R. v. Karas, 2020 ONSC 8183

Her Majesty the Queen v. Michael Karas

COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-40000111

DATE: 20201229

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

• and -

MICHAEL KARAS

COUNSEL:

Martin Sabat and Arian Khader, for the Crown

Dragi Zekavica, for the Defence

HEARD: December 22, 23 and 29, 2020 at Toronto by videoconference

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

DUCHARME J.

A. Overview

I. Overview

1Mr. Karas is before the court on a 24-count indictment involving offences related to four bank robberies he committed using an imitation firearm. Mr. Karas has pleaded to two counts of robbery, two counts of using an imitation firearm while committing the offence of robbery and one count of forcible confinement. This was done on the understanding that the facts would be read in for all four robberies and would be accepted as true by Mr. Karas pursuant to Regina v. Garcia and Silva, 1969 CanLII 450 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 821 (C.A.).

II. The Positions of the Parties

2The Crown is seeking a sentence of 22 years in custody less time for pre-trial custody which in this case includes time for lockdowns and restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the Crown seeks the following additional orders:

• a DNA order
• s. 109 weapons prohibition for life
• s. 743.21 non-communication order re all civilian witnesses involved
• Forfeiture order in relation to money and items seized from Mr. Karas
• Delayed Ineligibility for parole under section 743.6

3Mr. Zekavica for Mr. Karas is seeking a sentence of six to eight years less time for pre-trial custody. He submits that this is not an appropriate case for an order delaying parole ineligibility under s. 743.6 but he is not otherwise opposed to the other orders sought by the Crown.

III. The Facts of the Four Robberies

4The first robbery occurred on November 10, 2017 at the Bank of Montreal at 1775 Queen Street East in Toronto. This is the basis for the guilty plea to count 1, robbery, and count 3, use imitation firearm, while committing a robbery. At approximately 5:14 p.m., Mr. Karas walked into the bank. Ms. Padma Rampersad, a teller, saw him enter and said: “I’ll be with you in a minute”. Ms. Rampersad was about to count her colleague’s cash. Mr. Karas approached Ms. Rampersad so she asked: “How can I help you?”. Mr. Karas demanded that Ms. Rampersad give him the cash she had, and she refused. Mr. Karas then pulled out what appeared to be a black handgun. Mr. Karas said, “yes you would or I’m going to blow your fucking head off”. Mr. Karas took $5,155.00 and left the bank. Ms. Rampersad locked the branch doors. This was witnessed by another employee and captured on video.

5The last of the four robberies occurred on August 18, 2018 at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce at 27 King Street North in Waterloo. This is the basis for the guilty plea to count 12, robbery, count 20, use imitation firearm while committing a robbery, and count 15, forcible confinement. At approximately 8:30 a.m., Mr. Karas walked into the CIBC at 27 King Street North in Waterloo. Anabelle DaCosta, a teller, had just arrived to open the branch. Mr. Karas showed her what appeared to be a gun and said he was robbing her. She told Mr. Karas that she could not open the vault without another employee and Mr. Karas said to wait for the “blonde girl”. Two other employees, Lidjia Kunovac and Prabot Jugpall, arrived and Mr. Karas forced the employees to the back room at gunpoint where he demanded that they open the vault. Mr. Karas told Ms. DaCosta that he would shoot if she did not give him the money or if she played tricks. Mr. Karas was told that the vault would take 15 minutes to open. The employees were forced to put their combinations into the safe. Mr. Karas then forcibly confined them inside the bank at gunpoint until the safe opened. Mr. Karas took money and put it in his bag. $19,645.00 CAD and $2,893.00 USD was taken. Mr. Karas wore a construction helmet, a dust mask, a construction vest, sunglasses, a long-sleeved black shirt, black gloves, beige pants and black shoes. He had a black duffle bag. Mr. Karas was captured on bank surveillance.

