La Forest

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans authorized the issuance of offshore lobster licences to the appellant but later revoked the authorization before the licences were issued, citing government policy and lobbying by inshore fishermen.

The appellant sued the Crown in negligence for economic loss incurred in preparing its vessels.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 7 of the Fisheries Act, the Minister's power to authorize the issuance of a licence is a continuing power, allowing revocation at any time prior to actual issuance.

Consequently, the Minister acted within his statutory authority and was not liable in negligence.

The appellant land developer suffered financial losses due to a two-year delay by the respondent transit authority in determining the precise location and acreage required for a new transit station on the appellant's land.

The municipality withheld development approvals during this period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the damages resulting from the delay were the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation and were compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act is a remedial statute that must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had ordered the stay due to a 20-month delay between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest, finding a breach of the right to be informed of the specific offence without unreasonable delay under section 11(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no proof of prejudice to the accused.

In an addendum, the Chief Justice noted that an infringement of section 11(a) could potentially be established based on economic prejudice, rather than solely on prejudice to the right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed a stay of proceedings order rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal proprio motu, which set aside his conviction for armed robbery but deprived him of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence could not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Cumming J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the trial judge's order staying the court action in favour of arbitration.

The appellant was awarded costs in both courts.

The accused was charged with robbing a convenience store.

The only evidence identifying the accused as the robber was a security camera videotape, as the store clerk could not positively identify him.

The trial judge convicted the accused based solely on her own comparison of the videotape and the accused in court.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, finding it unreasonable without corroborating testimony.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a trier of fact may identify an accused based solely on clear and convincing videotape evidence without the need for corroborating witness testimony.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

At trial, the Crown did not call the child to testify, but instead introduced out-of-court statements made by the child to others.

The trial judge admitted the statements without conducting a formal inquiry into whether it was necessary to rely on hearsay rather than calling the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in failing to make a formal finding of necessity, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The uncontradicted expert evidence established that the child would have been traumatized by testifying and lacked testimonial competence, meaning a trial judge would inevitably have found the necessity requirement met.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, airline pilots forced to retire at age 60, filed complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging age discrimination.

The Commission dismissed the complaints because the Canadian Human Rights Act provided an exception for mandatory retirement at the normal industry age.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the exception violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that neither the Commission nor a tribunal appointed by it has the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its enabling statute, as Parliament did not grant them the power to determine general questions of law.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision finding it liable for negligence in failing to enforce a building by-law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the municipality owed no duty of care to the respondent in the circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal's judgment was reversed and the trial judgment dismissing the action was restored.

The appellant applied for an order pursuant to s. 70 of the Supreme Court Act to reverse a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Manitoba that upheld his sentence for manslaughter.

The original sentence included life imprisonment with a minimum ten-year period of incarceration before parole eligibility under s. 741.2 of the Criminal Code.

Upon reading the materials and noting the respondent's consent, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and varied the sentence by deleting the ten-year minimum incarceration requirement.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that late Crown disclosure prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and that the trial judge erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement for its substantive use under a K.G.B. application.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the late disclosure.

The Court also held that a witness's failure of memory, which prevents complete cross-examination, is a factor going to the weight of the prior inconsistent statement rather than its admissibility.

The appellant employer provided an income replacement insurance policy that terminated benefits for mentally disabled employees after two years unless they were institutionalized, while physically disabled employees received benefits until age 65 regardless of institutionalization.

The respondent, who became mentally disabled, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurance plan discriminated on the basis of mental disability contrary to s. 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, as the true purpose of the plan was to insure against the income-related consequences of disability generally, making the distinction between mental and physical disabilities discriminatory.

The respondents were issued speeding tickets under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act.

They failed to pay the fines and did not appear in court, resulting in convictions without a trial pursuant to s. 16 of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 16, arguing it infringed their right to be presumed innocent and to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 16 does not infringe s. 11(d), as the regulatory scheme provides sufficient safeguards and notice such that an accused's failure to act constitutes a valid waiver of their s. 11(d) rights.

The appellant broadcaster challenged an order made by a trial judge under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code excluding the public and media from part of the sentencing proceedings of an accused who pleaded guilty to sexual offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 486(1) infringes the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect the proper administration of justice.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion to exclude the public in this specific case, as there was insufficient evidence to support a concern for undue hardship to the victims or the accused.

The appeal was allowed and the exclusion order was quashed.

The appellant suffered back injuries in two successive motor vehicle accidents.

While recovering, he experienced a disc herniation during a mild stretching exercise.

The trial judge found the accidents contributed 25% to the herniation and awarded 25% of the global damages, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that apportionment between tortious and non-tortious causes is contrary to tort principles.

Because the accidents materially contributed to the indivisible injury, the defendants were fully liable for the entire loss under the thin skull rule.

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and being disguised with intent to commit an indictable offence, challenging the eyewitness identification.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal that the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of welfare fraud after selling real property without informing social assistance authorities.

The trial judge found her conduct did not create a risk of deprivation exceeding $1,000 and that she honestly believed her circumstances had not changed to affect her entitlement, negating mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding the trial judge made no error of law.

The appellant, a Mohawk, was charged with fishing without a licence in Lake St. Francis, contrary to the Quebec Fishery Regulations.

He argued that he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish for food protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title, and that the appellant had demonstrated an aboriginal right to fish for food in the area.

The Court found that this right had not been extinguished, and that the regulatory scheme, which subjected the right to unstructured ministerial discretion, constituted an unjustified infringement.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

During deliberations, the jury announced an impasse.

The trial judge exhorted the jury to reach a verdict, referencing the public expense of a new trial, the inconvenience to participants, and suggesting the minority reconsider the majority's views.

The jury returned a guilty verdict 15 minutes later.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the exhortation introduced irrelevant, coercive factors that interfered with the jury's right to deliberate freely.