Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario Discipline Committee
Between:
THE REGISTERED INSURANCE BROKERS OF ONTARIO
and
MARK ANTHONY SCOTT, REGISTRATION NO. 31969
Heard: January 8, 2026
PRESIDING PANEL MEMBER:
- Rose Cavaliere, Discipline Committee Chair
IN ATTENDANCE:
Alex Smith, Counsel for RIBO
Mark Anthony Scott, Licensee
Heather Vaughan, Discipline Committee Independent Legal Counsel
DECISION AND REASONS ON MOTION FOR PUBLICATION BAN
1This Motion for a Publication Ban was brought before the commencement of the Discipline Hearing on consent under Rule 13.1. The Licensee seeks an order restricting the publication of the decision and reasons regarding this professional discipline matter.
2This motion was heard virtually on January 8, 2026 pursuant to the Registered Insurance Brokers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.19, (RIBA) and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 and regulations thereunder and was governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Discipline Committee of the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO).
Procedural History:
3RIBO received a complaint from Mr. Scott’s former employer regarding allegations of misconduct which was the subject of an internal investigation on or around December 12, 2019.
4Those allegations were investigated by an internal RIBO investigator and then referred to an external investigator on or about March 2024.
5The investigation was submitted to RIBO’s Complaints Committee and on December 21, 2024 the Complaints Committee referred the matter to the Discipline Committee under s. 16(2)(a) of RIBA to determine allegations of misconduct.
6Two Pre-Hearing Conferences were held before me on July 24, 2025 and August 11, 2025. Mr. Scott confirmed his intention to seek a publication ban of the decision and reasons of the Discipline Committee and consented to me hearing this motion as a single member of the Discipline Committee under Rule 13.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Discipline Committee of the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario.
Grounds for the Motion:
7Mr. Scott’s grounds for the motion are that the underlying alleged conduct occurred 6 years ago, that the alleged conduct was committed under duress and threats to his life causing overwhelming psychological pressure, and that publicizing the decision would cause unjust harm to his employment, professional opportunities and long-term career.
Evidence on Motion:
8Sworn affidavit evidence was submitted by Mr. Scott indicating that he was a person of good character who lived an honest, hard-working, and law-abiding life. He was coerced and under duress when the alleged misconduct occurred in 2019. Mr. Scott has changed occupations since that time and argues publication of any decision may cause harm to his employment and professional opportunities.
9RIBO’s responding affidavit material confirmed the timeline of this complaint, as outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
10RIBO’s affidavit evidence also included the details of the alleged conduct within the Report of Investigation and the Complaints Committee Decision. However, this information at this point consists of unproven allegations and I therefore did not rely on any of that material in coming to my decision and I do not admit this as evidence on the motion.
11The alleged conduct is immaterial to my decision in this matter. The only relevant information is that the Complaints Committee hearing the information contained in the Investigation Report exercised its jurisdiction under section 16(2)(a) of the Registered Insurance Brokers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.R19 to refer the matter to the Discipline Committee for a misconduct hearing.
Open Courts Principle:
12RIBO is a self-governing organization that regulates the licensing, professional competence, ethical conduct and insurance related financial obligations of all independent general insurance brokers in the province of Ontario to ensure that the public is served and protected accordingly.
13RIBO is committed to building trust, transparency and accountability as a self-regulating organization and recognizes that self-regulation is a privilege with great responsibility.
14The Discipline Committee of the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario adheres to the open court principle which requires proceedings to be fully and publicly accessible subject to very limited exceptions.
15The Discipline Committee Rules of Procedure in Rule 9.1 confirms that hearings are open to the public unless otherwise ordered and Rule 19.1 confirms that subject to an order made for a publication ban under Rule 13.5, all Orders and Decisions of the Discipline Committee shall be published.
16Section 23 of the General Regulation of RIBA, Regulation 991, also provides that all findings and decisions of the Discipline Committee, may be published in any matter subject to an order to the contrary.
17Discipline Committee decisions are published in the RIBO Bulletin, the Canadian Insurance Regulators Disciplinary Actions (CIRDA) Database and on CanLII.org.
Test for a Publication Ban:
18I agree with the legal submissions made by RIBO Counsel that the common law test for the ordering of a publication ban applies to the within motion. Ordering a publication ban in this case is a discretionary remedy that essentially limits the open court principle and is an exceptional tool available to protect the administration of justice, privacy or the safety of individuals, victims or witnesses.
19The applicable test for assessing where a full or partial publication ban should be ordered is the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test (“the test”) named after three Supreme Court of Canada cases, Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 835, R v. Mentuck 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 SCR 442, and Sherman Estate v. Donovan 2021 SCC 25, [2021] 2 SCR 75. This test is summarized succulently the Ontario Court of Appeal in B.M.D. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2022 ONCA 580, as follows;
5…. The Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test for whether a discretionary publication ban should be granted can be summarized as follows:
Does court openness pose a serious risk to an important public interest?
Is the order sought necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk?
As a matter of proportionality, do the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects?
20The Court of Appeal in B.M.D. also confirms that the work of courts is presumptively open but confirms that, “an exception to the open court principle may be justified where dissemination of highly sensitive personal information would result in an affront to the affected person’s dignity.”
21Part of Mr. Scott’s argument is based on his own privacy interests and I must therefore determine whether his privacy interest justifies an exception to the open court principle by considering the two questions from paragraph 7 of B.M.D;
Is the information in issue of a highly sensitive nature that goes beyond discomfort or embarrassment, such that its dissemination would amount to an affront to the dignity of the applicant?
Does society as a whole have a stake in protecting the interests in issue such that the public would not tolerate publication, even in service of open proceedings?
22Merely having a privacy interest is not sufficient. “Open courts by their nature can be a source of discomfort and embarrassment, however these intrusions are generally seen as of insufficient importance to overcome the presumption of openness.” Sherman Estate at paragraph 56.
23Virtually every professional discipline case invariably deals with personal and private information regarding the conduct of the regulated professional under review for misconduct allegations.
24While there may be cases where a full or partial publication ban is appropriate, simply shielding the professional from the publication of misconduct findings is an insufficient ground and would defeat the purposes of the regulatory tribunal.
25Mr. Scott, who is seeking the publication ban has the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities to show that the ban is necessary to prevent a serious, real and well-grounded risk to the administration of justice and no reasonable alternative exist and that the salutary effects of the ban outweigh its negative impact on freedom of expression and the open courts principle as outlined in the cases above.
Decision and Reasons:
26Mr. Scott has not provided any evidence to support that there is an important public interest that requires a publication ban to address and as such, he fails the first stage of the test.
27Mr. Scott seeks a publication ban for the private interest of protecting himself from the potential negative consequences of any findings of misconduct, however, these concerns, no matter how justified, do not override the public interest in the open courts principle.
28Further, the information is not of a highly sensitive nature that goes beyond discomfort or embarrassment such that its dissemination would amount to an affront to Mr. Scott’s dignity.
29Society as a whole does not have a stake in protecting Mr. Scott’s interests in this case.
30On the contrary, there is a strong public interest in the reporting of names of involved professionals and the findings of regulatory tribunals, including RIBO’s Discipline Committee, so that the regulation of the profession is transparent and instills public confidence in the administration of justice in relation to professional regulation.
31The publication of decisions serves the goals of specific and general deterrence by educating other members of the profession that there are consequences to engaging in professional misconduct and providing education regarding the associated penalties that may be imposed upon members of the profession.
32As such, the motion brought by Ms. Scott seeking a publication ban is dismissed.
Rose Cavaliere, Discipline Committee Chair May 13, 2026