La Forest

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of welfare fraud after selling real property without informing social assistance authorities.

The trial judge found her conduct did not create a risk of deprivation exceeding $1,000 and that she honestly believed her circumstances had not changed to affect her entitlement, negating mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding the trial judge made no error of law.

The appellant, a Mohawk, was charged with fishing without a licence in Lake St. Francis, contrary to the Quebec Fishery Regulations.

He argued that he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish for food protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title, and that the appellant had demonstrated an aboriginal right to fish for food in the area.

The Court found that this right had not been extinguished, and that the regulatory scheme, which subjected the right to unstructured ministerial discretion, constituted an unjustified infringement.

The appellant challenged a securities disciplinary process on the basis that the appointment of the hearing panel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the tribunal's practice was only one of many factors in assessing whether the necessary degree of independence existed.

In the self-regulatory context, the circumstances were materially different from the authority relied on by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

During deliberations, the jury announced an impasse.

The trial judge exhorted the jury to reach a verdict, referencing the public expense of a new trial, the inconvenience to participants, and suggesting the minority reconsider the majority's views.

The jury returned a guilty verdict 15 minutes later.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the exhortation introduced irrelevant, coercive factors that interfered with the jury's right to deliberate freely.

The respondent was imprisoned for failing to pay fines under the Quebec Highway Safety Code.

He sought authorization to bring a class action against the government for damages, alleging the sentencing provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court denied authorization, finding no serious colour of right, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter generally cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Superior Court judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny authorization.

The appellant's 19-year-old son was fatally shot by a police officer while fleeing arrest.

The appellant brought a civil liability action against the officer and his employer, claiming compensatory and exemplary damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solatium doloris (grief and distress) is a compensable head of moral prejudice in Quebec civil law, and referred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to assess the quantum.

However, the Court dismissed the claims for interference with parental rights and for the victim's loss of life expectancy, ruling that the right to life is extinguished upon death and cannot be transmitted to heirs.

The Court also denied exemplary damages, finding that the officer's negligent conduct did not amount to 'intentional interference' under the Quebec Charter.

The appellants, members of the Algonquin people, were convicted of entering a controlled harvest zone without paying a motor vehicle access fee, and one appellant was convicted of fishing without a licence.

They argued they were exercising an aboriginal right to fish.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title and that the failure of the French colonial regime to legally recognize such rights did not extinguish them.

The Court found the appellants had an aboriginal right to fish for food in the zone.

The federal fishing licence requirement was found to be an unjustified infringement of this right, but the provincial motor vehicle access fee was held to be a valid user fee that did not infringe the right.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm after a motor vehicle accident.

At the hospital, a police officer demanded a blood sample but failed to provide the medical assurances required under s. 254(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the blood evidence, finding the accused did not consent, and acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the demand was deficient and violated the Charter, consent is not an essential element under s. 254(3), and the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) must be determined at a new trial.

The appellant, a regional legal aid corporation, requested a business tax exemption for its legal aid bureau under the Act respecting Municipal Taxation.

The municipal commission refused the exemption, finding that professional legal services did not fall under the exemption for activities carried on mainly for social purposes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the commission's decision was patently unreasonable.

The Court found that the professional legal services offered by a legal aid bureau to economically underprivileged persons are inherently social in nature and clearly qualify for the business tax exemption under s. 236(5) of the Act.

The appellant, a non-accused target of authorized electronic surveillance, sought access to the sealed wiretap packet and related recordings in order to pursue a civil claim for unlawful interception and Charter damages.

The Court held that a non-accused target may bring an application under s. 187(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code before commencing a civil action, but is not automatically entitled to disclosure.

For non-accused applicants, the statutory discretion remains governed by confidentiality concerns and will normally require some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully, such as fraud or wilful non-disclosure.

The motion judge erred by rejecting the application outright on the basis that the applicant was not an accused.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for reconsideration, while access to recordings was held to be premature at this stage.

The individual appellant, a 50 percent shareholder in the corporate appellant autobody shop, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the respondents.

The individual appellant could no longer perform heavy physical labour, causing the corporate appellant to hire replacement labour and suffer a loss of profits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the corporate appellant could not recover its pure economic loss, as it was a contractual relational economic loss that lacked sufficient proximity and foreseeability.

