Alex Smith

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court order dismissing an application for judicial review of an Ontario Special Education Tribunal decision, and a motion to reopen a previous Court of Appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding them to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process.

The judicial review application was premature as the Tribunal proceedings were ongoing, and the moving party failed to meet the high standard required to reopen a previous decision.

The licensee brought a motion for a publication ban prior to the commencement of a professional discipline hearing, arguing that publication of the decision would cause unjust harm to his employment and professional opportunities.

The Discipline Committee applied the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test and found that the licensee failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest.

The motion was dismissed, as the public interest in transparency and the open court principle outweighed the licensee's private interests in avoiding discomfort or embarrassment.

The Licensee, a registered insurance broker, pled guilty to professional misconduct for submitting 39 false health claims totaling $4,799.47 under her employer's group benefits plan.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and a Joint Submission on Penalty.

The Committee found the Licensee guilty of failing to act with integrity and ordered a reprimand, a one-month suspension, and the completion of three hours of ethics education, noting her early admission of guilt and arrangement to repay the insurer as mitigating factors.

The moving party sought reconsideration of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay Divisional Court proceedings.

The stay was sought to prevent the Divisional Court from issuing a publication ban and anonymization order regarding the moving party's child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for reconsideration as moot, noting that the Divisional Court had already granted the publication ban and anonymization order.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding no matter of public importance that extended beyond the interests of the parties.

The Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO) brought professional misconduct allegations against a former insurance broker who misappropriated client premiums and issued fraudulent temporary liability slips.

The matter proceeded by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts and a Joint Submission on Penalty.

The Discipline Committee found the broker guilty of misconduct for breaching the Code of Conduct and trust money regulations.

Applying the Anthony-Cook standard, the Committee accepted the joint submission, ordering a reprimand and accepting the broker's undertaking to never reapply for registration with RIBO.

The Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO) alleged that the respondent broker committed professional misconduct by sharing confidential client information and delegating tasks to an unlicensed individual.

The matter proceeded by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts and a Joint Submission on Penalty.

The Discipline Committee found the respondent guilty of breaching sections 14.1, 14.3, and 14.6 of the Code of Conduct.

The Committee accepted the joint submission and ordered a reprimand and the completion of three hours of ethics education, noting mitigating factors including client consent, lack of consumer harm, and the respondent's remorse and cooperation.

The Licensee, an insurance broker, pled guilty to professional misconduct for failing to report to the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO) that his insurance agent license had been revoked by the Financial Services Tribunal.

He also admitted to providing false information on his annual renewal by indicating he was not subject to any disciplinary action.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and a Joint Submission on Penalty, finding the Licensee guilty and ordering a reprimand along with two hours of ethics education.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion requesting that the hearing panel recuse themselves due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant alleged bias after the panel chair directed that written submissions might be required on whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to order the requested placement, and because the chair was cross-appointed to another tribunal.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that an informed person would not conclude that the panel's actions, which included attempting to assist the appellant in focusing on relevant evidence and exercising its authority to determine a jurisdictional issue, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Member, a registered nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for failing to participate in the College's Quality Assurance assessment despite multiple notifications and opportunities to comply.

The Member admitted to the allegations via an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct.

Accepting a Joint Submission on Order, the Committee imposed a penalty including an oral reprimand, a two-month suspension of the Member's certificate of registration, and terms requiring meetings with a Regulatory Expert and completion of the Quality Assurance Program.

The Member, a Registered Practical Nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for failing to participate in the College's Quality Assurance Program despite multiple notifications and extensions.

The Member admitted to the allegations via an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct, characterizing the conduct as dishonourable and unprofessional.

Accepting a Joint Submission on Order, the Committee imposed a penalty including an oral reprimand, a two-month suspension of the Member's certificate of registration, and terms requiring meetings with a Regulatory Expert and completion of the Quality Assurance Program.

The Member, a registered nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for placing a pillow over a psychiatric patient's face and pressing down during a physical intervention.

