Lise Favreau

The appellant, K.M., appealed convictions for sexual assault and for choking the complainant to render her incapable of resisting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge’s reasons were not ideal, they were sufficient when read contextually.

The trial judge’s credibility findings and rejection of the defence theory of fabrication were adequately explained, and the application of the W.(D.) framework was proper.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Douglas Naus, appealed an order confirming a Consent and Capacity Board decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment and subject to a community treatment order (CTO) requiring antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal from the incapacity finding was moot, but exercised its discretion to decide the CTO issue, holding that the Board and appeal judge erred in interpreting the statutory preconditions for a CTO.

The Court held that the Mental Health Act requires successful treatment to have occurred during a prior hospitalization, not the current one, before a CTO can be issued.

The CTO was quashed.

The appellant, Marvin Gurango, appealed his three-year custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle or law in the sentencing judge’s decision, nor was the sentence manifestly unfit.

The court emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence for this offence and found the sentence consistent with similar cases.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Krishan Arora, appealed his sentence of seven years and two months for four counts of forcible confinement and one count of extortion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s approach to aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not double count aggravating circumstances and properly considered the appellant’s guilty plea, remorse, and gambling debts.

The sentence was found to be fit given the seriousness of the offences and their impact on the victims.

The appellant, Sasikaran Thanapalasingam, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Tharshika Jeganathan.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s analysis or conclusions.

The court held that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the finding that the murder was planned and deliberate, and that the appellant’s intoxication did not impair his capacity to form the requisite intent.

The trial judge’s consideration of the evidence, including the impact of alcohol and alleged mental disturbance, was thorough and appropriate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Dwayne Gordon’s appeal from his guilty plea to human trafficking-related offences, finding that the plea was uninformed.

Gordon believed, based on his counsel’s assurances, that the plea judge would impose no more than six additional months in custody, but was instead sentenced to two-and-a-half years.

The court held that this misunderstanding constituted a serious unknown legal consequence and that Gordon would not have pleaded guilty had he known the true risk.

The plea was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The appellants, Alex and Maryam Furney, appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment to the respondent, Mohammad Ali Rabbani, for debts owed on promissory notes and a mortgage.

The appellants raised over thirty grounds of appeal, primarily alleging unfairness, errors of law and fact, and an improper costs award.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the motion judge's discretion in refusing an adjournment and her finding that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The Superior Court had dismissed an application to review an arbitrator's jurisdiction decision, finding the responding parties had waived their right to object.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the application judge's order, citing s. 17(9) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which explicitly states there is no appeal from a court's decision on a preliminary question of an arbitrator's jurisdiction.

The court found the arbitrator's jurisdiction ruling was indeed a preliminary question, despite its timing.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was quashed, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or consent analysis.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's s. 11(b) Charter application regarding post-conviction delay.

The court found the delay unreasonable, specifically rejecting the trial judge's characterization of immigration complexity and minor technical issues as exceptional circumstances.

As a remedy for the Charter breach, the conditional sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 20 months, as a conditional discharge was deemed unfit given the serious nature of the offence.

The appellants, Charles McVety and Canada Christian College, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss their anti-SLAPP motion against a defamation action brought by Kory Teneycke and Rubicon Strategy Inc. The defamation claim alleged that McVety publicly stated Teneycke acted in a conflict of interest regarding Ontario's vaccine passport policy and profited from it, and that Teneycke was prejudiced against Christians.

The motion judge found substantial merit to the defamation action and that the appellants had no viable defences, partly due to potential malice, and that the public interest favored allowing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the claim's merits and defences, and while agreeing the balancing analysis was flawed, a fresh analysis led to the same conclusion that the public interest in allowing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, given the low quality and malicious motivation of the speech.

The request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The appellants challenged the validity of their deceased father's 2021 will and an inter vivos property transfer, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the respondents.

The application judge dismissed their motion for directions, finding they failed to meet the minimal evidentiary threshold under Rule 75.06.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's assessment of the evidence regarding capacity or undue influence, nor in his treatment of the evidence or sufficiency of reasons for dismissing the challenge to the property transfer.

The appellant, Starkman Barristers, sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that referred their accounts for assessment under the Solicitor's Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the proposed appeal because the order was interlocutory, not finally determining the real issue between the parties.

The court reiterated that appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed.

This appeal concerned a dispute over specific performance of a property transfer agreement between a son (respondent) and his father and stepmother (appellants).

The trial judge had dismissed the appellants' claim for specific performance, finding no uniqueness in the property and delay by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the subjective uniqueness of the property as the appellants' established home and the unique nature of the transaction.

The Court also found no unreasonable delay by the appellants in seeking specific performance, as the respondent had repudiated the agreement.

Specific performance was ordered, along with an accounting of expenses and a reassessment of costs in favour of the appellants.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against his niece, appealed both convictions and the global 9-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's restrictions on cross-examination regarding delay in reporting or avoidant behaviour, nor in the refusal to order production of psychiatric records, and no Kienapple error as distinct delicts were found.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the proportionality and fitness of the sentence, distinguishing it from a lower comparable sentence based on the severity and duration of the abuse.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the judge's view that the complainant's confusion about consent enhanced her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment, affirming that a witness's candour, including about confusion, can properly support credibility findings.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, and a human trafficking offence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge improperly used s. 276 of the Criminal Code to disregard all of the complainant’s evidence regarding her work as a sex worker and made errors in assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by effectively excluding a broad area of evidence related to the complainant's sex trade involvement without providing notice or an opportunity for submissions, which constituted a significant breach of procedural fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants, condominium unit owners, appealed a Superior Court order that enforced a non-smoking rule against them and terminated their "Grandfather Agreement," which had previously allowed them to smoke in their unit under certain conditions.

They also sought leave to appeal a substantial costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or unfair treatment by the application judge.

The court denied leave to adduce fresh evidence, concluding it would not have affected the original outcome.

Leave to appeal costs was also denied, with the court affirming the application judge's costs award and fixing appeal costs.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her alleged financial motive to fabricate and by failing to properly consider the implausibility of the assaults given the proximity of sleeping children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the implausibility argument.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to believe the complainant's testimony.