6The second robbery occurred on July 26, 2018 at the Scotiabank at 416 Spadina Road in Toronto. Mr. Karas admitted the following facts. At approximately 9:34 a.m., Mr. Karas walked into the bank and approached a teller, Sara Salituro, and pointed what appeared to be a black handgun at her. He said: “Give me all your money”. Ms. Salituro froze. She then took out some money. As she was doing that, Mr. Karas said “Open your drawer all the way, give me all your money. I need large bills, $100 bills”. Ms. Salituro complied and opened the drawer. She said “See, I don’t have any more”. Mr. Karas took all the money and put it in his bag. Mr. Karas then went to Ms. Ramos’ wicket, pushed a client, Jill Wein, out of the way, and said to Ms. Ramos: “Give me all your money, hurry up”. Ms. Ramos opened her drawer and gave him the money. Mr. Karas pointed the gun at Ms. Ramos as he robbed her. He left through the front door. Ms. Ramos broke down crying. Mr. Karas wore a construction helmet, dust mask, a construction vest, sunglasses, a long-sleeved black shirt, black gloves, beige pants and black shoes. He had a black duffle bag with him. Mr. Karas took $2,690.00 from the bank and he was captured on surveillance video.

7The third robbery occurred on August 11, 2018 at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce at 462 Spadina Road in Toronto. Mr. Karas admitted the following facts. At approximately 9:35 a.m., Mr. Karas walked into the bank. He pointed what appeared to be a gun at Ms. Ergodan’s face. She started to shake and thought she was going to die. He said, “Give me all the money”. Ms. Ergodan gave him $50 and $100 bills and stepped back. Mr. Karas took the entire contents of Ms. Erdogan’s drawer and left the bank. He took $3,165.00 from the bank. Mr. Karas wore a construction helmet, dust mask, a construction vest, sunglasses, long sleeve black shirt, black gloves, beige pants, and black shoes. He had a black duffle bag. He was captured on bank surveillance.

IV. The Antecedents and Canadian Criminal Record of Mr. Karas

8I have been told almost nothing about Mr. Karas’ childhood or his life outside of prison. He was born and raised in Toronto and, other than the time he spent in Thailand, he has lived primarily in Ontario and British Columbia. He apparently pursued some studies at Queen’s University and Simon Fraser University. There is no indication that his early life was remarkable in any way that might contribute to his decision to pursue a life of crime. Thus, I find myself in the same situation as Finch J. on December 9, 1988 when, in sentencing Mr. Karas for two counts of extortion, he said:

I have tried as best I can to understand why someone with your apparently fortunate beginnings would be led into the life of crime that you have pursued for the last 8 years and I must confess that I am incapable of understanding why you would do that.

9Mr. Karas’ criminal record starts in 1981 when he was sentenced in Toronto on two counts of robbery (2.5 years on each charge consecutive); use firearm while committing an indictable offence (1 year consecutive and a 5-year weapons prohibition); and 3 counts of fraud (6 months concurrent but consecutive to the other sentences) for a total of 6.5 years.

10Mr. Karas was paroled on August 25, 1983 and on January 31, 1985 he was sentenced to three counts of robbery (4.5 years, 3.5 years consecutive, and 3 years concurrent) and possession of a weapon (2 years concurrent) for a total of 8.0 years.

11On June 6, 1985, Mr. Karas was sentenced on two counts of robbery (12 years on each count concurrent to each other and the sentence he was serving) and use firearm while committing an indictable offence (3 years consecutive).

12On December 9, 1988, Mr. Karas was sentenced on two counts of attempted extortion (2 years on each charge concurrent to the sentence he was serving) and one count of extortion (3 years consecutive and a 10-year weapons prohibition.)

13On April 7, 1989, Mr. Karas was sentenced on a charge of assist in prison escape (3 years consecutive to sentence serving, reduced on appeal to 18 months).

14On January 24, 1991, Mr. Karas was sentenced for being unlawfully at large (1 year consecutive to sentence serving).

15On December 12, 2005, Mr. Karas was sentenced on two robberies (1 day consecutive to the sentence he was serving and 1 day concurrent) and two use imitation firearms offences (3 years consecutive to the robbery sentences and to the sentence he was serving; and 3 years concurrent to the other firearm charge).

V. The Thai Criminal Record of Mr. Karas

16In July 1997, Thailand requested the extradition of Mr. Karas to Thailand in relation to the killing of Ms. Suwannee Ratanaprakorn in Thailand on September 23 or 24, 1996. Mr. Karas and Ms. Ratanaprakorn were married or in a marriage-like relationship. There was evidence that the applicant caused the death of the victim at a hotel in Pattaya, Thailand, where they were residing together at that time. There also exists evidence that he cut up her body and disposed of her body parts in a swampy area located not far from the area of the hotel.

