Richard Stephenson

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying dispute arose from a commercial arbitration where the arbitrator made a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction over a counterclaim.

The Superior Court reversed this ruling.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, holding that under section 17(9) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, there is no right of appeal from a court's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling, distinguishing it from an appeal of an award.

An appeal of a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a workplace fatality case.

The respondents were charged with offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following the death of a worker at a gold mine.

The trial was scheduled to begin approximately three months beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The application judge stayed the charges, finding the Crown had failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in this particularly complex case.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge had misinterpreted the particularly complex case exception by using the presumptive ceiling as a benchmark for assessing the Crown's conduct, rather than assessing whether the Crown reasonably attempted to minimize delay occasioned by the case's complexity.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision staying regulatory charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act on the basis of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from a workplace fatality at a gold mine where a worker was poisoned by cyanide.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the net delay of 23 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months and that the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Crown sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on four grounds relating to the calculation of delay and the application of the Jordan framework.

The Crown appealed a decision staying charges against the respondents under the Occupational Health and Safety Act due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found a 23-month delay and concluded the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in a complex case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown's failure to secure a trial date in a timely manner and its problematic case management fell below the standard required by Jordan.

The moving party brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an order of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that adjourned the hearing of an appeal from an Official Plan Amendment.

The OMB had adjourned the hearing until the municipality enacted a development permit by-law, despite acknowledging it could not order the municipality to pass such a by-law.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's order raised a question of law of sufficient general or public importance regarding whether the municipality is entitled under s. 17(44) of the Planning Act to have its appeal adjudicated before enacting a development permit by-law.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order, arguing the motion judge erred by granting it despite a viable set-off defence and inconsistently allowing the counterclaim to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge reasonably exercised his discretion.

The appellants had failed to provide evidence of their damages claim after being given a year to do so, leaving only an unsubstantial punitive damages claim.

The appellants challenged a regulatory decision reducing a power generator's proposed revenue requirements for nuclear compensation costs during a forward test period.

The Court of Appeal held that future compensation costs mandated by existing collective agreements were committed costs, not forecast costs that could simply be managed downward.

The Board acted unreasonably by relying on hindsight and current benchmarking information unavailable when the collective agreements were made, and by failing to conduct a prudence review based on what was known or ought to have been known at the time of the commitments.

The matter was remitted to the Board for rehearing in accordance with those principles.

Following the release of its reasons for judgment, the Court of Appeal received submissions from the parties regarding the costs of the application.

The court awarded costs of the application below to the appellant, fixed at $17,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant, a technical sales representative, was terminated after 17 years of employment.

He sought a declaration that a restrictive covenant in his employment contract, which prohibited him from competing with the respondent for one year by dealing with any of its customers, was unenforceable.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the covenant reasonable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the covenant overly broad and unworkable in practice, as the appellant had no way of knowing all of the respondent's customers over the past 17 years.

The appeal was allowed and the restrictive covenant was declared unenforceable.

The appellants, former senior executives of the respondent corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding that no 'change in control' had occurred to trigger generous compensation provisions in their employment contracts.

During a period of financial difficulty, a shareholder group accumulated proxies for over 35 percent of the voting shares to requisition a special meeting to replace the board of directors.

A settlement was reached before the meeting, and the executives subsequently claimed payouts from a trust fund established for change of control scenarios.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that the mere accumulation of proxies did not confer the right to control or direct the voting power of the corporation, and thus did not constitute a change in control under the agreements.