However, the Court restored the trial judge's award of $290,000 to the individual appellant for loss of earning capacity, finding no palpable and overriding error to justify the Court of Appeal's interference.

The respondent logging company obtained an interim injunction prohibiting named defendants and 'John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown' from blocking roads to its logging operations.

The appellants, environmental protesters, appealed the order, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to grant injunctions against non-parties or the general public in private civil litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts of inherent jurisdiction have the power to make orders binding on non-parties to protect private rights from mass obstruction.

Non-parties who violate such orders with notice may be found guilty of contempt of court.

The appellant, an elected member of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, was convicted of an illegal practice under the Elections Act for inducing a minor to vote.

Consequently, he was expelled from the legislature and disqualified from seeking electoral office for five years pursuant to s. 119(c) of the Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of these provisions under ss. 3 and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the disqualification infringed the right to be qualified for membership in a legislative assembly under s. 3, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

The Court also found no violation of s. 12.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged Ontario's education development charge regime, which required payments tied to new development to fund growth-related school capital costs.

The Court held that the regime was constitutionally valid and dismissed the appeal.

In the leading reasons, the charges were characterized as indirect taxes but upheld as ancillary to a comprehensive provincial land-use planning and regulatory scheme under ss. 92(9), (13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867; concurring reasons would have upheld them instead as direct land taxes under s. 92(2).

The Court further held that the scheme did not prejudicially affect denominational school rights under s. 93(1), and that legislation falling within s. 93 was immune from Charter scrutiny.

In a family law appeal arising from separation under a regime of separation of property, the court considered competing claims for compensatory allowance where one spouse had provided extensive unpaid administrative and domestic services to support the other spouse's business and properties had been placed in the contributing spouse's name.

The court reaffirmed that compensatory allowance analysis must be overall, flexible, and generous, and that courts must assess enrichment, impoverishment, causal link, proportion, and absence of justification in the context of the whole marriage.

A transfer of property between spouses bars a compensatory allowance claim only where the evidence shows an intention to benefit the receiving spouse, not merely a formal transfer.

The Court held that the appellate court improperly treated a foreign ownership judgment as new evidence discharging the award and improperly interfered with the trial judge's discretionary global assessment.

The trial judgment awarding the appellant a compensatory allowance and rejecting the respondent's claim was restored.

The appellants were convicted of attempting to sell herring spawn on kelp without the required licence and argued that the prohibition infringed an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The majority held that the conduct amounted to an attempt to sell and that the Heiltsuk had established an aboriginal right to trade herring spawn on kelp on a commercial basis, grounded in pre-contact practices integral to their distinctive culture.

The majority further held that the right had not been extinguished and that the regulatory scheme prima facie infringed it.

However, the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the infringement was justified, so a new trial was ordered on guilt or innocence and on justification.

A dissent would have found either no applicable aboriginal right in the circumstances or that any such right had been extinguished.

The appellant, a food processing company, was convicted of purchasing and selling salmon caught by members of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht bands under Indian food fish licences, contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

The appellant argued that the regulations infringed the aboriginal rights of the bands to sell fish, protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the exchange of fish for money or other goods was not an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht prior to contact with Europeans.

Therefore, no aboriginal right to sell fish was established, and the regulations were validly applied.

The appellant challenged a conviction for selling salmon caught under an Indian food fish licence, arguing that the prohibition on sale infringed an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The majority held that aboriginal rights are identified by asking whether the claimed activity is an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the specific aboriginal group prior to contact with Europeans.

Applying that framework, the Court held that exchange of fish for money or other goods was incidental rather than integral to the Sto:lo’s distinctive culture and therefore not constitutionally protected.

The appeal was dismissed, with important dissents proposing broader approaches grounded in livelihood, continuity, and historical use of resources.

The accused was convicted of narcotics offences based on the viva voce evidence of a co-accused who had been arrested during an illegal search of a marijuana-growing operation.

The co-accused had pleaded guilty and volunteered to testify.

The Court of Appeal excluded the testimony under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's decision to testify was too remote.

The Court distinguished between the discovery of inanimate objects and live witness testimony, noting that the witness's voluntary decision to cooperate severed the temporal and causal links to the Charter breach.