Chief Firearms Officer’s refusal to issue a broad authorization to transport a restricted firearm under the Firearms Act.

The requested authorization sought permission to transport the firearm to unspecified border crossings, shooting clubs, competitions, gunsmiths, and other locations without specific limitations.

The court applied a reasonableness standard under ss. 77 and 79 of the Firearms Act and considered whether the appellant demonstrated that the CFO’s refusal was unreasonable.

It held that the statutory scheme governing restricted firearms transportation requires specific authorized purposes and locations, and that the CFO may refuse authorizations for good and sufficient reasons under s. 68.

The court concluded the requested authorization was excessively broad and that the CFO’s refusal fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and imposing a 12-month suspension and an indefinite restriction on needling the subclavius muscle.

The misconduct arose after the appellant performed acupuncture on a patient's subclavius muscle, causing a punctured lung (pneumothorax), and subsequently failed to refer the patient to a hospital when she presented with symptoms of the condition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's conclusions regarding the appellant's incompetence, failure to maintain professional standards, and disgraceful conduct were reasonable and supported by expert evidence.

The Court also upheld the penalty, noting it was within the reasonable range and justified by the need to protect the public.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion seeking leave to amend three consolidated statements of claim to add allegations of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation against a lawyer and a property appraiser involved in mortgage transactions, and to assert that the claims survived bankruptcy under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the amendments introduced a new cause of action after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The court held that the original pleadings alleged negligence only and did not contain the material facts necessary to support allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, including knowledge of falsity or intention to deceive.

Because the proposed amendments introduced a fundamentally different cause of action, the limitation period created a presumption of non‑compensable prejudice.

The motion to amend was therefore dismissed.

The insured brought a motion for a determination that its insurer had a duty to defend it in an action arising from the sale of a commercial building containing asbestos.

The insured also sought an order allowing it to select its own counsel due to a potential conflict of interest.

The court found that the underlying statement of claim alleged both intentional misconduct and negligence, and that the negligence claim was not derivative.

Therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend.

However, the court dismissed the request for independent counsel, finding no reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest that would disentitle the insurer from its right to control the defence and appoint counsel.

The appellant client appealed an order varying an Assessment Officer's report.

The motion judge found that the Assessment Officer exceeded his jurisdiction by determining that the appellant was not a client of the respondent solicitor, which constituted a dispute over the retainer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the Assessment Officer improperly determined a retainer issue.

The court also upheld the motion judge's order imposing joint and several liability, noting the parties had previously consented to proceed by assessment on that basis.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt after the defendant failed to comply with a litigation timetable order.

The defendant eventually provided the required productions, rendering the contempt motion moot, but the parties disputed costs.

The court found that the defendants' counsel had disregarded the timetable order and that the plaintiff's counsel had made every effort to follow up before bringing the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff $2,500 in costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to deliver a psychiatric expert report outside the timelines set by Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, abridgement of time, an adjournment of a trial scheduled under the simplified procedure, and issuance of an interprovincial summons for a witness.

The delay resulted from counsel failing to promptly secure a psychiatric report after indicating at pre-trial that such evidence would be obtained.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, emphasizing proportionality and prejudice caused by the late request.

The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s non-compliance and lack of diligence but held that the interests of justice favoured allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to present expert evidence.

The trial was adjourned with conditions, including that the plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs thrown away by the adjournment.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rule 48.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the contextual approach to the Reid factors governing relief from dismissal for delay, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although there had been a period of more than three years with no steps taken to advance the litigation, the delay resulted from counsel’s inattentiveness and the failure to receive the Registrar’s status notice.

The motion was brought promptly once the dismissal was discovered, and the court found insufficient evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside subject to conditions including suspension of pre‑judgment interest during the delay period, a litigation timetable, and costs payable to the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order compelling the responding defendants to provide particulars to allegations contained in their statement of defence and counterclaim.

The litigation concerned the validity of a transfer of the plaintiff’s interest in real property allegedly executed under a power of attorney, with the defendants asserting entitlement based on labour and financial contributions and alleging that the plaintiff had exhibited signs of dementia and diminished capacity.

The court held that the pleaded allegations were sufficiently vague that the plaintiff could not respond with anything more than a broad denial without further detail.

Applying established principles governing the function of particulars in pleadings, the court concluded that the requested particulars were necessary to define the issues and allow the plaintiff to plead intelligently.

The motion was granted and the responding defendants were ordered to deliver the demanded particulars.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order requiring them to produce summaries of facts, observations, and conclusions contained in investigation reports listed in Schedule B of their affidavit of documents, along with will‑say statements of intended witnesses.

The moving parties argued the order improperly expanded documentary discovery by compelling disclosure of information contained in litigation‑privileged materials and effectively permitted indirect discovery outside the oral discovery process.