17A Canadian extradition arrest warrant was served on Mr. Karas on October 25, 1999 while he was in custody in Canada. He then resisted extradition until he was extradited to Thailand on September 8, 2011. On March 13, 2012, Mr. Karas was sentenced on a count of Offence Against Life (equivalent to first degree murder) and received a sentence of 25 years which was reduced through subsequent sentence commutations. While Mr. Karas claims that he was pardoned outright for this offence, I reject this claim. The Thai records make clear that all of these “pardons” were actually sentence commutations.

18Mr. Karas now denies that he had anything to do with the murder of Ms. Ratanaprakorn. He now says that he does not know who killed her and he saw no signs that she had been killed in their hotel room. He claims that his guilty plea in Thailand was based on assurances from a Thai prosecutor that he would receive a sentence of time served. There is no other evidence that tends to support this claim. In other words, Mr. Karas now claims that he lied to the Thai court.

19Mr. Karas was also shown a document dated June 4, 2013 that he admits he had filled out in support of his application to be transferred from Thailand to Canada to serve out his sentence. In that document Mr. Karas claimed that his girlfriend had tried to cut his throat and he snapped her neck in self-defense. Before this Court, Mr. Karas testified that this was also a lie intended to assist his application to be transferred back to Canada.

20The Thai documents relating to Mr. Karas’ guilty plea and sentencing, which would otherwise be hearsay, are admissible under s. 36(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.): see R. v. Boyce, 2019 ONCA 828, 148 O.R. (3d) 451. Mr. Zekavica for Mr. Karas submitted that I should not attach much, if any, weight to these records although it was not completely clear to me why that should be the case. The Crown submits that I can rely on the Thai records fully. However, the issue of the weight attached to these documents is greatly simplified by the fact that Mr. Karas admitted much of the relevant aspects of them.

21I do not believe Mr. Karas’ claim that he was not involved in the murder and dismemberment of Ms. Ratanaprakorn. This claim is contradicted by both his guilty plea and the somewhat modified narrative of the killing he advanced when applying for a prisoner transfer to Canada. The facts revealed during the investigation about the state of their hotel room, the observations made of Mr. Karas repeatedly carrying luggage out of the hotel and his immediate departure from Thailand are all supportive of his guilt. In this regard, I accept the facts as outlined in the Thai records. Indeed, to give any credence to Mr. Karas’ claims of innocence in this regard would be to accept that there was a conspiracy involving employees of the hotel where he was living, the Thai police and the Thai prosecutors.

VI. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

22In this case the aggravating factors are many. The offence was extremely serious especially as Mr. Karas used an imitation firearm and wore a mask to commit them. These were not crimes borne out of need, economic desperation or addiction. In this regard, I reject Mr. Karas’ claim that he knew nothing of available social services and was in dire financial circumstances. Nor do I accept that he was driven to rob because of an oxycontin addiction. Rather these robberies were simply crimes of greed. These crimes were not spontaneous or impulsive. These crimes were carefully planned out. Mr. Karas went to the banks beforehand to survey the layout. He obtained the weapon he was going to use and a disguise in advance and went so far as to bring a change of clothing. In this regard, the level of sophistication increased with each robbery. As evidenced by the Victim Impact Statements, these offences had a profoundly deleterious impact on the victims.

23Mr. Karas is an institutionalized career criminal. His criminal record, which dates back to 1981, includes nine prior bank robberies and three offences involving firearms or a weapon. The offences admitted to before this court bring his total to 13 robberies and seven weapons offences. The highest sentence Mr. Karas has previously received for armed robbery of a bank was two concurrent sentences of 12 years.

24Mr. Karas’ prior criminal record, the facts of these offences and his conviction for the killing of Ms. Ratanaprakorn confirm that Mr. Karas is an extremely dangerous man who poses a serious threat to society. While Mr. Karas now purports to be remorseful about his actions, I reject these claims as self-serving lies designed to lighten the sentence that I shall impose. Far more powerful than Mr. Karas’ recent claims of remorse is the fact that he continued to commit armed bank robberies over the years.

25The mitigating facts in this case are few. Mr. Karas’ guilty plea avoids the need for a trial which would have been difficult for some of the victims. However, I do not view his guilty plea to be a significant demonstration of remorse given the strength of the Crown’s case. Mr. Karas is now 64 years of age which is somewhat mitigating as he might be less dangerous to society after he serves whatever sentence I impose. I say this while recognizing that he committed these offences when he was 61. Beyond that I see no other mitigating circumstances.

