Leslie McIntosh

The applicant sought judicial review for a declaration that the Ministry of Transportation unreasonably withheld a clearance letter for a subdivision development.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Ministry was still actively reviewing the engineering drawings.

The Court further held that the appropriate forum to address difficulties in implementing draft plan approval conditions is the Ontario Municipal Board, which retained jurisdiction over the matter.

The parties advised the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that they had reached a settlement of all outstanding issues.

The Tribunal ordered that the proceeding be terminated.

The Crown moved to strike portions of two affidavits filed by the Ontario Propane Association in support of its judicial review application challenging O. Reg. 440/08.

The Crown argued the impugned sections contained improper legal argument and irrelevant exhibits.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, applying the general principle that issues of admissibility and relevance of affidavit evidence should be determined by the panel hearing the judicial review application, rather than on an interlocutory basis.

The Ministry of Correctional Services and a non-party intervenor requested a publication ban on portions of an investigation report and minutes of settlement produced in the proceeding, citing privacy and the integrity of confidential settlements.

The Tribunal denied the requests, finding insufficient evidence to override the strong public interest in open hearings and the need for transparent decision-making.

However, the Tribunal granted a request to redact the home addresses of Ministry personnel from the exhibits due to safety concerns.

The complainant brought a motion requesting the Tribunal state a case for contempt to the Divisional Court against the respondent Ministry for failing to disclose documents.

The Ministry objected to the intervenor union (OPSEU) participating in the contempt motion, arguing it fell outside the scope of their limited intervenor standing.

The Tribunal ruled that OPSEU may make submissions, as the alleged refusal to implement systemic remedies directly impacts its members and the union can provide valuable perspective on the Ministry-wide impact of the Tribunal's exercise of discretion.

The Ministry brought a motion requesting the adjudicator recuse himself from hearing the complainant's contempt motion, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Ministry argued that the adjudicator had prejudged the contempt issue by stating in a prior interim decision that the Ministry had failed to disclose relevant documents in a timely way.

The adjudicator dismissed the recusal motion, finding that the impugned statement was a factual observation regarding late disclosure, not a prejudgment of whether the non-disclosure was wilful or contemptuous.

The adjudicator concluded that a reasonable, informed person would not apprehend bias.

The complainant sought the production of minutes of settlement of grievances relating to three substantiated Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention policy complaints.

The respondent Ministry argued the documents were protected by settlement privilege.

The Tribunal held that settlement privilege must be established on a case-by-case basis using the Wigmore criteria, rather than as a prima facie class privilege.

The Tribunal found the Ministry failed to establish that the harm caused by disclosure outweighed the benefit to the correct disposal of the litigation.

Even if a prima facie privilege applied, the Tribunal found that an exception was warranted because disclosure was necessary for the attainment of an overriding interest of justice.

The Ministry was ordered to produce the settlement agreements.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging that the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) discriminated against him on the basis of his male gender during a family law proceeding.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that the OCL was acting pursuant to its statutory mandate to provide services to the minor children, not to the applicant.

As the OCL was not providing a service to the applicant, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application.

The complainant requested the Tribunal to reconvene to address the Ministry's alleged failure to comply with previous orders.

The Ministry objected, arguing a lack of particulars and asserting that the complainant must lead evidence first to establish a prima facie case of non-compliance.

The Ministry also questioned the Tribunal's jurisdiction to enforce the orders.

The Tribunal held that it retained supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the implementation of its orders.

It found that sufficient particulars were provided for the initial issues raised.

Given the Ministry's control over the relevant information and the protracted history of the proceedings, the Tribunal exercised its procedural discretion to order the Ministry to present its evidence first.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against Ontario on behalf of individuals who contracted SARS during the 2003 outbreak, alleging negligence in the province's handling of the crisis.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal applied the Cooper-Anns test and concluded that no relationship of proximity existed between the plaintiff and Ontario capable of giving rise to a private law duty of care.

The court held that the government's public law duty to protect the health of residents does not translate into a private law duty owed to specific individuals.

The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, Ontario's cross-appeal was allowed, and the claim was struck in its entirety.

The estate trustee and family members of a person who died after contracting SARS sued Ontario, alleging negligence in failing to protect the deceased from the virus.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing it owed no private law duty of care.

The motion judge struck part of the claim but refused to strike it entirely.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adopting its reasons in a companion case to hold that it was plain and obvious Ontario did not owe the deceased a private law duty of care.

The plaintiff brought an action against Ontario and two hospitals after her spouse contracted SARS and died during the 2003 outbreak.

Ontario moved to strike the claim, arguing it did not owe a private law duty of care.

The motion judge refused to strike substantial parts of the claim.

On appeal, adopting the reasons in the related Williams appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed Ontario's appeal, struck the claim in its entirety against Ontario, and dismissed the action, finding no private law duty of care was owed.

The plaintiffs, nurses who contracted SARS during the 2003 outbreak, sued Ontario for negligence and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

Ontario moved to strike the claim, arguing it owed no private law duty of care to the nurses.

The motion judge struck parts of the claim but allowed the action to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal struck the entire claim, holding that Ontario's duty to protect the public from communicable diseases does not create a private law duty of care to individual healthcare workers.

The Court also found no basis for the section 7 Charter claim, as the government's actions were not arbitrary.

The plaintiffs sued Ontario for damages suffered as a result of contracting SARS during the 2003 outbreak, alleging negligence, breach of statutory duty, conflict of interest, and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim.

The motion judge struck parts of the claim but allowed the negligence, conflict of interest, and Charter claims to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was plain and obvious the allegations did not give rise to a private law duty of care or a viable Charter claim.

The appeal was allowed and the statement of claim was struck in its entirety.

The complainant requested that the hearing be reconvened to address the Ministry's alleged failure to comply with previous Tribunal orders from 2002 and 2007.

Following a pre-hearing conference, the Tribunal ordered the hearing to resume and suspended the operations of the TEDC Compliance Committee pending resolution.

The Tribunal also ordered the Ministry to produce various documents related to workplace discrimination and harassment prevention, respond to a METRAC report, and provide METRAC personnel with access to Ministry staff for evaluation purposes.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's pleading wholly failed to plead any particulars of the claims alleged.

Costs of $6,250 were awarded to each of the respondents.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award which held that the respondent employer was not obliged to pay the Ontario Health Premium (OHP) on behalf of its employees under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review, noting the strong privative clause in the Police Services Act.

The court found that the arbitrator's conclusion—that the collective agreement language was intended to cover the procurement of OHIP coverage rather than a general health tax like the OHP—was not patently unreasonable.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order directing the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry to state a case to the Divisional Court regarding whether the proposed evidence of two witnesses fell within the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

The evidence concerned a sexual assault reported contemporaneously, which the applicants argued did not constitute 'historical abuse' under the mandate.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner had not exceeded his jurisdiction and that the evidence was reasonably relevant to the Inquiry's mandate to examine the institutional response to allegations of abuse.

A dissenting opinion would have granted the application.

The moving party, THICC, sought a stay of a Master's order requiring the Minister of Health to file a section 10 record that included THICC's allegedly confidential information, pending an appeal of that order.

The underlying judicial review challenged the Minister's approval of hospital infrastructure plans.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the interpretation of a prior consent confidentiality order, irreparable harm if the information was disclosed before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay to preserve the appeal's utility.

The appellant sued an Assistant Crown Attorney for defamation after the respondent provided incorrect information about the appellant's criminal record to another Crown Attorney during a bail hearing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the action was statute-barred and protected by qualified and absolute privilege, with no evidence of malice to defeat the privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial regarding malice and that absolute privilege applied to communications made in respect of court proceedings.