Leah Gensey

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder after stabbing his grandfather to death and severely injuring his grandmother.

The accused admitted to the acts but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

While the court accepted expert evidence that the accused suffered from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder at the time of the offences, it rejected the defence experts' opinions that he was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that the accused's post-offence conduct, which included fleeing the scene, hiding, and attempting to destroy evidence, demonstrated a rational capacity to appreciate that his actions were wrong according to societal standards.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought to admit his protected statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for the truth of their contents to support a not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence.

He also challenged the constitutionality of section 672.21(3)(e) of the Criminal Code, arguing that its interpretation, which prohibits the literal admission of such statements for their truth, violates his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that common law evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule and confessions rule, apply to protected statements.

While preposterous statements are admissible as original evidence of mental state, and protected statements can be used to challenge the basis of an expert's opinion or for credibility if the accused testifies, they are not admissible for the truth of their contents in an NCRMD hearing without meeting specific common law exceptions.

The court found this interpretation consistent with parliamentary intent to balance truth-seeking and accused protection, and not in violation of Charter sections 7, 11(c), 11(d), or 12.

The accused, Trae Worrie, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought a ruling to permit the jury to consider his protected out-of-court statements to forensic experts for the truth of their contents, in support of his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements should only be used to assess the basis of expert opinions, not for their truth.

The court ruled that while the accused consented to the use of the statements for the NCR defence, his exculpatory statements were inadmissible for the truth of their contents unless the Crown sought to admit them.

The statements could be used for the limited purpose of assessing the basis of expert opinions and as original evidence of mental state (e.g., preposterous statements indicating delusions).

The applicant, C.W., charged with second-degree murder, sought bail.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds could be met with appropriate sureties, but opposed on the tertiary ground, arguing that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court considered the proposed house arrest plan with sureties (the applicant's aunt and uncle), the applicant's minor and dated criminal record, his Indigenous status, and the application of Gladue factors.

Despite concerns about the applicant's disrespectful attitude during a police interview and the gravity of the offence, the court found that the sureties were capable of supervision and that Indigenous law and customs provided sufficient incentive for compliance.

Applying the St. Cloud test and Gladue principles, the court determined that detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence and granted bail with strict conditions including house arrest, substance abuse treatment, and camera monitoring by sureties.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for trafficking in fentanyl and using a forged prescription.

The conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence of identity.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of three counts of using a forged document and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl, sentencing him to six years imprisonment less eighteen months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that another person could have impersonated him using fake identification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence of identity was sufficient and that the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit and proportionate to the appellant's role in the trafficking ring.

In a jury trial on a first degree murder indictment arising from a planned drug-related shooting, the court issued written reasons addressing objections to the jury charge and counsel's closings.

The court held that an out-of-court statement about a distinctive licence plate was inadmissible for its truth because it was hearsay and did not meet the excited utterance exception.

The court also gave a strong Hay warning on weak police identification evidence, ruled that haircut evidence lacked probative value as after-the-fact conduct, and corrected improper closing submissions by both Crown and defence where they exceeded the evidentiary record.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused of manslaughter and acquitted the third.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge ruled on several motions.

The judge excused a prospective juror for obvious partiality under s. 632(c) of the Criminal Code.

A motion to sever one of the co-accused due to his counsel's illness was dismissed, as the jury was willing to wait and the public interest favoured a joint trial.

The judge also dismissed a Charter application alleging that the consumption of a DNA negative control by the Centre of Forensic Sciences breached the accused's rights, finding the control was an analytical tool rather than first-party disclosure.

Finally, a request for a mid-trial instruction regarding an in-dock identification was denied, with the judge opting to provide a general warning about eyewitness identification instead.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.

During jury deliberations in a first-degree murder trial, the jury requested to take a view of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred.

The Crown opposed the request due to logistical and security concerns, while one of the accused argued a view constitutes real evidence.

The trial judge refused the request, finding that a view would not provide a real and demonstrable advantage given the extensive photographic and video evidence already adduced.

Furthermore, the judge held that a view at the deliberation stage was not in the interests of justice due to the passage of time, the risk of the jury drawing untested inferences, and significant logistical challenges.

The appellant appealed her conviction on multiple counts including fraud over $5,000, personating a police officer, transferring proceeds of crime, and criminal organization offences.

She also appealed her sentence of 32 months' imprisonment plus a fine of $225,400 or three years' imprisonment in lieu.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding proceeds of crime and money laundering, no error in the jury charge on circumstantial evidence, and no error in principle in the sentencing.