VII. The Purpose and Principles of Sentencing

26The purpose and objectives of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (the “Criminal Code”). Generally speaking, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to foster respect for the law and to maintain a just, peaceful and safe society.

27Courts attempt to achieve this purpose by imposing just penalties that have one or more of the following objectives which have been codified in s. 718 of the Criminal Code:

(a) denouncing unlawful conduct;

(b) deterring this offender and others from committing offences;

(c) imprisoning offenders, where necessary, to separate them from the law-abiding members of society;

(d) assisting in rehabilitating offenders and, in appropriate circumstances, encouraging their treatment;

(e) providing reparation for harm done to victims of the community; and

(f) promoting in offenders a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of, the harm they have done to victims and to the community.

28Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code also requires that courts take into account other principles, including the following:

718.2 (a) a sentence may be increased or decreased depending upon the presence of any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender and without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim

(b) a sentence should be similar to those imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh

29Sentencing is an individualized process, in which the trial judge has considerable discretion in fashioning a fit sentence. The rationale behind this approach stems from the principle of proportionality, the fundamental principle of sentencing now codified in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that a sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Proportionality requires an examination of the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence, so that the “punishment fits the crime.” As a by-product of such an individualized approach, there will be an inevitable variation in sentences imposed for particular crimes.

VIII. Principles of Sentencing Most Relevant to These Offences

30In R. v. Stairs, [1994] O.J. No. 1326 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal upheld a life sentence imposed on an offender with six prior convictions for robbery and two subsequent robberies. The Court stated at para. 4 that “the overriding principle that should guide us in this case is the requirement for the protection of the public.” In my view, the protection of the public is the overriding principle in this case as well and the chief reason why Mr. Karas must be incarcerated in order to separate him from the public.

31Denunciation and general deterrence are also important when dealing with armed bank robberies. Specific deterrence has never been achieved despite all the years Mr. Karas has spent in jail and, for this reason, I do not consider it to be particularly important in this case. While a court should never abandon the goal of rehabilitation, given Mr. Karas’ criminal history, I recognize that his prospects for genuine rehabilitation are slim.

IX. Applicable Mandatory Minimum Sentences

32Sections 85(3) to 85(4) of the Criminal Code set out the minimum sentence for the offence of use imitation firearm and s. 84(5) sets out what constitutes a subsequent offence:

85 (3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable

(a) in the case of a first offence, except as provided in paragraph (b), to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; and

(b) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years.

(4) A sentence imposed on a person for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) shall be served consecutively to any other punishment imposed on the person for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events and to any other sentence to which the person is subject at the time the sentence is imposed on the person for an offence under subsection (1) or (2).

(5) In determining, for the purpose of subsection 85(3), 95(2), 99(2), 100(2) or 103(2), whether a convicted person has committed a second or subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of any of the following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence:

(a) an offence under section 85, 95, 96, 98, 98.1, 99, 100, 102 or 103 or subsection 117.01(1);

(b) an offence under section 244 or 244.2; or

(c) an offence under section 220, 236, 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1, 344 or 346 if a firearm was used in the commission of the offence.

However, an earlier offence shall not be taken into account if 10 years have elapsed between the day on which the person was convicted of the earlier offence and the day on which the person was convicted of the offence for which sentence is being imposed, not taking into account any time in custody.

33Mr. Karas was last sentenced for use of an imitation firearm on December 12, 2005. He has pleaded guilty to two further counts of use imitation firearm before me. Mr. Zekavica submits that these are not subsequent offences as they are more than ten years since his last conviction. But this ignores the clear language in s. 84(5) that states that the calculation of this ten-year period must be done “not taking into account any time in custody.” In this case, Mr. Karas was in custody for most of the time since his previous conviction. Therefore, the present charges constitute subsequent convictions and attract a minimum sentence of three years which pursuant to s. 85(4) must each be served subsequent to any other sentence I impose on Mr. Karas.

