Logan Crowell

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss or quash the appellant's appeal of a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed his medical negligence action.

The appellant argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to dismiss because he had previously presided over a settlement conference in the same matter.

The Divisional Court declined to dismiss or quash the appeal, finding that the jurisdictional argument regarding the settlement conference judge presiding over the motion was not manifestly devoid of merit.

However, the court struck out the majority of the appellant's notice of appeal for being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, leaving only the jurisdictional ground to be argued at the appeal hearing.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of a medical malpractice action arising from the death of his common law spouse from terminal brain cancer.

The appellant alleged that the defendant physicians breached the standard of care by terminating the drug dexamethasone without tapering and by failing to obtain informed consent.

The motion judge dismissed the action after finding that the appellant's expert evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue requiring trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant failed to provide qualified expert evidence on standard of care and causation, and that the evidence supported informed consent had been obtained.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an unsuccessful motion brought by the plaintiffs to strike the defendants' jury notices.

The defendants were entirely successful in defending the motion and were presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 57.01.

The court considered the amount in dispute ($1,500,000), the importance of the issue (right to jury trial), and the moderate complexity of the motion.

The plaintiffs had rejected an offer to withdraw the motion without costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to both sets of defendants, discounting the amounts to align with the costs outlines served prior to the motion and disallowing senior counsel's attendance for the doctor defendants as unnecessary.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against several physician and hospital defendants following the death of his common-law spouse from aggressive brain cancer.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing a lack of expert evidence to establish professional negligence and causation, and that the duty to obtain informed consent rested with the physicians, not the hospital pharmacies.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the plaintiff's expert evidence was insufficient and causation was not established.

The plaintiffs moved to strike jury notices filed by the defendants after the plaintiffs amended their Statement of Claim to double the damages sought from $750,000 to $1.5 million, prompted by new expert reports on future care costs.

The court applied the principles from Dow v. Ottawa Hospital-Civic Campus to determine if the amendment reopened pleadings for all purposes, including the timely filing of jury notices.

The court found that the amendments were necessary, implicitly contained new allegations regarding the plaintiff's limitations and future care needs, significantly changed the nature of the action, and necessitated further discoveries.

As the defendants filed the jury notices promptly and were not the party seeking the amendment, the court concluded that pleadings were reopened for all purposes, granting the defendants a statutory right to a jury trial.

The plaintiffs' motion to strike the jury notices was dismissed, as were their alternative requests for costs and further discoveries of the defendants.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to extend an expired timetable in a medical malpractice action against the respondent doctors and hospital.

The motion judge applied the four-factor test from Marché d'Alimentation Denis Theriault Ltee v. Giant Tiger Stores Ltd. and found the history of delay and inactivity by the appellant's lawyers to be inexcusable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the factors, including prejudice to the respondents given the passage of almost eight years since the surgery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, an Advanced Care Paramedic, sought judicial review of a medical director's decision to decertify him following an investigation into a call where a patient later died.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the medical director did not follow the advisory recommendations of the Paramedic Practice Review Committee and acted as investigator, prosecutor, and decision-maker.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was provided with adequate notice, disclosure, opportunities to respond, and reasons, and that the process did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action moved for an order nunc pro tunc to extend the deadlines set out in a previous consent timetable order.

The court applied the test for setting aside a Registrar's dismissal order, considering the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Finding the plaintiff's explanations for missing multiple deadlines inadequate and not the result of inadvertence, the court dismissed the motion and directed the Registrar to dismiss the action for noncompliance.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for delay.

The applicant's late husband was denied a liver transplant due to a policy requiring six months of abstinence from alcohol.

The applicant filed her human rights complaint almost two years later, arguing she did not know the policy was discriminatory until then.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that ignorance of the law does not constitute a good faith explanation for delay under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court declined to award costs to any party, citing the tragic circumstances of the case and the reasonableness of the appeal, which raised bona fide legal issues.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.