Martin Sabat

The applicant sought severance from her co-accused on the basis that a joint trial would result in significant prejudice and an unfair trial.

The applicant faces a charge of first degree murder while her co-accused faces second degree murder, despite the Crown alleging the same conduct of planning and deliberation against both.

The applicant argued that the differential charges would improperly lead the jury to conclude she is more culpable.

The Crown opposed severance, arguing that any prejudice would be eliminated through proper jury instructions.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the presumption of joint trial applies with particular force where co-accused are blaming each other, that the evidence is the same against both, and that jury instructions would adequately protect against any risk of prejudicial reasoning.

The decision concerns the conviction of Kayani As-Sadiq for assault, threatening death, aggravated assault, and related offences against his former wife, Marie-Lyne Toussaint.

The court found the complainant credible and her account corroborated by independent evidence and post-offence conduct.

The court rejected the accused’s alibi and alternative explanations, finding them improbable and unsupported by the evidence.

The court acquitted the accused of attempted murder, finding a reasonable doubt as to intent to kill, but convicted him of the included offence of aggravated assault.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of manslaughter against Ahmed Rafin following the fatal stabbing of Maahir Dosani during a schoolyard swarming incident.

The Crown argued unlawful act manslaughter, positing that Rafin either intentionally stabbed his attackers (with Dosani being an incidental victim) or committed offenses of weapon possession and threatening.

The defence contended that Rafin acted in self-defence and lacked the requisite intent.

The court found Rafin to be a credible witness, accepting his testimony that he displayed a knife to deter an angry, armed, and numerically superior crowd while attempting to retreat.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rafin committed an unlawful act causing Dosani's death, leading to an acquittal.

The Crown sought directions regarding the disclosure of police records concerning a young person (M.A.) involved in an incident related to a murder charge against the accused.

The court determined that records pertaining to extrajudicial measures (EJM) taken with M.A. are presumptively non-disclosable under section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to protect the young person from stigmatization.

However, information about the underlying incident, such as a fight and its reason, and any animus between M.A. and the deceased, is disclosable and permissible for witness questioning, provided it does not reveal police involvement or EJM details.

The court suggested an Agreed Statement of Facts as a means to address the defence's need for full answer and defence without violating YCJA provisions.

Jayson Cacdac pleaded guilty to sexual assault.

The Crown sought 16 months of actual incarceration, while the defence proposed a 9-12 month conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence, including house arrest and community service, followed by 12 months of probation.

The decision balanced the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, considering the accused's first-offender status, remorse, and the victim's vulnerability and the impact of the assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple charges including robbery, weapons dangerous, and failing to comply with release conditions, stemming from two separate incidents involving the theft of high-value running shoes using an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for time served, citing enhanced pre-sentence credit due to strict bail conditions and punitive jail lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the offences, the use of an imitation firearm, and the commission of new offences while on release.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth, guilty plea, remorse, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a 1-year conditional sentence, followed by 2 years of probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition, finding it consistent with sentencing principles given the accused's demonstrated efforts towards rehabilitation.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple counts of robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and forcible confinement relating to four bank robberies.

The offender, a career criminal with a lengthy record including a conviction for murder in Thailand, used an imitation firearm and disguises during the carefully planned robberies.

The court applied the totality principle to reduce the cumulative sentence from 34 years to 21 years, resulting in a net sentence of 15 years, 6 months, and 10 days after enhanced credit for pre-trial custody and pandemic lockdowns.

The court declined the Crown's request to delay parole eligibility under s. 743.6.

The accused, Shevon McKitty and Celdon Parris-Thompson, were charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, R.H., had incomplete memory due to blackouts from intoxication but clearly expressed non-consent to sexual intercourse.

The court found that R.H. did not lack the capacity to consent to any sexual contact but explicitly withheld consent for sexual intercourse.

McKitty was found guilty of sexual assault for engaging in intercourse after R.H.'s clear non-consent.

Parris-Thompson was found guilty of sexual assault for physically pressing into R.H. and attempting penetration despite her verbal and physical resistance.

Neither accused was found to be a party to the other's offence.

