Michael Code

The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit.

At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation.

The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from two closely similar bank robberies, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his treatment of identification, forensic hair evidence, and similar fact reasoning.

The court held that the eyewitness identification evidence on the Burlington robbery, together with the appellant's association with the getaway vehicle and limited after-the-fact conduct evidence, supported the verdict.

Although the trial judge used an anchoring rather than pooling approach to similar fact evidence, the court found no prejudice because the allegedly exculpatory Hamilton evidence did not materially undermine identification of the appellant.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle and assault with a weapon arising from a confrontation between police and occupiers of a provincial park claimed under an aboriginal treaty right.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning intent and held the reasons must be read as a whole under the governing appellate framework.

The court further held that the defence of property under s. 41(1) of the Criminal Code was unavailable because the occupiers were not in peaceable possession and the force used by driving at police officers was neither necessary nor proportionate.

The defence of justification under ss. 27 and 30 also failed because the trial judge did not accept that the appellant acted to rescue the arrested band member.

Conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged arson-related convictions arising from a house fire prosecuted entirely on circumstantial evidence, arguing among other things that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using the Hodge's case formulation to test the defence explanation for the fire.

The court held that the trial judge improperly required the accused to provide a reasonable explanation based on proven facts, rather than asking whether the Crown had proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

That error required the convictions to be set aside and a new trial ordered.

Fresh evidence relating to the trial judge's earlier involvement in family proceedings was admitted but found insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused appealed convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a parking lot incident where he claimed he was fleeing an assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by permitting Crown cross-examination on the accused's failure, upon surrender and arrest, to complain to police about the alleged assault.

The court found that using the accused's silence to attack credibility and support an inference of recent fabrication violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The jury's questions and the contradictory instructions on silence demonstrated the significance of the error.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.