Jonathan Sydor

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Niagara Escarpment Commission to refer an application to amend the Niagara Escarpment Plan to the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review should not fragment ongoing administrative processes, and the merits of the proposed amendment would be properly decided by the Tribunal.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought forfeiture of $99,210 in Canadian currency seized at Fallsview Casino, alleging it was the proceeds of unlawful activity, specifically money laundering.

The respondent, Branavan Kanapathipillai, claimed the funds were from legitimate gambling and a third mortgage.

The court reviewed expert evidence, financial tracing, and the respondent’s explanations, ultimately finding the Attorney General met the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.

The court ordered the funds forfeited, finding the respondent’s explanations unconvincing and the circumstances highly suspicious.

The plaintiff moved for approval of a $15 million settlement in a class action against Ontario concerning the practice of youth segregation in provincial youth justice facilities.

Class counsel also sought approval of a $4.05 million fee and a $15,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks regarding whether youth segregation amounted to unconstitutional solitary confinement.

The court approved the settlement, the counsel fees, and the honorarium.

The plaintiff in a certified class action moved for an order approving the form, content, and distribution plan of short and long form notices to class members regarding a proposed settlement.

The court reviewed the motion record and granted the order as requested, noting the notice plan was similar to the one previously approved for certification.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal regarding the calculation of the 10% levy payable to the Class Proceedings Fund under O. Reg. 771/92 of the Law Society Act.

The appellant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario, argued the levy should apply only to settlement funds actually received by class members.

The respondent, Christopher Welsh, contended it should apply to the total settlement funds available.

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's interpretation that the levy applies to the amount of settlement funds to which class members were "entitled," regardless of whether they claimed their entitlement.

This decision addresses a rehearing on class counsel's legal fees and the calculation of the Class Proceedings Fund (CPF) levy in a class action settlement.

The court approved the 25% contingency fee, finding it fair and reasonable based on the risk incurred and results achieved, despite an earlier judge's concerns about the settlement's modesty.

The court also determined that the CPF levy should be calculated on the total amount class members were entitled to receive ($10.2 million), rather than the amount actually paid out ($7.5 million), aligning with the settlement agreement and O. Reg. 771/92.

The appellant, as representative plaintiff in a class action on behalf of approximately 4,500 former students of three provincial schools for the Deaf, appealed from a motion judge's order approving class counsel's legal fees subject to conditions.

The class action involved allegations of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, and resulted in a $15 million settlement.

The motion judge approved fees of $3.75 million (25% of the settlement) but imposed conditions requiring class counsel to donate $1.5 million to a charity for the Deaf and made the remaining fees subject to proportionate reduction based on settlement fund reversion.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in unilaterally imposing the charitable donation condition without party consent, as this altered the negotiated settlement agreement.

The court set aside the order and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a different judge.

This decision grants an unopposed motion for class certification in an action against the Province of Ontario concerning the alleged unlawful use of youth segregation in justice facilities.

The class is defined as persons under 18 placed in youth segregation for more than 6 consecutive hours without meaningful human contact between April 1, 2004, and December 17, 2018.

The common issues certified include claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion for approval of a $15 million settlement in a class action against Ontario regarding systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty at provincially-run schools for the deaf.

The court found the settlement to be poor for the majority of the class, as 90% of the student class and 100% of the family class would receive no compensation.

However, given the significant litigation risks and the lack of aggregate damages available, the court approved the settlement as falling within the zone of reasonableness.

The court also approved class counsel's fee request of $3.75 million, but on the condition that counsel donate $1.5 million to a charity for the deaf to introduce a cy-près element and provide some benefit to the uncompensated class members.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's order striking its third party claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Crown's third party claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

However, the respondent plaintiff amended his pleading to include language that would render the Crown's third party claim subject to being struck.

As a result, while the appeal was allowed, the practical outcome remained that the Crown's third party claim was struck.

The court awarded costs in accordance with the motion judge's decision, with each party bearing their own costs of the appeal.

This is an appeal of a motion judge's decision to strike the Crown's third party claims against 15 non-government, non-profit organizations that operated youth detention centres under contract with the Crown.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter rights arising from the use of solitary confinement in youth detention centres.

The plaintiff limited his claim to damages attributable to the Crown's proportionate degree of fault.

