Ernest J. Guiste

The appellant veterinarian appealed three separate decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and imposing penalties including suspensions and costs.

The appellant argued that the proceedings should have been dismissed for abuse of process due to delay and procedural irregularities, that the College's expert evidence should not have been admitted, and that the penalties were clearly unfit.

The Divisional Court dismissed all three appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the Committee's factual findings and no errors of law.

The Court held that the statutory referral process was properly followed, the delay was not inordinate and caused no prejudice, the expert evidence was properly admitted, and the penalties and costs were within the Committee's reasonable discretion.

Mark Sheldon Roberts appealed a 2020 Ontario Review Board disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the 2020 disposition had been superseded by a 2021 disposition, and new criminal charges and re-admission to a secure forensic unit at CAMH had rendered the factual record stale.

The court reiterated the principle of not deciding moot cases, especially in Review Board matters where no effective remedy can be given for a spent disposition.

The applicant, a member of the College of Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists of Ontario, sought judicial review to quash the appointment of investigators who were investigating her failure to pay legal costs to the College.

The applicant argued the College lacked jurisdiction as inability to pay cannot constitute professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that absent exceptional circumstances, administrative processes should run their full course before judicial intervention.

The moving party brought a second motion under Rule 59.06 to reopen a 2016 decision of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal from a professional discipline decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1, noting the motion appeared contrary to the finality principle and res judicata.

Finding the moving party's response asserting undisclosed 'new evidence' to be frivolous, the court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered that she be prohibited from bringing further steps without prior judicial permission.

The appellant, convicted of multiple domestic violence offences and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

Grounds included reasonable apprehension of bias, errors in credibility findings, abuse of process regarding a breach of recognizance, and unreasonable post-verdict delay violating Charter s. 11(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility, the dangerous offender designation, and finding no bias or Charter breach due to the exceptional nature of dangerous offender proceedings.

The plaintiff, a former route supervisor for the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), sued for wrongful dismissal after being terminated for her alleged involvement in a group benefits fraud scheme involving a healthcare supplier.

The TTC counterclaimed for the amount of the fraudulent benefits paid.

The court found that the plaintiff knowingly participated in the fraud by submitting claims for unnecessary medical devices and splitting the reimbursement proceeds with the supplier.

The court held that the plaintiff's conduct constituted civil fraud and willful misconduct, justifying summary dismissal without notice or termination pay.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the TTC's counterclaim for $15,815 was allowed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time for written submissions following the conclusion of evidence at trial.

The plaintiff's new counsel required trial transcripts, which would not be available until mid-December, as the trial had been split over a year due to a change of counsel.

The court granted the extension, finding it would be unfair to require the new counsel to prepare submissions without the transcripts.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 37 to vary or set aside the Divisional Court's final costs disposition in the underlying application.

The applicant argued that the court's costs reasons did not address several of her submissions.

The court dismissed the motion without requiring a response from the respondent, finding it manifestly devoid of merit.

The court held that it had considered all submissions in its original costs decision and was now functus officio, noting that any remedy must be sought in the Court of Appeal.

The moving party, former counsel for the applicant, sought leave to intervene as an added party in a judicial review application.

He claimed a pecuniary interest in being paid for his legal services and a reputational interest in defending himself against negative comments made by the hearing panel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party's interests were entirely aligned with those of the applicant, who was already advancing the same arguments.

Furthermore, the court held that granting intervention would dramatically expand the issues and record, causing undue delay, and that the motion was brought too late in the proceedings.

The plaintiff, an identical twin, was arrested and charged with armed robbery after his brother committed the offence.

The plaintiff sued the arresting officers and the police services board for Charter violations, false arrest, excessive force, and negligent investigation.

The court dismissed most claims, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiff given his identical appearance to the suspect and the dynamic circumstances.

However, the court found the police were negligent in their investigation by failing to properly investigate, account for, and document a stolen ring seized from the plaintiff's brother at booking.

The plaintiff was awarded $18,000 in general damages for the stress and stigma of remaining under the robbery charges longer than necessary.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The court applied the contextual test for setting aside administrative dismissals, balancing the explanation for delay, inadvertence, timeliness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Finding that the plaintiff adequately explained the delay, moved promptly to set aside the order, and that the defendant suffered no actual prejudice, the court granted the motion and set aside the dismissal order.

The applicant, previously disciplined for unauthorized use of the title 'Doctor', brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the Divisional Court's prior decision upholding her discipline.

She alleged fraud and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the College's internal procedures for referring matters to discipline.

She also sought to disqualify the College's counsel, and a third party sought leave to intervene.

The Divisional Court dismissed all motions, finding no fraud, no procedural unfairness, and that the fresh evidence would not have altered the original outcome.

The plaintiffs, who are suing for wrongful arrest based on mistaken identity, brought a motion to compel the defendant Toronto Police Services Board to deliver a further and better Affidavit of Documents and comply with previous production orders under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' Affidavit of Documents failed to properly list and describe the documents for which privilege was claimed.

The court ordered the defendants to deliver a further and better affidavit within 30 days, after which compliance with the production orders could be assessed.

The appellant, Androy Spring, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) by failing to properly assess his alibi evidence and the totality of the evidence, and by concluding belief in the complainant solely due to disbelief of the accused.

The appellant also contended the trial judge failed to address conflicting evidence regarding the time of the assault and the complainant's memory issues.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge's application of W.(D.) principles, his assessment of credibility and reliability, or his factual findings regarding the timing of the assault and the alibi.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's alibi and acceptance of the complainant's detailed recollection were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant's motion to set aside a previous Divisional Court order under Rule 59.06 was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The successful respondents and intervenors sought costs.

The applicant argued against a costs award, citing impecuniosity and public interest.

The court rejected the public interest argument but considered impecuniosity in determining the quantum.

The Attorney General and the Justices of the Peace Review Council were awarded $7,500 each on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, the applicant's former counsel, were awarded $23,000 on a substantial indemnity basis due to the applicant's reprehensible conduct in making unfounded allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace removed from office for misconduct, brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous Divisional Court order that had dismissed his judicial review application.

The applicant argued he was denied a fair hearing and alleged ineffective assistance by his former counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and finding that the applicant's complaints did not fit within the narrow exceptions of Rule 59.06 for fraud or newly discovered facts.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged that the decision to continue a criminal prosecution against him for fraud was motivated by racial profiling.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked sufficient material facts to support the allegations of malice and improper purpose, and struck the claim.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim, finding that the record suggested there were facts that could be pleaded to support the causes of action.

The proposed intervenors, former appellate counsel for the applicant, brought a motion to be added as parties to the applicant's Rule 59.06 motion, which sought to set aside a previous Divisional Court order based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant consented to the intervention but sought to restrict the intervenors from seeking costs or making submissions on underlying legal issues.

The court granted the intervention with full party rights, declined to impose the requested restrictions, and awarded costs of the motion to the intervenors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of a conviction.

The appellant raised two grounds: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and an argument that the fee arrangement with his counsel constituted a prohibited contingency fee under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's evidence regarding ineffective assistance to be totally incredible and rejected the contingency fee argument as having no basis on the record.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The accused sought a trial adjournment to pursue a battered wife syndrome defence, requiring expert assessment and Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) funding.

The Crown opposed the adjournment, citing significant delays.

The court granted the adjournment reluctantly, imposing strict timelines for obtaining funding and developing the defence, and setting a peremptory trial date.

The court also raised concerns about the defence counsel's budget estimates and the overall pace of the proceedings.