X. The Appropriate Sentence

(A) Credit for Pre-trial Custody

34Mr. Karas was arrested on August 25, 2018 and is being sentenced on December 29, 2020 for a total of 859 days. I would calculate credit for pre-trial custody as follows. The usual enhanced credit for pre-trial custody at a rate of 1.5 days per 1 day equals 1,292 days.¹ As well, I will give Mr. Karas enhanced credit for the 354 days he was subject to a lockdown at a rate of 1.5 days per 1 day. This equals another 531 days. Finally, I will give enhanced credit due to COVID-19 from March 15, 2020 to December 29, 2020, 294 days, at a rate of 0.5 days per 1 day. This equals a further 147 days. Taken together this gives Mr. Karas credit of 1,970 days or 5 years, 5 months and 20 days.

(B) The Appropriate Sentence

35Sentencing is an individualized process, and my duty is to impose a sentence on Mr. Karas that is just and appropriate. The range of sentences for armed robbery is broad and s. 344 of the Criminal Code provides for the possibility of life imprisonment and, where a firearm is used, for a minimum sentence of four years. In R. v. Stairs, the Court of Appeal upheld a life sentence imposed on an offender with six prior convictions for robbery and two subsequent robberies. The offence was not as serious as the second robbery that Mr. Karas has pleaded guilty to. As I have already mentioned, the Court stated at para 4 that “the overriding principle that should guide us in this case is the requirement for the protection of the public.” Noting the appellant’s lack of remorse, the Court added the following observation that equally applies to Mr. Karas:

Likewise, the criminal record and incorrigibility of a convicted person may be such as to justify the imposition of a maximum sentence to deter the convict and protect the public although the circumstances of the particular crime committed do not justify categorizing it as one of the worst of its kind.

36I have considered the sentencing cases provided to me by the Crown and the defence although it is really not necessary that I discuss them. After much thought and considering the circumstances of both the offence and the offender, particularly his criminal record, I have concluded that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Karas on the first robbery is 13 years imprisonment. Given the separation in time between the first robbery and the others, I think the second robbery, a much more serious offence, merits a further increase in sentence to 15 years. I will impose consecutive sentences of three years for the two use imitation firearm offences. Finally, I will impose a concurrent sentence of five years for the forcible confinement charge. This result is required by denunciation, general deterrence, as well as the principle of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code both with respect to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

37Given their separation in time I think it would be appropriate to impose consecutive sentences for the two robberies and the two use imitation firearms charges must be consecutive. However, if these sentences were imposed consecutively, they would total 34 years. This requires that I consider the totality principle as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. M. (C.A.) 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500. At para. 42 of M. (C.A.), the Supreme Court stated:

In the context of consecutive sentences, this general principle of proportionality expresses itself through the more particular form of the "totality principle". The totality principle, in short, requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. As D. A. Thomas describes the principle in Principles of Sentencing (2nd ed. 1979), at p. 56:

The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is "just and appropriate".

Clayton Ruby articulates the principle in the following terms in his treatise, Sentencing, supra, at pp. 44-45:

The purpose is to ensure that a series of sentences, each properly imposed in relation to the offence to which it relates, is in aggregate "just and appropriate". A cumulative sentence may offend the totality principle if the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal level of a sentence for the most serious of the individual offences involved, or if its effect is to impose on the offender "a crushing sentence" not in keeping with his record and prospects.

38In my view a sentence of 34 years would not be a just and appropriate result and such a sentence would offend the totality principle. Consequently, while consecutive sentences for the two robberies are merited, I shall make these sentences concurrent to one another. This would result in a sentence of 21 years. Less the enhanced credit for pre-trial custody of 5 years, 5 months and 20 days discussed above, Mr. Karas will receive a sentence of 15 years, 6 months and 10 days.

XI. Should the Period of Parole Ineligibility Be Increased Pursuant to s. 743.6?

39Having determined what the appropriate sentence should be I can now turn to a consideration of whether it would be appropriate in this case for me to exercise my power to delay parole under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code which provides:

Power of court to delay parole

743.6 (1) Notwithstanding subsection 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, where an offender receives, on or after November 1, 1992, a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more, including a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed otherwise than as a minimum punishment, on conviction for an offence set out in Schedule I or II to that Act that was prosecuted by way of indictment, the court may, if satisfied, having regard to the circumstances of the commission of the offence and the character and circumstances of the offender, that the expression of society’s denunciation of the offence or the objective of specific or general deterrence so requires, order that the portion of the sentence that must be served before the offender may be released on full parole is one half of the sentence or ten years, whichever is less.

