Domenico Polla

In related horse racing appeals arising from race-day scratches after a trainer's full suspension, the Registrar brought a motion to quash summonses issued to two Commission employees.

The responding parties sought to challenge underlying scratching decisions and, for some horses, redistribution of purse monies to obtain guaranteed starting fees.

The Panel granted the motion and quashed the summonses.

The notice of decision provides the procedural background and outcome without substantive reasons.

The defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (HMQ), brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statements of claim in two actions arising from a fire that destroyed a school.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Office of the Fire Marshal (OFM) was negligent in failing to ensure a proper fire watch was in place after the initial fire was extinguished, leading to a rekindling that caused extensive damage.

The court found that the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 does not impose a duty on the OFM to post a fire watch or suppress fires, as those duties belong to municipal fire departments.

The court struck the negligence and nuisance claims against HMQ but granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to properly allege a duty of care based on specific interactions or assumption of control, provided the alleged duty does not exceed the OFM's statutory powers.

The claimant brought a motion to compel the respondent to provide answers to questions and produce documents refused at an examination for discovery.

At the commencement of the hearing, the claimant requested an adjournment sine die, indicating that a settlement was expected within a month.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment and directed the parties to provide a status update in one month, while maintaining the previously scheduled hearing dates.

The applicant sought sanctions for civil contempt against the respondent church and its pastors for repeatedly breaching a restraining order that enforced COVID-19 public health gathering limits.

The court found the respondents in contempt for holding large indoor religious services in defiance of the order.

Applying the factors for civil contempt sentencing, the court imposed fines of $35,000 on the church, $10,000 on the lead pastor, and $3,000 on the assistant pastor.

The court also ordered the church doors to be locked until gathering limits were eased to permit 30 percent capacity, and awarded $69,000 in partial indemnity costs to the applicant.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The applicant, Hudson's Bay Company, sought judicial review of a regulation that required its department stores to close during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing big box stores that sell groceries to remain open.

The applicant argued the distinction was irrational and ultra vires the enabling statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the regulation was authorized by the Reopening Ontario Act and consistent with its purpose of balancing public health measures with economic concerns.

The court held that it is not the role of the judiciary to assess the wisdom or efficacy of the government's policy choices.

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and the Federation of Rental Housing Providers of Ontario (FRPO) sought representation orders under Rule 10.01(1)(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to represent unknown tenants and landlords, respectively, in a motion to set aside an order suspending residential evictions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the requests, finding that the case did not fall within the enumerated types of proceedings for a Rule 10 order and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting one, as each tenant facing eviction has unique circumstances.

Furthermore, the court held that ACTO, as an advocacy group without a direct interest or shared cause of action, was not an appropriate representative.

The appellants brought a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion without costs, relying on the reasons given in a companion motion (M51732).

The Attorney General for Ontario moved to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for an interim stay of the Chief Justice's order ending the COVID-19 eviction moratorium.

The appellants argued the order was final because it effectively determined their case was not justiciable and disposed of their substantive rights.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing a stay is interlocutory, as the merits of the underlying motion to set aside the Chief Justice's order remained to be determined.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and two residential tenants moved for an urgent stay of an order by Chief Justice Morawetz, which had varied a previous order to end a moratorium on residential evictions in Ontario.

The applicants sought to reinstate the moratorium, arguing that lifting it was premature due to ongoing COVID-19 risks, especially for vulnerable tenants.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, as the Chief Justice's original order was an exercise of inherent jurisdiction to control court processes, not a policy decision on the pandemic.

The court emphasized that the issues raised by tenants were policy matters for the government, not legal issues for the court.

Following an appeal where the appellant had mixed success on a summary judgment motion and was unsuccessful on a contempt motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court reduced the costs awarded to the respondents on the summary judgment motion from $35,000 to $10,000 due to the appellant's partial success.

The court also awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $3,500 for the contempt appeal and $1,500 for the summary judgment appeal.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.

The plaintiffs in two related civil actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident following a police pursuit brought motions under Rule 30.10 for the production of the complete investigative file of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a non-party.

The SIU had produced parts of its file but opposed producing witness statements without consent and other administrative or derivative documents.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the production of the civilian and police officer witness statements, finding them highly relevant to the issue of liability and that it would be unfair to require the plaintiffs to proceed to trial without them.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the balance of the file, as the plaintiffs failed to establish relevance.

The appellants, whose children were previously made Crown wards, commenced a civil action against various individuals and organizations involved in the child protection proceedings.

Two defendants requested the dismissal of the action under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous and vexatious.

The motion judge dismissed the action against those two defendants, and subsequently amended her reasons to dismiss the action against all defendants without giving the appellants notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the two moving defendants, finding the action was an abuse of process attempting to relitigate the child protection proceedings.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the other defendants, holding that the motion judge committed a procedural error by dismissing the action against them without providing notice and an opportunity to make submissions as required by Rule 2.1.01.

This was a costs endorsement following the defendants’ successful summary judgment motion dismissing a historic claim arising from the plaintiff’s time in care of a children’s aid society.

The court held that the usual rule that costs follow the event applied, but reduced the amount sought in light of the self-represented plaintiff’s vulnerability and the need to impose only a fair and reasonable amount.

Applying the court’s broad discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and the fairness principles in the appellate costs jurisprudence, the court declined to award the defendants’ full unreduced partial indemnity costs exceeding $60,000.

Costs were fixed at $35,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The self-represented plaintiffs brought a civil action against police officers, the Toronto Police Services Board, a Crown Attorney, and the Attorney General of Ontario, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and negligent investigation arising from child abuse charges that were ultimately withdrawn.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the defendants' motions, finding that the claims against the police were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that both the police and the Crown had reasonable and probable grounds for their actions.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former Crown ward, brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto and the Crown, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and breach of privacy regarding her time in care and the contents and disclosure of her child-in-care file.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims of wrongful diagnosis or failure to act on abuse complaints.

The court also held that the society's record-keeping was mandated by law, protected by qualified privilege, and that the Crown owed no fiduciary or non-delegable duty regarding the society's day-to-day care or record-keeping.

An appeal concerning reasonable apprehension of bias and adjudicative independence in administrative tribunal decision-making.

The applicant sought a determination that her motor vehicle accident injuries met the statutory threshold for catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal adjudicator initially determined the threshold was not met.

An anonymous letter subsequently revealed that the executive chair of the tribunal cluster had reviewed and altered the adjudicator's draft decision before release.

The Divisional Court found a reasonable apprehension of lack of adjudicative independence due to the imposed consultation process lacking procedural safeguards.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, emphasizing that consultation cannot be imposed by a superior level of authority without the adjudicator's consent and that robust procedural protections are required to safeguard independence.

The appellants appealed a Director's Order requiring compliance with work items related to contamination at a former dry-cleaning site.

Prior to the hearing, the parties reached a settlement agreement to alter the compliance dates.

The Tribunal granted presenter status to three neighbouring landowners, who did not object to the settlement.

Finding the agreement consistent with the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest, the Tribunal approved the settlement, directed the amendment of the compliance dates, and dismissed the appeals.