Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-03-17
Docket: COA-24-CR-0104

Coram: Paul Rouleau, L. Favreau, L. Madsen JJ.A.

Between:
His Majesty the King (Respondent)
and
Sasikaran Thanapalasingam (Appellant)

Appearances:
Richard Litkowski, for the appellant
Robin Flumerfelt, for the respondent

Heard: 2025-03-11

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Anne M. Molloy of the Superior Court of Justice on May 30, 2023, with reasons reported at 2023 ONSC 4282.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1] The appellant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. We dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

Background

[2] On September 11, 2019, the appellant killed his 27-year-old wife, Tharshika Jeganathan, when she was on her way home from work. The appellant had consumed a large amount of alcohol either before or just after the murder, then presented himself at a police station, visibly upset. The murder took place 27 days after Ms. Jeganathan filed her Answer to the appellant’s divorce proceedings.

[3] That the murder of Ms. Jeganathan was intentional was conceded by the appellant’s trial counsel in closing argument. The only issue for determination at trial, which took place by judge alone, was whether the appellant’s “capacity to form the requisite intent [for first degree murder] was so impaired by alcohol that he should be convicted only of second degree murder.”

The Trial Judge’s Findings

[4] The trial judge had no difficulty concluding that the appellant’s acts were planned and deliberate. Two years prior, the appellant had openly expressed to a lay mediator his hatred for his wife and intention to kill her, he stalked her “relentlessly”, and repeatedly harassed a friend who gave her refuge after the parties’ separation. The appellant knew where Ms. Jeganathan lived and worked. On the day of the murder, he placed binoculars in his car, drove to where he knew she would emerge on her way home from work, and waited for her. He either already had, or that day placed a machete in his car. He intercepted her, chased her down the street and across lawns and driveways, wielding the machete and slashing her with it. Then, when he knocked her down, he repeatedly and deliberately hacked and chopped her body. There was video footage from a neighbour’s security camera capturing the attack, and from a camera at the police station capturing his subsequent behaviour.

[5] The trial judge carefully considered the impact of alcohol on the appellant. He had purchased and stolen alcohol earlier in the day, and after the murder, his vehicle cupholders were found to contain two bottles: a three quarters empty 375 ml vodka bottle and an empty 375 ml Crown Royal bottle, suggesting the appellant consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol, either before or shortly after the murder. While at the police station, the appellant showed increasing degrees of intoxication. Thereafter, at the hospital, the breathalyzer reading showed a blood alcohol reading of 247 mg. of alcohol in 100 ml. of blood and the appellant presented as extremely intoxicated. He was discharged from the hospital in a wheelchair, as he was unable to walk.

[6] The trial judge nevertheless found that at the relevant time – that is, at the time the appellant committed the offence and the attack had already been planned and deliberated upon – the appellant demonstrated very little impact from the consumption of alcohol. He showed physical coordination at the time of the attack, never stumbling or wavering; he delivered 30 “chops” to Ms. Jeganathan’s body “steadily and forcefully”; he walked away with no difficulty; and he drove his car to the police station, parking “in a straight manner”. The trial judge concluded that the appellant “knew exactly what he was doing, that he planned to kill Ms. Jeganathan with a machete, that he deliberated on that plan, and that he then carried out that plan in a thoroughly horrific manner.”

Grounds of Appeal

[7] On appeal, the appellant raises three arguments, which each relate to how the trial judge treated the evidence of alcohol consumption and evidence of alleged mental disturbance. Each ground seeks to disturb findings of fact that were readily available to the trial judge on the evidence. None of the arguments can succeed.

First Ground

[8] First, we reject the argument that the trial judge improperly compartmentalized the evidence of intoxication, considering only the appellant’s apparent motor skills reflected in the video footage immediately prior and at the time of the attack. To the contrary, the trial judge considered the totality of the evidence, with a view to determining the appellant’s condition leading up to and at the time of the murder. She found that when the appellant murdered Ms. Jeganathan, he had already planned the attack and deliberated on it, and showed very little evidence of impact from the consumption of alcohol. Only after he drove himself to the police station did he show signs of intoxication, which became increasingly severe as the evening progressed. In our view, the conclusion was not only available, but as submitted by the respondent, it was inevitable.

Second Ground

[9] Second, we are unable to accept the argument that the trial judge failed to consider the impact of intoxication on the mental state required for planning and deliberation as distinct from the impact intoxication had on the intent to commit murder. As noted, intent to commit murder was conceded, and only planning and deliberation were before the court. The trial judge considered all of the evidence to determine whether the mental state for planning and deliberation had been established and she concluded that it was. The threats to kill, stalking behaviour, and public confrontation with Ms. Jeganathan reflected deep resentment and hatred—in other words, animus—towards her. Further, the appellant’s actions on the day of the murder confirmed his formulation of a “plan to kill”. The evidence of the required mental state for planning and deliberation was overwhelming.

Third Ground

[10] Finally, the appellant’s argument that the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative impact of the appellant’s allegedly disturbed mental state and extreme intoxication in assessing the appellant’s state of mind cannot succeed. This is so because there was simply no evidence that the appellant’s mental state and intoxication affected the required mental state for planning and deliberation, the only issue at trial. The evidence in this case was that before the murder, the appellant took careful steps to prepare to murder his wife, and then implemented his plan. Only after the murder did he show signs of emotional distress when he presented at the police station as “obviously upset, possibly even traumatized by the enormity of what he had just done”, as found by the trial judge. The appellant did not testify and tendered no evidence related to his mental health. The trial judge considered the evidence before her, as she was required to do, and there is no basis for finding that she erred in failing to consider the cumulative impact of intoxication and emotional disturbance.

Conclusion

[11] We therefore find no error in the analysis or conclusions of the trial judge.

[12] The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Rouleau J.A.
L. Favreau J.A.
L. Madsen J.A.