Lee K. Ferrier

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissing his claim for compensation.

The Board had found the appellant to be a vague, evasive, and inconsistent witness, and was unable to establish whether a crime of violence occurred or whether the appellant injured himself due to intoxication.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's credibility findings were determinative and that no error of law was demonstrated.

The Court emphasized that the Board's decisions should not be subjected to the same strict scrutiny as judicial reasons.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision finding that health care aides dispatched to a hospital were not 'casual' employees under the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal had focused on 'the work' performed rather than the 'position', concluding the work was performed on a regular and continuing basis.

The Divisional Court applied the patently unreasonable standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of its home statute was not patently unreasonable.

The Registrar appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission granting the respondent a liquor delivery service licence.

The respondent had failed to disclose recent criminal convictions on his application.

The Board found that the respondent made a false statement but granted the licence anyway, citing personal hardships and relying on evidence it had otherwise deemed not credible.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 6(2)(e) and s. 10(2) of the Liquor Licence Act, the Board has no discretion to grant a licence once it finds an applicant made a false statement.

The Court also found the Board erred by considering irrelevant factors and rejected evidence.

The Registrar was ordered to carry out the proposal to refuse the licence.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal which held that the landlord substantially interfered with the tenants' reasonable enjoyment by changing secondary locks installed by the tenants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in focusing on the ownership of the locks rather than whether the landlord had consented to the alteration of the locking system under s. 23 of the Tenant Protection Act.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to determine the issue of consent for each individual tenancy.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the University of Toronto's appeal panel, which upheld a penalty of a zero grade for a course due to plagiarism.

The applicant argued that the penalty effectively prevented him from re-enrolling.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no manifest unfairness or violation of natural justice.

The court noted that the appeal panel had considered fresh evidence regarding the applicant's academic record and reasonably concluded that the trial panel did not intend to impose a sanction that would necessarily permit re-enrollment if the student was otherwise ineligible.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Licence Suspension Appeal Board decision that directed the refusal of their motor vehicle inspection licences.

They also brought a motion to adduce new evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for new evidence, finding it irrelevant and lacking an explanation for why it was not presented earlier.

The court also dismissed the application for judicial review, noting that the applicants had failed to pursue their statutory right of appeal under the Highway Traffic Act and had not proceeded in a timely manner.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $20,580 in damages for a defective motor vehicle.

The trial judge found a fundamental breach of a collateral contract to provide a safe vehicle, entitling the respondent to rescission.

The Divisional Court upheld the damages calculation, noting an equitable adjustment was made for the respondent's use of the vehicle.

The respondent's cross-appeal for leave to appeal costs was dismissed.

The court declined to award costs for the appeal, citing disproportionate fees and the respondent's unreasonable refusal of a settlement offer.

The defendants appealed a decision of Master Kelly.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly applied the law and exercised his discretion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the responding parties, noting that the appellants filed voluminous, prolix, and largely irrelevant materials, which amounted to an unnecessary onslaught that the responding parties had to defend against.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of evaluation scores awarded to consulting engineering firms bidding on highway construction projects.

The applicants argued the scores were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation and application of the exemptions were reasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm from disclosure.

The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines sought judicial review of two orders by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of project evaluation reports.

The Ministry argued that the Commissioner misinterpreted the 'advice or recommendations' exemption under section 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation—that 'advice' and 'recommendations' have similar meanings and require a suggested course of action—was reasonable.

The applications for judicial review were dismissed.

The Registrar of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act appealed a Tribunal decision that refused to direct the Registrar to carry out a proposal to revoke the respondent's registration.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by misdirecting itself on the obligations of a corporate director under the Business Corporations Act, misconstruing the respondent's ignorance of his statutory responsibilities, and ignoring relevant evidence of his role in the business.

The Court directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke the registration.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the appointment of an investigator by the College of Physiotherapists of Ontario to examine their practices, and a stay of the investigations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting the well-established rule against piecemeal judicial review of administrative action absent exceptional circumstances.

The court held that the administrative proceedings should run their full course before judicial intervention.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their second motion for summary judgment and other relief.

The motion judge had ruled that the dismissal of their first summary judgment motion rendered the determination of triable issues res judicata.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the finding of a genuine issue for trial was res judicata, as the appellants had failed to put their best foot forward on the first motion.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's implicit refusal to grant leave to bring the motion after the action was set down for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The insured retained a public adjuster on a contingency fee basis to assist with a fire insurance claim.

The insured applied for a declaration that the adjuster's fees were a 'loss' under statutory condition 11 of the Insurance Act, and therefore subject to the appraisal process under s. 128.

The application judge agreed.

The insurer appealed, arguing that 'amount of loss' should be restricted to property damage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that economic losses were covered by the policy and the enhancer endorsement, and that any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent employee was constructively dismissed and awarding her damages.

The respondent, a director, had refused to accept a corporate restructuring that required her to report to a newly appointed assistant vice-president rather than the senior vice-president.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in construing the altered reporting obligation as a transfer of responsibility.

Applying an objective test, the court found that the structural change did not constitute a fundamental breach of the employment contract, and therefore, there was no constructive dismissal.

The applicant First Nation brought a motion to stay proceedings before the Ontario Labour Relations Board pending judicial review.

The applicant challenged the Board's jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions regarding the applicability of labour laws to aboriginal persons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the Board lacked jurisdiction, as the Board has the concomitant jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions arising from its power to determine questions of law.

The Court also reiterated its practice of refusing to fragment administrative proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.

The applicant, a real estate broker, sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the Real Estate Council of Ontario (RECO) that found him guilty of professional misconduct for advertising properties without consent.

The applicant argued that RECO did not exercise a statutory power of decision and alleged bias in the disciplinary process.

The Divisional Court held that RECO's disciplinary bodies do exercise a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding no evidence of bias or procedural unfairness, as the applicant was provided full disclosure and a fair opportunity to be heard.

The respondent college brought a motion to dismiss the union's application for judicial review on the grounds of undue delay.

The union had delayed perfecting the application for approximately nineteen months, citing difficulties assembling the record, a strike, and counsel workload.

The court applied the three-part test for undue delay, considering the length of delay, the explanation, and prejudice.

Although the delay was substantial and the explanation regarding counsel workload was generally insufficient, the court dismissed the motion because there was no actual prejudice to the college and no ongoing turmoil in the workplace.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $12,203.73 for unpaid commissions and $28,400.00 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding on the merits, concluding there was ample evidence to support the commission entitlement.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in the costs award, noting the importance of proportionality and reasonableness under the simplified rules.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the trial costs reduced to $10,000.00.

The applicant challenged the legality of a municipal by-law that prohibited charging fees for visitor parking at residential apartment buildings, arguing the municipality lacked jurisdiction and a planning rationale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the power to pass pay parking prohibition by-laws is necessarily implied from the express power to restrict land use under section 34(1) of the Planning Act.

The court also accepted the respondent's expert evidence that the prohibition was enacted in the context of planning policy and rejected the argument that the by-law improperly discriminated between commercial and residential landlords.