Lee K. Ferrier

The Minister of Finance appealed an order granting the respondent an extension of time to file a notice of appeal regarding a tax assessment.

The respondent had filed his notice of appeal 37 days after the 90-day limitation period prescribed by the Retail Sales Tax Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the court has no jurisdiction to extend the express limitation period set out in the Act, and that the Minister was not estopped from relying on the limitation period.

The appellant, Inco Limited, appealed a decision of the motion judge setting aside a Master's order that had struck the respondents' reply affidavits with leave to amend.

The underlying motion for judgment brought by the appellant was based on statutory authority, the Limitations Act, and accord and satisfaction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was not clearly wrong in concluding that the judge hearing the motion for judgment should deal with any defects in the affidavit material, rather than having a Master review them in advance.

Costs of the proceedings to date were fixed at $45,000 on a partial indemnity basis payable to the respondents.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, which had set aside a direction from the Medical Review Committee requiring a paediatric respirologist to reimburse OHIP approximately $76,000 for 'General Assessments'.

The Board found that the definition of a general assessment did not require a specialist to perform a full bodily assessment, but rather an assessment of the relevant body parts affected by the patient's condition.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision finding breaches of the Mortgage Brokers Act and revoking its licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no breach of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, ample evidence of regulatory breaches, and no apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the penalty, finding the Tribunal erred in law by imposing licence revocation without allowing submissions on penalty, considering alternatives, or reviewing similar cases.

The revocation order was set aside and replaced with conditions on the appellant's licence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Social Benefits Tribunal denying him disability benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in law by overlooking medical evidence and making findings of fact without evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal correctly interpreted the legislation, properly considered the medical evidence, and made credibility findings that supported its conclusion that the applicant did not meet the statutory definition of a person with a disability.

The tenant appealed a Tribunal decision, arguing that pertinent evidence regarding bad faith was ignored.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting that bad faith is a question of fact and an appeal lies only on a question of law.

The court found it was open to the Tribunal to find no bad faith on the evidence as a whole.

However, the court ordered the landlord to refund $900 in rent paid for April.

The tenants appealed a decision regarding a rent decrease related to property taxes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the tenants' constitutional issue due to lack of an evidentiary record and failure to provide proper notice to the Minister of Justice under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court also dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the Tribunal erred in initially dismissing the landlord's application based on a delay in filing evidence, as the delay was caused by the City and did not prejudice the tenants.

The appellant, who had been detained in a mental health facility for 23 years, appealed an order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as his litigation guardian.

The order was made by a judge on his own motion at a Call-Over Court immediately after removing the appellant's solicitor of record.

The appellant was not present and had no actual notice of the intention to make such an appointment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that there was no basis in law for the appointment and no evidence before the presiding judge concerning the factors required under the Rules.

The appellants appealed an order of a motions judge awarding costs of an interlocutory injunction motion to the respondents, payable within 30 days.

The appellants argued that, following established principles, costs of an interlocutory injunction should typically be reserved to the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure preserves the motions judge's residual discretion to fix costs payable forthwith.

The court found the motions judge reasonably exercised her discretion based on the appellants' conduct, including unauthorized cashing of cheques and retention of property.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award concerning the interpretation of a collective agreement and an employee's status under the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review.

The court found the arbitrator's analysis of the collective agreement and the employee's status to be reasonable and dismissed the application with costs.

The tenant appealed a Tribunal decision regarding her ability to reasonably participate in a proceeding and a motion to set aside a default order.

The Divisional Court found the appeal to be moot.

Applying the Borowski factors, the court declined to hear the appeal, concluding that the issue was not of public importance requiring prompt resolution.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,500.

The appellant appealed two orders of a Master dismissing its action and ordering payment out of court.

The action, which was over seven years old, had been transferred to Case Management after years of dormancy.

The Master found the appellant had repeatedly breached orders regarding security for costs, delivery of a release, and provision of damages calculations and documentation.

The Divisional Court held that the Master did not err in principle or in the exercise of his discretion under Rules 60.12 and 77.10(7) to dismiss the action.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale.

An erratum and addendum was issued on consent of all counsel to correct a date in paragraph 69 of the court's reasons released on June 21, 2004.

The date 'April 1, 2002' was deleted and replaced with 'April 1, 2001'.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court amended its previous ruling on costs at the request of the respondents.

The court deleted the original paragraph regarding costs and substituted a new paragraph directing all counsel to address the court in writing on whether costs should be assessed or fixed, and if fixed, the quantum of such costs.

The applicants had filed a bill of costs seeking partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84.

The Government of Ontario applied for judicial review of the Fifth Triennial Report of the Provincial Judges Remuneration Commission, which recommended a 21% salary increase for provincial judges.

The Ontario Conference of Judges brought a separate application for an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Government to implement the recommendations.

The Divisional Court held that while the Commission's recommendations are subject to judicial review on a standard of patent unreasonableness, the Government's application must be dismissed due to its failure to exhaust internal reconsideration remedies under the Framework Agreement and its excessive delay in bringing the application.

The court granted the Ontario Conference of Judges' application and ordered the Government to implement the recommendations retroactively.

The applicants, who were social assistance recipients, brought a Charter challenge against a 'lifetime ban' on benefits imposed after convictions related to their benefits.

Before the hearing, a newly elected government repealed the regulations, and the parties settled all issues except costs.

The applicants sought their costs on a public interest basis.

The Divisional Court (majority) awarded the applicants partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84, finding that the litigation was meritorious, the issues were of public importance, and the applicants could not have proceeded without pro bono counsel.

A dissenting judge would have made no order as to costs.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of documents related to default hearings under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The Ministry claimed exemptions under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, including solicitor-client privilege.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's decision regarding sections 13, 14, and 18, but found the Commissioner erred in law by concluding that the documents, which were prepared by in-house counsel, lost their solicitor-client privilege once used as guidelines for general application.

The court held the documents were exempt from disclosure under section 19.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to suspend his driver's licence after he failed to meet the mandatory vision standards due to peripheral vision loss from brain tumor surgeries.

The Divisional Court held that the vision standard under O. Reg. 340/94 is a mandatory legislative requirement.

Because the applicant did not meet this standard, the Ministry had no discretion to issue a licence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

A stated case was brought before the Divisional Court regarding whether a municipality's Property Negotiator/Appraiser had the authority to file assessment complaints without prior specific authorization from the Municipal Council.

The Court held that while the act of filing the complaint was purely administrative and authorized by by-law, the decision to pursue the appeal required authorization or ratification by Council within a reasonable time.

Because the Council's resolution attempted to delegate the decision-making power rather than ratify the administrative action, the Court found the process deficient and concluded there were no valid complaints before the Assessment Review Board.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary child support and rescind arrears totalling $21,343.40, alongside ongoing support of $425 per month.

The Divisional Court considered whether it had jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, given the combined amount in issue exceeded $25,000.

The court held that the monetary limit applies to the total amount in issue across all subclauses, concluding it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal.