La Forest

The employer changed the work schedule of its employees, resulting in the loss of Sunday rest days.

The union filed a grievance and sought an interim injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court to postpone the implementation of the new schedule pending arbitration.

The employer appealed the court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts retain a residual discretionary power to grant interlocutory relief where no adequate alternative remedy exists under the statutory labour scheme, even in the absence of a cause of action claiming final relief.

The respondent purchaser agreed to buy a house from the appellant vendor.

The vendor reneged on the agreement before the closing date.

The purchaser sued for specific performance or damages in lieu thereof.

At trial, the purchaser elected to take damages.

The property value had increased significantly by the time of trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that damages in lieu of specific performance should be assessed as of the date of trial, not the date of breach, to provide a true substitute for specific performance.

The Court also held that the increase in value of the purchaser's own unsold residence should not be deducted from the damages award.

The appellant alleged workplace and sexual harassment, obtained workers’ compensation benefits for an employment injury under Quebec’s no-fault compensation regime, and also sought compensatory and exemplary damages under the Quebec Charter.

The majority held that the remedy in s. 49 of the Charter is a civil liability remedy, including the exemplary damages component, and that s. 438 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases bars such actions against the employer once the same events have been compensated as an employment injury.

The Court emphasized that the statutory compensation scheme is a final compromise replacing fault-based civil recourse with fixed-sum benefits and employer immunity.

The appeal and the respondents’ cross-appeal were dismissed, with La Forest and L'Heureux‑Dubé JJ. dissenting in part on the availability of exemplary damages and arbitral forum.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, arguing that the police search of his car violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant had freely and voluntarily consented to the search before he was detained.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings ordered after a lengthy pre-trial delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, finding that a stay could not be ordered absent proof of impairment of the ability to present a full answer and defence or proof of oppressive or vexatious behaviour by the Crown or police.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada to quash his guilty pleas, arguing they resulted from the undue influence of his counsel.

The Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Bisson J.A. in the Court of Appeal, and quashed the guilty pleas.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his wife while severely intoxicated.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the effect of drunkenness on his ability to form the requisite intent for murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly link the common sense inference that a person intends the natural consequences of their actions to the evidence of the appellant's intoxication.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, which were subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

After exhausting his appeals, the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his continued detention violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus cannot be used as a collateral attack on a conviction by a superior court once the accused is no longer in the judicial system, and that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

The appellant, charged with murder in Canada, fled to the United States where he was arrested by American police on an extradition warrant.

The American police obtained a statement from the appellant without advising him of his right to counsel forthwith, as required by the Charter, though they complied with American law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to foreign police gathering evidence in their own jurisdiction.

Consequently, there was no Charter breach, and the evidence could not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a 22-year-old teacher, was charged with sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old student during the summer holidays.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding he was not in a position of trust or authority and had not exploited his position, which the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and entered a conviction, holding that actual exploitation is not a constituent element of the offence.

The Court further held that teachers are inherently in a position of trust and authority towards their students, and absent evidence raising a reasonable doubt, the accused occupied such a position.

The appellant was acquitted of robbery at trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on complicity as an alternative basis for guilt under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on complicity warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by relying on the contents of the complainant's diary as corroboration of her testimony, even though the diary was not introduced into evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's application of the proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge and the Tax Court.

The Court held that the property in question retained its character as inventory in the hands of the appellant company after being acquired from a subsidiary.

The parties divorced in Maryland, with the father granted custody and the mother granted access rights.

The father moved to Quebec with the child while the mother's motions to modify access were pending in Maryland.

The mother obtained an ex parte interim custody order in Maryland and sought the child's return under the Quebec Act implementing the Hague Convention.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act did not apply because the father had custody at the time of removal and no custody modification proceedings were pending.

However, the Court affirmed the order returning the child to the United States, finding that the Quebec Superior Court had jurisdiction under civil law and correctly determined that returning the child was in her best interests.

The employer posted a position for a personal care attendant but rejected a female union member's application because it had determined a male was needed for the intimate personal care of elderly male residents.

The collective agreement contained a no-discrimination clause without a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception, whereas the provincial Human Rights Code included a BFOQ provision.

An arbitration board held that the employer could rely on the BFOQ provision, finding that the parties could not contract out of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while parties can contract out of human rights legislation to provide greater protection, the arbitration board's interpretation that the collective agreement should be read in harmony with the Code's BFOQ provision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a variation application arising from a custodial parent's proposed relocation of the child to Australia.

The Court held that the party seeking variation must first establish a material change in the circumstances affecting the child, after which the court must conduct a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests without any legal presumption favouring the custodial parent, while giving that parent's views serious respect.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded that the relocation materially affected the child because it would significantly curtail frequent and meaningful contact with the access parent, but the child's best interests still favoured remaining in the custodial parent's care.

The appeal was allowed in part only to vary access so it could be exercised in Canada rather than Australia, with no costs.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and manslaughter.

The appeal concerned whether the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on self-defence and defence of another following a verbal threat made to an inmate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants, members of the Squamish Indian Band, were charged with contravening the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations for net fishing on the Squamish River adjacent to their reserve.

They argued that a band by-law, passed pursuant to s. 81(1)(o) of the Indian Act, authorized their fishing and superseded the federal regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the fishery was not part of the reserve, the ad medium filum aquae presumption did not apply to navigable rivers to extend the reserve boundary, and the phrase 'on the reserve' in the Indian Act meant strictly within the reserve boundaries.

Consequently, the band by-law did not apply extra-territorially to the river, and the convictions were upheld.

The Minister of National Revenue sought to garnish funds owed to tax debtors who had failed to remit GST and employee source deductions.

The tax debtors had previously granted general assignments of book debts (GABDs) to lending institutions.

The lending institutions argued that the GABDs were absolute assignments, meaning the tax debtors no longer had an interest in the property, and thus the Minister could not garnish the funds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a GABD is a security interest, not an absolute assignment, because the debtor retains an equity of redemption.

Therefore, the clear wording of the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act gives the Minister priority over the lending institutions' security interests.

The appellant, a Wet'suwet'en Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

He argued that the licensing scheme infringed his aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that a band by-law applied to the river.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the river was not part of the reserve, so the band by-law did not apply.

While the mere requirement of a licence did not infringe the appellant's aboriginal rights, the mandatory conditions attached to the licence did constitute a prima facie infringement that the government failed to justify.

Because the unconstitutional conditions were integral to the licence and not severable, the licence itself was invalid.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant's acquittal was restored.