This is a reverse onus judicial interim release (bail) hearing for an accused charged with multiple serious offences including impaired operation of a motor vehicle, firearm-related offences, drug trafficking, and weapons possession.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted bail with strict conditions, finding that the accused met his onus despite the serious nature of the charges.

The decision emphasizes the importance of a strong plan of release with credible sureties and the narrow scope of the public safety component under the secondary ground.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on two counts of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by impermissibly weighing evidence, assessing pieces of evidence in isolation, and selecting between competing inferences rather than accepting the inferences most favourable to the Crown.

The application was granted, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted to commit the accused on two counts of first-degree murder.

David Persaud appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had conducted a blended trial and Charter application, granting a s. 10(b) application but dismissing a s. 8 application, and then convicting Persaud.

The appeal court found that the trial judge conflated s. 8 Charter issues with the trial proper, provided insufficient reasons for conviction, and improperly used evidence admissible only for the Charter application to convict on the substantive charge.

The court dismissed grounds related to unreasonable verdict and a new ground raised on appeal.

Ultimately, the conviction could not stand due to significant flaws in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an order for a new trial on the impaired driving charge.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for a violation of her Charter s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge found the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or reasonable steps to mitigate the delay following an adjournment caused by a witness's medical emergency.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the trial judge's implicit findings that no delay was attributable to the defence and that the Crown had not taken reasonable steps to secure an earlier trial date after the initial adjournment.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and voyeurism, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, relied on inadmissible video evidence, and misinterpreted the voyeurism provisions of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal court found no reversible errors, noting the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and the video exhibit was admitted without limiting instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of possessing child pornography, applied for bail pending appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appeal was frivolous.

The applicant argued that the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. test, failed to consider key evidence, and failed to consider whether guilt was the only logical conclusion in a circumstantial case.

The court rejected all three arguments, concluding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, considered the relevant evidence, and correctly applied the burden of proof.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples and dismiss 'over 80' charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer failed to administer the approved screening device 'forthwith' in violation of s. 8 of the Charter, and failed to implement the respondent's right to counsel of choice in violation of s. 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's analysis, concluding that the officer prioritized privacy over the statutory imperative to administer the test forthwith, and took a 'short-cut' by calling duty counsel instead of facilitating the respondent's counsel of choice.

The appeal was dismissed.

Derrick Harvey, an American citizen, appealed his 2011 guilty pleas for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, which subsequently led to his permanent residence application being refused due to criminality.

He argued his plea was not informed as his trial counsel failed to advise him of the significant immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice, on summary conviction appeal, found that Harvey's plea was not informed because he was unaware of the critical ramifications, specifically the distinction between border entry and criminal inadmissibility for permanent residence.

The court emphasized that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, including collateral consequences.

It was not necessary to find counsel ineffective.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the decision to re-prosecute left to the Crown.

The Crown appealed acquittals for assault with intent to resist lawful arrest.

The trial judge found the arrest unlawful because the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached a bail condition by "attending" a prohibited location, considering only his walking past it.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in law by limiting the circumstances considered for objective reasonableness, failing to include the respondent's prior drug trafficking arrest at the location, the nature of the location, and physical barriers.

The court also held that the respondent's flight, occurring after the decision to arrest but before its execution, was a relevant factor for objective grounds.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Martin Bartholomew, appealed his convictions for three counts of assault involving the inappropriate touching of a 13-year-old student.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to properly consider witness contamination by the complainant's mother, an error in admitting a witness statement as past recollection recorded, and the insufficiency of the trial judge's reasons regarding the complainant's credibility.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the contamination issue, correctly applied the test for past recollection recorded, and provided sufficient reasons for the convictions.

The appellant appealed a common law peace bond order, arguing that it could only be made on consent, that the Crown failed to prove the complainant feared for their life, and that the peace bond hearing breached natural justice.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that common law peace bonds do not require consent, the threshold is a "reasonably apprehended breach of the peace," and natural justice was observed as the appellant had notice, made submissions, and gave evidence, with the trial judge relying on evidence adduced at the prior criminal harassment trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was involved in a single motor vehicle accident and was later arrested after registering a fail on an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control for the period between a tow truck's arrival and police arrival.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to the entire relevant time period, specifically the period of driving leading up to the collision.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.