The court held that the order did not establish a new legal principle but was a fact‑specific procedural response to unusual circumstances, including late disclosure of Schedule B documents long after discoveries had occurred.

The information ordered produced was information that would have been available on examination for discovery under Rule 31.06.

Leave to appeal was therefore not warranted.

The appellant sought costs of $107,070 plus disbursements after successfully appealing a decision under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent argued for no costs on the basis that he was a public interest litigant.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party, noting that success on the appeal was divided, the proceeding raised novel legal issues of public importance regarding municipal codes of conduct, and it was reasonable for the respondent to have pursued the application initially.

The defendant, a lawyer representing himself, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a solicitor's negligence claim brought by his former clients.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant failed to communicate court orders and allowed their underlying personal injury action to be administratively dismissed for delay.

The defendant argued the negligence claim was premature because the administrative dismissal could still be set aside.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial existed because it was uncertain whether a motion to set aside the dismissal would succeed and the plaintiffs had alleged other acts of negligence.

A used car dealer brought an action for negligent misrepresentation after purchasing a vehicle from another dealer who represented that the vehicle had not been involved in an accident.

After resale to a consumer, the plaintiff discovered through vehicle history reports that the vehicle had previously been involved in an accident and ultimately repossessed and resold the vehicle at a significant loss.

The court accepted evidence that the seller had represented the vehicle as accident-free and that the buyer relied on that representation when deciding not to conduct its own search.

The court found the corporate seller liable for negligent misrepresentation but declined to impose personal liability on the individual agent who made the representation.

Damages were limited to the diminution in value of the vehicle rather than the plaintiff’s claimed financing-related losses.

In a proposed securities class action arising from the takeover of a mining company through a joint bid on the Toronto Stock Exchange, multiple defendant groups moved to transfer the proceeding from London, Ontario to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs opposed the transfer, asserting that the dispute had multinational elements and that no venue factor strongly favoured Toronto.

The court held that the defendants failed to establish that a transfer was desirable in the interests of justice and dismissed the transfer motions.

The plaintiffs also moved to stay a related statutory valuation proceeding involving dissenting shareholders under the Business Corporations Act.

The court granted a temporary stay, finding substantial overlap in factual and expert valuation issues and concluding that a stay would avoid duplication of proceedings and promote access to justice.

The appellant, Mayor Robert Ford, appealed a decision declaring his seat vacant for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA).

The application judge found the appellant breached the MCIA by speaking and voting on a council motion to rescind a previous council decision that required him to reimburse $3,150 in donations to his private football foundation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original reimbursement order was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which only permits reprimands or suspensions of remuneration for Code of Conduct violations.

Because the financial sanction was a nullity, the appellant did not have a pecuniary interest when he voted to rescind it, and therefore did not contravene the MCIA.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a North American-wide class action settlement regarding alleged deficiencies in the defendant's organic shingles warranty program.

The settlement enhanced the warranty, provided an independent appeal process, and had no monetary limit or expiration date.

The court found the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class members, noting the arm's length negotiations, early resolution, and lack of objections.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside portions of a consent final order regarding shared custody, arguing her consent was obtained under duress.

The applicant claimed she was coerced into signing the agreement after the motions judge indicated in open court that he would otherwise grant primary residence to the respondent and restrict the applicant to supervised access.

The court found that the motions judge's comments placed illegitimate pressure on the applicant, vitiating her consent.

The motion was granted, the shared custody provisions were set aside, and the prior temporary arrangement was reinstated pending a case conference.

The defendants and proposed defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's ruling on a Rule 21 motion, an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding, and an order granting the plaintiffs leave to commence an action under the Securities Act.

The court granted leave to appeal the Rule 21 motion in relation to the pleadings of negligence and negligent misrepresentation, noting that two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions created a correctness and conflict issue.

Consequently, leave to appeal the certification order was also granted.

Furthermore, the court granted the proposed defendants leave to appeal the order allowing proceedings against them under the Securities Act, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's determination that they were de facto officers of the Income Fund.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of a corporation, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its oppression claim against the corporation's directors and shareholders.

The appellant argued the respondents acted oppressively by failing to set aside funds to satisfy its judgment while repaying shareholder loans and other creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's finding that the respondents did not strip assets from a profitable company, but rather funded it, and the appellant had no reasonable expectation that a reserve would be maintained for its contingent claim.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding them jointly liable for a debt under a vehicle lease agreement.

The appellant argued her obligation was limited to a one-year guarantee based on a promise from her co-defendant, and that res judicata applied due to a prior default judgment against him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the trial judge.

The written agreement did not limit the obligation to one year, and section 139(1) of the Courts of Justice Act allows judgment against one jointly liable party without precluding judgment against another.