The Member admitted to the allegations, acknowledging that his actions constituted physical and emotional abuse, and breached the College's standards of practice.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and found the Member guilty of professional misconduct.

A joint submission on penalty was accepted, resulting in a reprimand, a three-month suspension of the Member's certificate of registration, and conditions requiring meetings with a regulatory expert and employer notification.

The court addressed two pretrial motions: one seeking to stay a counterclaim based on abuse of process due to delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement, and another seeking leave for third-party discovery.

The motion to stay was dismissed, as the immediate disclosure rule for settlement agreements was found not to apply to agreements with non-parties.

The motion for third-party discovery was granted, with the court finding the non-party's evidence critical and that the cooperation agreement constituted a constructive refusal to provide information, making a pretrial examination necessary for trial fairness.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce an "Outline of Terms of Settlement" reached during mediation, arguing it constituted a binding agreement.

The defendants contended that the Outline was not intended to be enforceable and lacked essential terms.

The court found that the Outline did not objectively reflect a mutual intention to create a binding agreement and that numerous material issues, including debt reallocation, minority shareholder rights, and tax implications of asset transfers, remained unresolved.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing that it cannot create a contract for parties where essential terms are missing.

The defendants in two related actions sought orders to compel the plaintiffs, Andrew Stronach and Selena Stronach, to undergo medical examinations to assess their mental capacities for the purpose of determining if litigation guardians were required.

The court dismissed the motion against Selena Stronach, finding insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

The motion against Andrew Stronach was dismissed without prejudice, as the court found it premature and suggested other discovery avenues should be pursued first.

The court also declined to order production of video recordings of Andrew's examination for discovery.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal from the decision of Cavanagh J. dated August 26, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs in the agreed amount of $20,000 payable by the responding parties.

A case management teleconference was scheduled to settle a schedule for the exchange of appeal materials and to schedule an expedited appeal date.

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, brought motions to strike out portions of the defendants' Fresh as Amended Statements of Defence under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that the impugned pleadings improperly referenced documents and communications that were subject to settlement privilege arising from a confidential judicial mediation.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had waived privilege or that an exception applied based on the justice of the case.

The court found that the mediation was subject to settlement privilege, the plaintiffs had not waived the privilege, and no exception applied.

The court granted the motions to strike the pleadings relating to the mediation.

The court also struck out portions of one defendant's pleading as scandalous, but dismissed a motion to require another defendant to reinstate a withdrawn admission.

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, sought leave to amend their respective statements of claim in two related actions concerning the management of the Stronach family business and trusts.

The defendants, including Belinda Stronach, opposed the amendments on several grounds, primarily arguing that references to a May 2020 Agreement were barred by settlement privilege.

The court found that the defendants failed to prove the May 2020 Agreement was intended to be kept confidential, and alternatively, that any privilege had been waived or an exception applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the amendments improperly withdrew admissions or were scandalous and vexatious.

Leave to amend the pleadings was granted.

The applicants sought declaratory relief to prevent the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from terminating their Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Contracts for failing to achieve commercial operation by the required milestone date.

The applicants argued that estoppel by convention applied based on a shared assumption that the IESO would grant an 18-month extension.

The court dismissed the application, finding no manifest representation by the IESO to establish a shared assumption, and noted that the entire agreement and waiver clauses in the contracts precluded reliance on past practices.

The applicants, solar power project developers, sought a declaration that the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) did not have the right to terminate their Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) contracts for failing to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation (MCOD).

The IESO had previously waived this right but issued a warning letter revoking past waivers following a government directive to wind down pre-construction energy contracts.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the FIT contracts, which included a 'time is of the essence' clause, unambiguously granted the IESO the right to terminate for failure to meet the MCOD.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought motions to discontinue the action against an individual defendant, to certify the action as a class proceeding, and for partial summary judgment.

The court approved the discontinuance as it did not prejudice the class and secured the corporate defendant's consent to certification.

The court certified the class action against the remaining defendants, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Act, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the interpretation of the statutory provisions raised genuine issues requiring a full trial.