Louis Todd Century

Electricity ratepayers brought an action seeking damages and declaratory relief concerning the sale of shares in Hydro One, alleging that the Premier and Ministers acted in bad faith to reward political donors and obtain further donations to the Ontario Liberal Party.

The motion judge struck out the claim under Rule 21, finding it was not justiciable as it concerned core policy and the pleadings were inadequate to support an inference of bad faith.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in assessing the facts in isolation, misconstruing material facts, and failing to accept pleaded facts as true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' allegations were insufficient to plead bad faith and that accepting such a pleading would undermine the immunity afforded to core policy decisions.

The plaintiffs, Hydro One ratepayers, brought an action for misfeasance in public office against the Premier and Ministers of Finance and Energy regarding the privatization of Hydro One.

They alleged the sale was motivated by improper purposes to reward Liberal Party benefactors.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding the decision to sell Hydro One shares was a core policy decision authorized by the Electricity Act, 1998, and thus immune from judicial review in a civil tort action absent bad faith, which was not adequately pleaded.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis following a successful summary judgment motion, requesting $28,339.41.

The defendant conceded entitlement to partial indemnity costs but proposed $7,500, arguing for divided success as the plaintiff did not succeed on all claims (aggravated damages, vacation pay) and the final award of $33,098.44 was close to the defendant's settlement offer.

The court found mixed success, noting the plaintiff was awarded 8 months' pay in lieu of notice (instead of 11 months sought), inclusion of a bonus, no vacation entitlement, and dismissal of punitive damages.

Considering the mixed success and the parties' offers to settle, the court fixed costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Lawyers (Evan L. Tingley and Baldwin Sennecke Halman LLP) were successful in their motion to strike out the Statement of Claim and dismiss the action against them.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale ($7,412.33) or, alternatively, partial indemnity ($5,244.12).

The court found the plaintiff's allegations of breach of trust against the Lawyers lacked factual foundation and were vexatious.

However, considering the plaintiff was represented by an agent, not counsel, and the agent had a good faith basis for some allegations, substantial indemnity costs were deemed inappropriate.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $4,000, all inclusive, payable by the plaintiff within 30 days.

The Lawyers' request for personal costs against the plaintiff's agent, J. Brad Maher, for prejudicing or delaying the action was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of significant prejudice or delay.

This is a wrongful dismissal action where both parties agreed to proceed by way of summary judgment to determine the period of reasonable notice and the calculation of damages.

The plaintiff sought 9 to 12 months' notice and aggravated damages, while the defendant proposed a notice period not exceeding 7.5 months and disputed aggravated damages.

The court determined an 8-month notice period was appropriate based on the Bardal factors, and calculated damages for salary, health care benefits, pension, and a bonus.

The claim for vacation pay and aggravated damages was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the defendant employer for unpaid overtime.

The proposed class included non-management employees subject to the defendant's overtime policy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed valid causes of action in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence.

The court certified the action, finding that there was an identifiable class, common issues regarding systemic practices and aggregate damages, that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and that the plaintiff was an appropriate representative.

The appellant sued his former lawyer for solicitors' negligence and breach of service agreements.

The respondents successfully moved to strike portions of the statement of claim under Rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by treating the pleadings motion as a summary judgment motion under Rule 20, improperly conducting a merits-based analysis of the conflicting affidavit evidence rather than assessing whether it was plain and obvious the claims could not succeed.

The plaintiff brought an action against the law firm that represented his former spouse in family law proceedings, alleging delay, distress, and dishonesty.

The defendant law firm moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff as opposing counsel.

The court also found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, characterizing it as a collateral attack on prior family court and Law Society decisions.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant on a full indemnity basis.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction to suspend the operation of s. 46(3) of the Fair Elections Act ahead of a federal election.

The impugned provision removed the Chief Electoral Officer's discretion to authorize voter identification cards as a valid form of identification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

Public interest organizations and individual electors sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a provision of the Fair Elections Act that prohibited the Chief Electoral Officer from authorizing the Voter Information Card as proof of identity or residence for voting in a federal election.

The applicants alleged the provision infringed the right to vote under s.3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and risked disenfranchising certain groups.

The court held the challenge raised a serious issue and that disenfranchisement could constitute irreparable harm.

However, binding appellate authority establishes a rule against granting interlocutory relief that effectively suspends electoral legislation immediately before an election.

Applying that principle, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the legislation to remain in force pending a full constitutional hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision upholding her required withdrawal from a family medicine residency program.

She argued that the university's unilateral decision to amend her schedule, deleting a four-week geriatric medicine rotation and continuing her in family medicine, was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the schedule change was a substantive academic decision within the university's discretion, made to better support the struggling student and ensure patient safety.

The court found no procedural unfairness or legitimate expectation that the schedule would not change.

Provincial sport association members of a national non-profit sought an order calling a members' meeting after the corporation's directors refused a requisition and then denied access to the membership list needed to call the meeting themselves.

The court held that the statutory exception permitting refusal where a proposal clearly seeks to enforce a personal claim or redress a personal grievance did not apply, because the dispute reflected broad policy and governance disagreements rather than a narrow personal vendetta.

The respondent's pending request to the Director for an exemption from disclosure of the members register did not create any stay or justify frustrating the applicants' meeting rights.

The court ordered the corporation to call a meeting to consider the resolutions set out in the April 2, 2015 notice.