Principles that are to guide the court

(2) For greater certainty, the paramount principles which are to guide the court under this section are denunciation and specific or general deterrence, with rehabilitation of the offender, in all cases, being subordinate to these paramount principles.

40In Zinck v. the Queen, 2003 SCC 6, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 41, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the second step of this two-part sentencing process as follows at paras. 30 and 31:

30 At this point, the analysis may shift to the exercise of the power to delay parole. The position of s. 743.6 in the Criminal Code signals that it should not be applied in a routine manner. The power should not be exercised in a mechanical or automatic way, nor invoked in connection with every jail term imposed for an offence covered by s. 743.6. The judge must once again apply the sentencing factors. In this part of the process, however, the addition of s. 743.6(2) requires that, in the course of this second balancing, priority be given to the factors of general and specific deterrence, and of denunciation. The other factors remain relevant, but, to the extent of any conflict, subordinated to those identified by Parliament. It is worth noting that Parliament has not given priority to these specific factors in the application of s. 745.4.

31 At this stage, having given priority to the factors of deterrence and denunciation as required by law, and having duly considered all the criteria and principles relevant to sentencing, based on the evidence at the sentencing hearing and at trial, the court must arrive at its conclusion as to whether this additional punishment is required. The prosecution has the burden of demonstrating that it is. The judge must satisfy himself or herself that the order is needed to reflect the objectives of sentencing, with awareness of the special weight ascribed by Parliament to the social imperatives of denunciation and deterrence. Nevertheless, at the end of this intellectual process, the sentencing decision must remain alive to the nature and position of delayed parole in criminal law as a special, additional form of punishment. Hence it should not be ordered without necessity, in a routine way. (Emphases added.)

41With a sentence of 15 years, 6 months and 10 days, Mr. Karas could apply for parole in slightly over 5 years and 2 months. I note this is the time when he will be first eligible to apply for parole, not the time when he will be paroled. It will be for the Parole Board to determine whether Mr. Karas remains a danger to society and whether he should be released back into society. Given his criminal record and the serious nature of these violent offences, I doubt that a parole application at this time by Mr. Karas would be successful. However, if it was, this raises the possibility that he might be released back into the community at the age of 69. This should significantly mitigate his dangerousness in terms of criminal activity. Moreover, the overall sentence that I am imposing accomplishes both denunciation and deterrence and, as such, I find that the Crown has not discharged the onus of demonstrating that I should make an order under s. 743 of the Code.

XII. The Sentence

42Mr. Karas, I sentence you as follows:

Count #1: Robbery - 12 years concurrent

Count #12: Robbery - 15 years

Count #3: Use imitation firearm - 3 years, consecutive

Count #20: Use imitation firearm - 3 years, consecutive

Count #15: Forcible Confinement - 5 years concurrent

43Deducting your enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, this means that your total sentence will be 15 years, 6 months and 10 days.

XIII Ancillary Orders

(A) DNA Order

44Robbery is among the list of primary designated offences in s. 487.04, the section of the Criminal Code dealing with forensic DNA analysis and the securing of DNA samples. On consent, there will be an order pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code requiring Mr. Karas to provide such samples of his bodily substances as are reasonably necessary for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.

(B) Weapons Ban

45Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, I prohibit Mr. Karas from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, explosive substance, prohibited weapon or prohibited device for life. I make this order for life with respect to all of the weapons outlined in s. 109, given that there is no reason why Mr. Karas might eventually require access to a firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition or explosive substance.

(C) Section 743.21 Order Prohibiting Communication with Witnesses

46Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, I prohibit Mr. Karas from communicating, directly or indirectly, with the following people:

Padma Rampersad

Tony Tran

Sara Salituro

Feliscima Ramos

Amato Paolericio

Jill Wein

Nafi Erdogan

Paul Cohen

Anabelle Da Costa

Lidija Kunovac

Prabot Jugpall

Laureen Moon

Khanjan Desai

(D) Order for Disposition of Property

47There shall be an order for the disposition of the proceeds of crime as follows:

1. $2893 USD seized from Michael Karas upon his arrest to be returned to the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

2. $4245 CAD (bills) and $1.35 CAD (coins) seized from Michael Karas upon arrest to be returned in equal parts ($1,415.45 CAD each) to the Bank of Montreal, Scotia Bank and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

Ducharme J.

Footnotes

1. 1This is calculated in accordance with the decision in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575.