The trial judge properly extrapolated the amount of fraud from a four-day monitoring period.

The accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

During pre-charge conferences, the Crown and defence counsel raised several issues regarding the jury instructions.

The court declined the Crown's request to leave section 21(2) of the Criminal Code and unlawful confinement under section 231(5)(e) as routes to liability, finding insufficient evidence to support those theories.

The court also dismissed defence requests to remove planning and deliberation or section 229(a)(ii) intent from the charge for one of the accused, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to consider.

Further defence requests for a specific identification instruction and modifications to the summary of eyewitness testimony were also dismissed.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused had been in custody for two years prior to the murder.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to prove the accused did not have access to a cell phone during that time, thereby refuting a potential defence claim that the accused was a contact in the deceased's phone.

The defence offered to admit the accused was 'out of the area' without cell phone access for two months.

The court held that the extended two-year period of non-access was irrelevant.

Furthermore, the court ruled that even if relevant, the prejudicial effect of revealing the accused's prior incarceration to the jury outweighed its probative value, and prohibited the Crown from leading the evidence.

In a murder trial, the Crown applied to exclude references to the name 'CJ' from the deceased's phone records, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay.

A co-accused also sought to redact text messages involving 'Scarface' on similar grounds.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the evidence relevant to the live issue of DNA transfer and identification.

The court held that the admission of the contact list and text messages engaged issues of authentication rather than hearsay, as they were not being adduced for the truth of their contents but to determine whether the communications were actually made by the accused.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to file a DNA expert's written report as an exhibit after the expert had already provided viva voce evidence.

The defence objected, arguing the report was prejudicial.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, ruling that the report was inadmissible because it added nothing to the oral testimony, contained matters not explored in evidence, and risked misleading or confusing the jury.

The court emphasized that the expert's evidence is their testimony, not their report.

During a criminal trial for a shooting death, the court issued written reasons for several oral evidentiary rulings.

The court ruled that the defence could not elicit self-serving admissions from a Crown witness during cross-examination.

The court allowed two photographs to be entered as numbered exhibits, finding them relevant and authenticated.

The court permitted the Crown to re-examine a witness regarding phone numbers to clarify answers given in cross-examination, but denied re-examination on the circumstances of an identification, finding it more prejudicial than probative.

Finally, the court prohibited the defence from introducing investigative hearsay about a third-party suspect without a proper voir dire.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to exclude cell phone numbers they had provided to their probation officers, which were subsequently disclosed to the police.

The accused argued the disclosure violated their rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and that the statements were not voluntary.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the probation officers were not persons in authority at the time the numbers were provided.

Furthermore, the court held there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers, and the disclosure was lawfully permitted under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act.

The court also found no evidence that the accused were compelled to provide the numbers in violation of section 7.

The phone numbers were ruled admissible.

The accused were on trial for first degree murder.

During the trial, the defence filed a section 24(1) Charter application alleging a breach due to the Centre of Forensic Sciences consuming a 'negative control' sample during DNA testing.

The Crown sought directions, arguing the court should determine the relevancy of the consumed sample before the Crown's DNA expert testified, and restrict cross-examination if relevance was not established.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, holding that the defence was entitled to cross-examine the expert on the DNA extraction process, including the use and consumption of the negative control.

The court deferred ruling on the Charter application until the end of the trial, when the full evidentiary record would allow for a proper assessment of prejudice.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to adduce opinion evidence from a police officer that clothing worn by a male in a surveillance video resembled clothing she had previously observed the accused wearing.

The defence objected, arguing the officer was in no better position than the jury to make this comparison.

The trial judge reconsidered and reversed an earlier ruling, holding that the officer's opinion was not helpful to the trier of fact and was more prejudicial than probative.

The jury, equipped with the video as real evidence, could make the comparison themselves without the officer's narration or opinion.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought leave to communicate with its witness, a cell phone security analyst, while she was still under cross-examination.

The defence had pointed out a geographical and temporal discrepancy in the cell phone records, and the Crown wished to direct the witness to investigate the discrepancy.

The court granted leave, noting that the witness was providing factual evidence about the operation of the network and that investigating the discrepancy would prevent further delay.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit portions of a witness's prior police statement as past recollection recorded due to the witness's professed memory loss.

The defence initially agreed to admit certain excerpts but later objected to the Crown tendering subsequent portions of the statement.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that all relevant parts of the statement met the four essential conditions for admissibility as past recollection recorded and that fairness to the Crown required presenting a complete and non-misleading picture to the jury.