The motion judge struck the Crown's third party claims, relying on the principle from Taylor v. Canada (Health Canada) that when a plaintiff limits damages to a defendant's proportionate fault, the defendant cannot pursue contribution and indemnity claims.

The Crown appealed, arguing it was not plain and obvious that third party claims had no reasonable prospect of success, particularly regarding vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

This class action concerned historical abuse at the W. Ross MacDonald School for the Blind.

The court approved an $8,000,000 settlement fund, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, particularly given the litigation risks and the advanced age of many class members.

The settlement provided for a paper-based, non-adversarial claims process with compensation up to $45,000 per claimant, free from tax claw-backs.

The court also approved a $15,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff and fixed class counsel's legal fees at $2,412,534 plus HST and disbursements, emphasizing the risks undertaken and results achieved over mere docketed time.

The respondent Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court order requiring the appellant to produce Youth Records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to produce specified Youth Records or face a stay of his proposed class action proceeding.

The appellant challenged the order as final rather than interlocutory, arguing the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory in nature—a production order with a sanction for non-compliance—and therefore any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the Crown.

Following a successful motion by the third party NGOs to strike the Crown's third party claims in a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the NGOs sought costs of $47,695.45 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued the amount was excessive and suggested $16,500, contending that the NGOs were only successful due to late amendments to the plaintiff's pleadings.

The court rejected the Crown's argument, finding the NGOs were entitled to costs for work both before and after the amendments, but reduced the claimed amount to $35,000 all inclusive as being within the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

An appeal concerning the disqualification of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer's transfer between law firms.

The lawyer, who had worked extensively on an insurance coverage dispute for the plaintiff, transferred to the defendant's law firm where he would work closely with opposing counsel.

The court addressed whether an ethical screen could adequately protect the former client's confidential information given the intense working relationship between the two lawyers.

The appeal court upheld the disqualification, finding that while the firm had achieved technical compliance with professional guidelines, the spirit of those guidelines was absent and the presumption of inadvertent disclosure could not be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

In a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations, explicitly limiting the claim to the Crown's several liability.

The Crown issued third party claims against the NGOs that operated some of the centres.

The plaintiff and the NGOs moved to strike the third party claims.

The court granted the motions, applying the principle that where a plaintiff limits their claim to the defendant's proportionate degree of fault, a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is legally untenable.

In a proposed class action regarding the use of secure isolation in youth detention centres, the Crown brought a motion seeking production of the representative plaintiff's Youth Records.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order production under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that while it could not directly order production of the records, it had jurisdiction under the Class Proceedings Act to order the plaintiff to apply to the Youth Justice Court for access to the records.

The court ordered the plaintiff to make the application, failing which the proposed class action would be stayed.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to remove counsel for the defendants due to an alleged conflict of interest.

A lawyer who had worked extensively on the plaintiff's file moved to the law firm representing the defendants.

The defendants' firm implemented an ethical screen.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred by focusing on whether the firm had done everything possible to avoid disclosure, rather than whether a reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur.

Given the close working relationship between the migrating lawyer and the defendants' counsel, the court concluded the ethical screen was insufficient to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appeal was granted and the defendants' counsel was removed.

The plaintiff brought a partial summary judgment motion seeking declarations regarding the construction of a floating dock and boathouse by his neighbors on a lake.

The neighbors had built the structure without municipal building permits or provincial work/occupancy permits, relying on the municipality's position that it lacked jurisdiction over Crown lands and the province's position that floating structures were exempt.

The court held that the municipality's zoning by-laws and the Building Code Act apply to private individuals constructing on Crown lands covered by water.

Furthermore, the court found that the provincial regulations under the Public Lands Act require work and occupancy permits for such structures, rejecting the government's interpretation as absurd.

Following a successful motion by certain defendant insurers seeking a declaration that their law firm could continue acting despite the arrival of a lawyer who had previously acted for the opposing party, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful party argued that the motion arose from circumstances created by the law firm’s hiring decision and that each party should bear its own costs, or alternatively that the amount sought was excessive.

The court applied the principles governing costs under s.131.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness rather than strict indemnification.

Although the successful defendants claimed approximately $59,800, the court found that amount excessive for a half‑day motion.

Costs were fixed at $42,000 payable within 30 days.